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The Vietnamese communists have always defined their revolution in national terms, 
telling the story of how the communists led the Vietnamese people to rescue and rebuild the 
nation from the plight of French colonisation and American aggression. This research 
problematises this national frame. Using post-structuralist discourse theory, it studies the 
process whereby the nation was imagined and became ‘real’ in the Vietnamese communist 
discourse and how this national imagining contributed to the legitimization of the socialist state 
in Vietnam. It argues that the Vietnamese nation is a discursive construct which legitimises the 
rule of the communist party and the socialist state in Vietnam. This argument is developed on 
three central findings. Firstly, the Vietnamese nation was constructed in the communist 
discourse in the very representation of French colonists, American interventionalists and their 
sponsored governments as enemies of the nation. Secondly, the nation was able to be imagined 
to be more real among the mass in the discursive fixing of national independence as the 
indispensable condition for the survival of the Vietnamese people, which occurred around the 
1945 August Revolution. Last, this national imagination enabled the Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VCP) and its socialist state to legalize its rule in Vietnam. Socialism and the leadership 
of the VCP are articulated as the indispensable condition to maintain national independence 
and to ensure that the national construction succeeds in Vietnam. The socialist regime, which 
includes the VCP and the socialist state, is equated with the nation in the communist discourse.  
The nation-making project of the Vietnamese communists is essentially a political 
project. It makes possible the establishment of socialism and allows the VCP to attain a 
monopolistic rule in Vietnam. It rules out other possibilities in Vietnamese politics, for 
example the possibility of having a non-communist government. It involves the destruction of 
enemies outside and inside the national self, whether they are foreign or Vietnamese, and the 
sacrifice of its own subjects to protect this national self. Moreover, the national identities of 
the Vietnamese communists and the boundaries of their national project are not objective but 
politically decided. The Vietnamese communists previously claimed to represent only the 
working class and made an enemy of other classes within the Vietnamese population. The 
boundaries of the nation used to be articulated to be close with the limits of the peasantry. This 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
‘Since World War II every successful revolution has defined itself in national terms’ 
(Anderson, 1983: 2) (italics in original). The communist-led revolution in Vietnam, which saw 
the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945, the reunification of the whole 
country under the name of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976 and the post-
independence national construction toward socialism, is one such ‘national’ revolution. The 
official communist-sponsored narrative in the country tells a story of an age-old nation torn 
apart and destroyed in the colonisation of France and the invasion of the United States. The 
communists had successfully led the Vietnamese people in the struggle to fight against foreign 
aggression for national salvation and independence and are now leading the people in the 
course of national construction. The Vietnamese Communist Party casts its image as a nation 
party which represents and exists for the interest of the whole nation. This study begins as a 
reaction to this narrative from an ex-insider who had taken this narrative for granted as a 
truthful story. 
 A few months after studying in a foreign country for the first time, as an MA student at 
the University of Birmingham, I was struck by a fellow student who stated that Ho Chi Minh 
was a dictator and the war in Vietnam, in which the United States were involved, was a civil 
war. I was shocked not only by the nature of the statement which went against my long-held 
images, which I had learnt about throughout my life in Vietnam, of Uncle Ho as the old 
respectful father of the Vietnamese nation and of a unified harmonious nation. I was also 
shocked in the very recognition that different interpretation and perspectives existed about the 
history of modern Vietnam.  
 Coming to this research, one of my initial purposes was to provide an interpretation of 
how the Vietnamese understand the recent history of their nation and view those actors, both 
domestic and international, that were involved. However, as the research went on, during which 
I familiarised myself with the general field of nationalism, the international literature on 
Vietnamese nationalism and, especially, with post-structuralism and discourse analysis, I 
became more critical and realized that there are elements of construction in all stories and 
interpretations of the nation. I no longer take the story of an age-old nation that was exploited 
in French colonialization and invaded by the United States, with which I grew up, for granted. 
This Vietnamese national narrative itself became a puzzle that needed to be investigated. The 
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principal question of this research is, therefore, ‘how is the revolution led by the communists 
in Vietnam constructed in national terms?’  
 The communist-led revolution in Vietnam is understood in this research as the entire 
lifespan of communism in Vietnam, which began in the mid-1920s when communism appeared 
until the present. This understanding is close to the official understanding of revolution in 
Vietnam, which defines the Vietnamese revolution as the period during which Vietnam has 
had the leadership of the VCP from 1930 until now (Nguyen Viet Thao, 2015). Given this long 
timescale of the revolution, I divided the principal questions into two sub-questions: (1) how 
were the communist-led struggles against the French colonization, the U.S. intervention and 
their sponsored governments constituted as the wars for national independence and unification? 
and (2) how are the VCP’s rule and adoption of socialism in post-war Vietnam constructed in 
national terms? In order to answer these research questions, I use post-structuralist discourse 
analysis to study those articulations that make up the constitution and significance of the nation 
in the Vietnamese communist discourse. 
 The debate on Vietnamese nationalism has moved beyond the traditional view that 
nationalism is historically given in Vietnam and the Vietnamese communists had been able to 
draw on the nationalist sentiment of the Vietnamese people in their call to fight against the 
French colonisation and the U.S. intervention. The new focus of the debate is to account for 
the process whereby the communists construct the national idea. Existing literature has 
dismantled ‘the national scaffolding of Vietnamese history’ (Bradley and Young, 2008: 11) 
and exposed the Vietnamese nation as ‘a modern social construct’ (Vu, 2007: 177). However, 
the bulk of the new scholarship was laid on the recent processes of writing history and forging 
a particular memory (interpretation) of the past which glory the national origins and the 
leadership of the Party in after-war Vietnam. ‘[T]he wartime period remained largely 
untouched’ by the constructivist approach (Bradley and Young, 2008: 12). This project aims 
to remedy this limitation in the existing literature on Vietnamese nationalism by exploring the 
process of national construction in the pre-unification Vietnam. It studies how the revolution 
led by the communists in Vietnam is constructed in national terms throughout the lifespan of 
Vietnamese communism, covering the colonial and war-time Vietnams and how this national 
construction contributed to the legitimation of the socialist state. Using post-structurcal 
discourse analysis, this research studies the constitution of meanings and significance of the 
nation in the discursive practices of the Vietnamese communists throughout the history of 
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communism in Vietnam. Before the nation can be constituted for the mass to identify with, it 
has to be produced, first and foremost, for the Vietnamese communists. The Vietnamese 
communists are the first subjects of the identities, including the national identity, constituted 
in the communist discourse.  
This research contributes a novel interpretation from a post-structural discursive 
approach to the existing literature on the the constructed nature of the Vietnamese nation and 
its role in legtimiting the socialist state. This is the first study that apply post-structuralist 
discourse theory in the case of Vietnamese nationalism. It is also a first historical analysis of 
the construction of the nation in the Vietnamese communist discourse throughout the lifespan 
of communism in Vietnam. 
The theoretical framework of this research is premised on a theory of post-structuralist 
discourse, which is drawn heavily from the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe and the 
genealogical approach of Michel Foucault, both of which inform my understanding of 
discourse and the deployment of discourse analysis. Discourse is conceptualized as ‘the 
systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects’ (Howard and 
Yannis, 2000: 3-4) and ‘a particular way of talking about and understanding the world’ 
(Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 1). It is also approached here as ‘the means to organize a society 
into a structured totality, in order to give it stability and meaning’ (Sutherland, 2005: 191). 
From a post-structural discoursive approach, everything is assumed to be constituted as an 
object of discourse. This theoretical framework allows a novel conceptualisation of Vietnamese 
communism as a discourse and of the Vietnamese nationa as one of the key constructs in this 
discourse. With this hypothesis, I set out to study those articulations that constitute the seeming 
reality and significance of the nation in the Vietnamese communist discourse (or the discourse 
of Vietnamese communists) with the aim to answer the research questions defined above.  
The primary data I used to study the Vietnamese communist discourse are the 
documents written by the Vietnamese communists throughout the history of the VCP since the 
mid-1920s until the present time. These documents are now available online in the e-newspaper 
of the VCP at the link http://www.dangcongsan.vn/tu-lieu-van-kien/van-kien-dang.html. In 
this vast archive, important documents of key events and meetings of the Communist Party are 
selected and put into a dataset. Methods of data analysis are chosen from various existing works 
and research programs of post-structuralism and discourse analysis.  
7 
 
By the Vietnamese Communists, I mean the members of the Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VCP) (Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, 1976 to present) and its preceding organizations: the 
Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League (Việt Nam Thanh Niên Cách Mệnh Đồng Chí Hội, 
1925 – 1930), the Vietnamese Communist Party (Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, 1930), the 
Indochinese Communist Party (Đảng Cộng sản Đông Dương, 1930 – 1945), the Vietnamese 
Labour Party (Đảng Lao Động Việt Nam, 1951 – 1975). Other people or organizations in 
Vietnam in the past and in the present may also associate themselves with Communism without 
being members of the VCP. However, within the scope of this research, Vietnamese 
Communists only refer to members of the official VCP, the only ruling and only legal political 
party in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Although subsuming these Vietnamese 
Communists into a group, I do not see this group as a unanimous, homogenous collective of 
actors sharing the same interests and intentions. My concern is not about these people as 
rational actors nor their agency, but about their discourse, which is the sense of reality and the 
world of meanings constructed in their signifying practices. The Vietnamese Communists are  
not treated as the originators of these meanings but as part of the communist discourse itself. 
In participating in this discourse, they are at the same time being constituted as social actors, 
as subjects of the communist discourse and as the Vietnamese communists.   
This research is as a historical study of the Vietnamese communist discourse in order 
to trace out continuities and changes in discursive practices. The communist discourse 
appeared around the time when communism entered Vietnamese politics in the mid-1920s 
when the country was in an acute identity crisis after nearly sevem decades of French 
colonization. The Vietnamese communist discourse is rooted itself not only in the international 
ideology of communism but also in the specific cultural and political context of colonial 
Vietnam. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how the Vietnamese identified themselves and 
the world in their encounter with the modern West under French colonialization before 
communism appeared in Vietnam in order to bring out such a context. This research goes 
beyond the timescale of the history of communism in Vietnam and covers a longer period 
starting from the beginning of French colonisation in 1858 up to the present. 
There are two important caveats about the temporal dimension of this research. First of 
all, although I structure these chapters in a sequential time order, there are no clear-cut timeline 
between them and the order here does not follow the orthodox timeline of Vietnam’s history. 
This is because these chapters are discourse-driven and the changes in discourse do not 
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necessarily occur at the same time as key historical turning points. Second, although this 
research covers the whole length of the history of modern Vietnam, which start since the 
beginning of French colonisation in 1858 up until the present time, it is not a study on 
Vietnam’s history. It does not aim to recover facts about the past or to show what had ‘really’ 
happened. It is a ‘history of the present’ to show that the present is the result of contingent 
processes, not the result of a liner progressive development.  
There is also a caveat about the Vietnameseness of the Vietnamese nation and 
Vietnamese people discussed in this research. The people living in the country are 
heterogeneous and multi-ethnic (Taylor, 2013; Goscha, 2016). Some ethnic groups may not 
want to identify themselves as Vietnamese or the state and nation making process of the Kinh 
majority may not resonate with other ethnic groups. As Taylor (2013: 625) put it, ‘the search 
for the ‘real’ Vietnam or for the ‘cultural core’ of being Vietnamese is bound to fail’ (emphasis 
in original). After all, the making of the Vietnamese people and of the Vietnamese nation has 
always been dominated by the Kinh ethnic group, which makes up the majority of the country’s 
population. This research is about the nation-making and the state-making within the discourse 
of the Vietnamese communists, a sub-group within the Kinh ethnic group. Therefore, although 
this research uses the word ‘the Vietnamese’, it may literally be true to only a segment of the 
population living in Vietnam. It can be the Kinh ethnic majority or only a part of this ethnic 
group.  
The use of the seemingly homogenous words such as the Vietnamese or the Vietnamese 
nation is unavoidable as this research studies what it means to be Vietnamese and the ethnical 
boundaries of the Vietnamese nation within the communist discourse. However, it is still able 
to engage critically with the idea of the one Vietnamese people and the one Vietnamese nation. 
Other scholars have done this by revealing different national narratives, displaying the plurality 
of the people living in the country or redeeming non-national actors and movements from 
obscurity. In these cases, the Vietnamese nation is attacked from the outside, from the 
perspective of those people living outside the nation-making project of the communists. This 
research attacks the Vietnamese nation sponsored by the communists from inside their world 
of meanings and subjectivities by revealing the discursive constructions and the shifts in their 
process of constituting the nation.  
The Vietnamese communists have always defined their revolution in national terms, 
telling the story of how the communists led the Vietnamese people to rescue and rebuild the 
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nation from the plight of French colonisation and American aggression. This research 
problematises this national frame. Using post-structuralist discourse theory, it studies the 
process whereby the nation was imagined and became ‘real’ in the Vietnamese communist 
discourse and how this national imagining contributed to the legitimization of the socialist state 
in Vietnam. It argues that the Vietnamese nation is a discursive construct in the communist 
discourse, which enables the communist party and the socialist to attain legitimacy in the 
country. This argument is developed with three main findings of the research. Firstly, the 
Vietnamese nation was constructed in the communist discourse in the very representation of 
French colonists, American interventionalists and their sponsored governments as enemies of 
the nation. Secondly, the nation was able to be imagined to be more real among the mass in the 
discursive fixing of national independence as the indispensable condition for the survival of 
the Vietnamese people, which occurred around the 1945 August Revolution. Last, this national 
imagination enabled the VCP and its socialist state to legalize its rule in Vietnam. Socialism 
and the leadership of the VCP are articulated as the indispensable condition to maintain 
national independence and to ensure that the national construction succeeds in Vietnam. The 
socialist regime, which includes the VCP and the socialist state, is equated with the nation in 
the communist discourse.  
The Vietnamese communist discourse is essentially a political project. It makes 
possible the establishment of socialism and allows the VCP to attain a monopolistic rule in 
Vietnam. It rules out other possibilities in Vietnamese politics, for example the possibility of 
having a non-communist government. It involves the destruction of enemies outside and inside 
the national self, whether they are foreign or Vietnamese, and the sacrifice of its own subjects 
to protect this national self. Moreover, the national identities of the Vietnamese communists 
and the boundaries of their national project are not objective but politically decided. The 
Vietnamese communists previously claimed to represent only the working class and made an 
enemy of other classes within the Vietnamese population, such as the landlords. The 
boundaries of the nation used to be articulated to be close with the limits of the peasantry. This 
is in stark contrast with the VCP’s present claim to represent the whole nation.  
This research exposes not only the constructed nature of the Vietnamese nation but also 
the embedded power relationship between statehood and nationhood in the country.  The 
central arguments of the research are that the Vietnamese nation is a construct in the 
Communist discourse and this national construction has enabled the socialist state to pursuit 
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its legitimacy. Throughout the thesis, I aim to study the process whereby the nation was 
imagined and became real in the Vietnamese communist discourse and how this national 
imagining contributed to the legitimation of the socialist state. While chapter 4 and chapter 5  
contextualise the social and political ferment of colonial Vietnam before communism entered 
the country and condition the communist-sponsored national narrative in the multi-ethnic and 
diverse social milieu of the population living inside Vietnam’s borders, the four empirical 
chapters from chapter 6 to chapter 9 show the crucial points or moments in the process whereby 
the nation was taken for granted and whereby the state is inserted into this national imaginary. 
It brings one established argument in the existing post-structuralist literature on nationalism 
that ‘nationalism is a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy’ (Campbell, 1992: 11) in 
the Vietnamese case. 
The whole thesis is made up of 10 chapters, including the Introduction and Conclusion 
as the first and the last chapters.  
The second chapter, ‘Literature Review’, situates the research in the broad scholarship 
of nationalism and in the area literature of Vietnamese nationalism. It introduces the core 
debate and notable works in the general field of nationalism before reviewing the existing 
works on Vietnamese nationalism, setting the academic stage for this research. This research 
is an add-on to the existing literature which exposes the constructed nature of the Vietnamese 
nation. Its originality is in the methodological approach. It is the first research which applies 
post-structuralist discourse theory to study Vietnamese nationalism. By analysing the 
Vietnamese communist discourse through documents in the VCP’s archive, this research 
studies how the communist-led revolution was constructed in the national frame. It examines 
the processes whereby the Vietnamese nation has come into being in the language of the 
Vietnamese Communists and how this construction of the nation contributed to the 
legitimization of the socialist state in the country.  
The third chapter, ‘Theoretical Framework and Methodology’, elaborates on the theory 
of discourse I deploy, which is drawn from post-structuralist discourse analysis, especially the 
discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe and the genealogical approach of Foucault. This 
understanding of discourse enables me to delimit the research (within the Vietnamese 
communist discourse), to define my objects of investigation (the nation as an empty signifier, 
nationalism as articulations that attach meanings onto the nation) and to locate my data (the 
writings of the Vietnamese communists, which are treated as a discourse). Together with other 
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methods that are available from existing works of post-structuralist discourse analysis, the 
theoretical concepts of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory are also used here as 
methodological tools to read and interpret the data.  
The fourth chapter, French Colonialization and the Identity Crisis in Vietnam, 
contextualizes Vietnam around the time French colonisation began and introduces the identity 
crisis induced by colonialism among the Vietnamese elite. It sets out the scene of a multi-
ethnic, fractious, disunited and young Vietnam or even of multiple Vietnams and the 
heterogeneity of the people living here. The making of the Vietnamese nation was shown to be 
dominated by the Kinh ethnic majority and this nation-making project may have less or no 
resonance with many other ethnic groups. In the recognition of the multiple ways of being 
Vietnamese and the multiple experiences that French colonisation might have generated on 
different segments or ethnic groups in Vietnam, this chapter capitalizes on the identity crisis 
among the ethnic Kinh majority or the elite within the Kinh majority to be more exact because 
their discourse enabled the later emergence of the communist discourse which is the focus of 
research in this study. According to discourse theory, the identity crisis, which in this case 
occurred among the elite Vietnamese Kinh, who were deeply governed by Confucianism, 
entails structural dislocations which reveal the contingency of the existing elite discourse and 
gives rise to new myths to re-structure the society in crisis.  
The fifth chapter, Numerous Projects of Identification with the Nation, follows up the 
identity crisis among the elite within the Kinh majority discussed in the previous chapter. It 
accounts for the different ways that the Vietnamese elite were trying to organise their society, 
to conceptualize their selves and the collective identity that they belonged to as the old 
discourse governed by Confucianism was disintegrated under colonisation. As in Huynh’s 
words, Vietnam in the 1920s was ‘the testing ground for all manners of ideas and movements’ 
(Huynh, 1982: 36). This is the time when it ‘becomes clear that different actors are trying to 
promote different ways of organising society’ as ‘struggle takes places between particular 
discourses’ (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2012: 36). Although nuances existed, various 
identification projects of the Vietnamese elite in this time responded to the societal dislocations 
with the myth of a Vietnamese nation. However, the nature of that nation remained in dispute. 
Should it be a nation under the French tutelage or free from French colonial yoke? Should the 
struggle involve the means of violence or peaceful reforms? While the projects of the scholar 
gentry and the northern literati remained an elitist top-down approach, the southern bourgeoisie 
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and the new radical intellectuals contemplated the national problem from their individual 
interest and personal dilemma. Revolutionaries made the first attempt to involve the mass in 
the nation-making project. 
Chapter sixth, The Vietnamese Communist Discourse and the Dominance of the 
Socialist Myth, explores the communist discourse in its early period from the mid-1920s to the 
early 1940s. In the revolutionary upsurge of Vietnamese politics towards the end of the 1920s, 
the communist discourse appeared alongside the proliferation of communist organisations, 
bringing a new pool of linguistic resources and meanings into the discursive space in Vietnam. 
The Vietnamese communist discourse was essentially a project of structuring the dislocated 
society in a unity. At the centre of the communist discourse was the nodal point ‘revolution’, 
which was articulated as the change from the bad to the good. The Vietnamese communists’ 
political project was presented as a revolution which was not only a struggle for national 
independence but also for social betterment. The two myths were introduced for the 
Vietnamese to read their current situation under the colonial rule. The national myth, which 
articulated a Vietnamese nation being exploited by the French colonists to the verge of 
extinction, was activated in the same tradition of previous anti-colonial generations. The 
socialist myth introduced the problem of class exploitation and invited people to become 
subject in the building of socialism, which was articulated as the end of class exploitation. 
While the national myth defined only the French as the enemies, the socialist myth added the 
Vietnamese feudal court, landlords and native bourgeoisie onto the list of others to be excluded. 
The socialist myth conceptualized the nation as composed of various classes, whose interests 
were different from those of the nation. The Vietnamese communists claimed to represent the 
interest of the working class. Although it constructed antagonism among different groups 
within the Vietnamese, the socialist myth brought the constructed social antagonism against 
the French closer to the Vietnamese mass. The myth of the nation was brought closer to the 
Vietnamese mass through the articulation of the French as class enemy in the socialist myth. 
Within the Vietnamese communist discourse, the French became a double enemy of the 
Vietnamese peasants and workers: a national enemy and a class enemy. The Vietnamese mass 
were discursively taken into the political realm in the communist discourse. The socialist myth 




Chapter seventh, The Nation: From Myth to Social Imaginary, accounts for the 
transformation of the national myth into a social imaginary in the communist discourse from 
the early 1940s when Japan marched into Indochina, through the August Revolution, until the 
early 1950s when the war against the French’s return was deepening. During this time, the 
national myth became increasingly dominant while the socialist myth was silenced. The ICP 
created an anti-colonial united front for national independence entitled the League for the 
Independence of Vietnam (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội - Viet Minh) in the 8th plenum 
of the Party’s central committee in 1941 and operated under its auspice1. The bourgeoisie, the 
landlords and other political groups, which used to be seen as enemies in the early 1930s, were 
now redrawn into the collective revolutionary identity constructed in the communist-led 
revolution. The proletariat was told to leave aside their class interest for the benefit of the 
nation. The nation and the proletariat were still seen as separate entities with different interest 
that might conflict with each other.  
A series of dislocations occurring in Vietnam under the Japanese occupation, especially 
the devastating hunger in 1944 and 1945, rendered the discursive equalisation between the 
struggle for national independence and the struggle to survive in the national myth more 
natural. After the August revolution when Ho Chi Minh declared independence of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on September 2nd 1945, the nation had already figured 
largely as a social imaginary in Vietnam’s discursive space. An independent nation free from 
foreign rule had been taken for granted as the condition of possibility for the survival of the 
Vietnamese people. The young national imaginary grew more viable as the French returned. 
The presence of the French inside the country provided the continuation of the other against 
which the national imaginary was consolidated.  
Chapter eighth, The Hegemony of the Communist Discourse, studies the process when 
the communist discourse attained its hegemony by grafting socialist elements to the national 
imaginary, which occurred from the early 1950s when the installation of socialism was 
officially announced in Vietnam, starting with a radical land reform. With the national 
imaginary being constituted and consolidated in the war against the French return, the nation 
had become a nodal point in the communist discourse. An independent Vietnam free from 
foreign rule had been taken for granted as the condition of possibility for the survival of the 
                                                        
1 In this study, Viet Minh and their writings are seen as part of the communist discourse.  
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Vietnamese people. Having had the national imaginary in place, the communist discourse 
started its hegemonic project to build a socialist society in the DRV by linking socialist 
elements to the nodal point ‘nation’. A system of hegemonic relations, ‘by which a certain 
particularity assumes the representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: xiii), were established between the party, the state, the peasants and 
the nation. While classes’ interests were differentiated with the nation’s in previous periods, 
the interests of peasants were now seen as congruent with those of the nation and, hence, the 
land issue was equalized with national independence. The communists also claimed to 
represent the whole nation, not only the working class as before. The communist party 
addressed itself as the party of the nation. With these new articulations, the socialist myth was 
being grafted into the national imaginary and became a social imaginary itself. With both the 
national imaginary and socialist imaginary in place, the Vietnamese communist discourse had 
achieved its hegemony. A Vietnamese nation had now been formed with a name, other national 
symbols like flags and anthems and a government for its people to be identified with. That 
means it had successful constructed a ‘discursive formation that provides a surface of 
inscription of a wider range of demands, views and attitudes’ (Torfing, 1999: 101). This chapter 
studies this process where the socialist elements were grafted into the national imaginary, 
enabling the communist discourse to attain hegemony, which occurred since the early 1950s 
and during the communist-led war against the American intervention and the Southern 
government.  
Chapter ninth, The Continued Hegemony of the Communist Discourse, examines the 
Vietnamese communist discourse from the communists’ victory against the Southern 
government in 1975, through the Reform Congress and up to the present. It argues that the 
hegemony of the communist discourse, which was attained during the communist-led war 
against the U.S. intervention and the southern government, has been maintained since 
reunification. The significance of national independence and the existence nation have been 
taken for granted as common sense. The symbiosis between nationalism and socialism, which 
was established in the war time, is becoming even more stronger. Socialism and the leadership 
of the VCP are articulated as the only condition to maintain national independence and to 
ensure that the national construction succeeds. The socialist regime and the nation are fused 
with each other in the language of national security and national defence, which made possible 
the protection of the party and the socialist state in the name of the nation. In return, the 
language and application of the law on national security and national defence contributes to 
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further blurring the distinction between the socialist regime and the nation. Although the 
economy is now geared towards a capitalist market mechanism, socialism never ceases to 
function as a social imaginary in the Vietnamese communist discourse. Since unification, the 
knowledge claim about the ‘scientific’ Marxist-Leninist law on human development has been 
increasingly circulated in the communist discourse, consolidating the war-time socialist 
imaginary, which justified the adoption of socialism and legitimated the continuation of 
socialism in Vietnam. The continued hegemony of the communist discourse has enabled the 
VCP to maintain its hegemonic position in Vietnam despite economic reforms and the collapse 
of the socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  
In what follows in the rest of this thesis, I provide how I arrive at the arguments about 


















 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces briefly the general literature on nationalism and reviews the 
existing literature on Vietnamese nationalism where this research is situated in. In the first 
section, I will introduce core debates and main approaches in the broad field of nations and 
nationalism. The bulk of this section is dedicated to constructivist and post-structualist 
approaches because they inform the theoretical foundation of this research. The second section 
presents the official historical narrative in Vietnam, which portrays an ancient nation with a 
continuous history and a homogenous people possessing passionate patriotism. The 
communist-led wars against the French and the United States were cast as just another episode 
in Vietnam’s timeless tradition of rising up against foreign aggression. Proceeding to socialism 
under the sole leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party is presented as a necessary, 
inevitable and natural path of the Vietnamese nation. While this master historical narrative of 
Vietnam has stayed almost the same, the international literature on the Vietnamese nation has 
undergone significant transformations. The third section reviews the international literature on 
Vietnamese nationalism, which consists of four main stages with distinctive approaches and 
arguments in each period. Scholars had gone from an early ambivalence in the existence of an 
ethnic Vietnamese nations, to a naïve belief in an age-old country with enduring traditions, to 
revisions and total disbelief. Although I present the developments of these arguments in a 
chronological order, it does not mean that one argument disappears totally when a new one 
arrives. New scholars still adopt old views and old scholars can change their mind. This is 
especially true in the literature of Vietnamese nationalism. This is to say although I focus on 
the recent new scholarship of the literature, previous arguments in earlier stages are still 
embraced by current Vietnam scholars. This chapter ends with a conclusion that identifies the 
area of literature where this project can fit in.  
2.1. The Nationalism Studies 
Although intellectual discussion about nations and nationalism began much earlier, it 
only became a subject of academic inquiry around the First World War (Ozkirimli, 2010). ‘The 
main axes of debate have been whether the nation is essential or constructed, ancient or modern, 
political or cultural’ (Penrose and Mole, 2008: 271). Three conventional theoretical approaches 
are primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism (Smith, 1998; Ozkrimli, 2010). 
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Primordialists believe in the naturalness and/or antiquity of the nation. People naturally gather 
as groups out of biological factors like common descent and kinship (Shils, 1957) and these 
early nations existed in the ancient world (Roshwald, 2006). This view is popularly held among 
historians, nationalists and politicians, who believe in the aged-old origin of their nations. 
Modernists see nations as the product of the modern area, when objective conditions arise for 
the homogenization of the population. Scholars of this approach argue that nations are not 
antique, but only come into being in the age of industrialisation. Despite being unanimous 
about the modern origin of the nation, modernists vary in their analysis of the nature of 
modernity (Breuilly, 2006: xxxi) and in identifying those processes in the transition to 
modernity which are central to the birth of nations. While neo-Marxist scholars such as Hechter 
(1975) and Nairn (1977) stress on the conditions of economic inequality, Breuilly (1982) and 
Brass (1985) focus on political factors like the state and mass politics.  Other prominent 
modernists like Gellner (1983) emphasizes the role of social and cultural elements of the 
modern area in bringing about nationalism and nations. His view is that nationalism and nations 
arise only in the industrialization stage of social organization. The modern economy has ‘an 
objective need for homogeneity’ because it requires labourers to move between specialities. 
Nationalism is about the coming together of state and culture in response to this imperative of 
homogenisation. ‘It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round’ 
(Gellner, 1983: 55). 
Criticizing modernists for ignoring the continuity between the past and present, ethno-
symbolism emphasizes the ancient ethnic origin of the nation and the role of symbols, myths, 
memories and traditions in the transition from ethnies into nations. The nation is a modern 
phenomenon, but have roots in pre-modern area (Smith, 1996). ‘Nationalists cannot, and do 
not, create nation ex nihilo’ (Smith, 1996: 108). Existing ethnic communities provide the 
essential ingredients such as myths, memories, traditions, symbols and culture, based on which 
those symbolic features of the nation are built up later. For ethno-symbolists, ‘national 
symbols, customs and ceremonies are the most potent and durable aspects of nationalism’ 
(Smith, 1991: 77). They make the abstract of the national ideology visible and tangible, evolve 
feelings and aspirations, help to assure the continuity of an abstract community of history and 
destiny (ibid: 77-78).  Therefore, accounts of ethno-symbolic components are essential to 
understand nations under the approach of ethno-symbolism. 
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While primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism quarrel about the age of the 
nation, they have no doubt on the genuine, physical existence of ‘true communities that can be 
advantageously juxtaposed to nations’ (Anderson, 1983: 6). Constructivism takes issue with 
the ontology of the nation. While re-asserting the modernist thesis about its recent origin, 
constructivists argue for the constructed, imaginative or symbolic nature of the nation 
(Anderson, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1983). In the words of Benedict Anderson (1983: 6), a nation is 
‘a subjective idea’, ‘an imagined political community’.  
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, met them, or even heard of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of 
their communion. (ibid) 
This imagination of the community that can be juxtaposed as nations became necessary 
in the modern time as a new route of identification when older identities lost their credibility. 
Towards the end of the 18th century, when the sacred language, the dynastic realm and the 
cosmological sense of the past, which used to provide meanings to every incident of human 
existence began to lose their grips on human belief, the idea of nationalism took their place. 
The physical conditions that gave rise to those cultural changes are capitalism and, especially, 
the printing industry. Capitalism and the invention of printing together created the modern 
vernaculars through which nations are imagined. The readership of the modern vernaculars 
often helped to define the limit of the nation. These modern vernaculars and the printing 
industry laid the base for national consciousness in three ways. First, they enabled an 
unprecedented exchange of information and communication of ideas. This helped people to 
become aware of the existence of other country fellows and to be confident that they were 
receiving the same information. Second, apart from spreading, the printed books also preserved 
ideas and information. This consequently helped to ‘build the image of antiquity so central to 
the subjective idea of nation’ (ibid, 46). Third, they facilitated the process of homogenization 
by creating the language of power. With the print industry, some language increased their 
popularity while others withered away. In short, capitalism and the print industry made the 
imagination of a national community necessary and possible. ‘Communities are to be 
distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined’ 
(ibid: 6). 
Similar to Anderson’s proposal that nations are imagined, Hobsbawm (1983) suggests 
their existence is mostly symbolic. His thesis is that nations are made up of recently ‘invented 
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traditions’, which are ritual and symbolic complexes. For example, a country cannot proclaim 
its sovereignty and identity without national flags, anthems and emblems. ‘Indeed most of the 
occasions when people become conscious of citizenship as such remain associated with 
symbols and semi-ritual practices…, most of which are historically novel and largely invented’ 
(Hobsbawm, 1983, 12). Inventing traditions is essentially a process of formalization and 
ritualization, characterized by reference to the past. The continuity with a historic past that 
invented traditions aim to establish is largely factitious. The invention of traditions occurs more 
frequently at times of rapid social changes when old traditions became incompatible. Traditions 
may be invented in different forms: the adaption of old traditions, the use of ancient materials 
to construct novel traditions for novel purpose, or the innovation of entirely new symbols and 
devices. Since the industrial revolution, human society is awash with invented traditions 
including three main innovations: primary education, public ceremonies and public 
monuments.  
Although Anderson and Hobsbawm put an emphasis on the subjective existence of 
nations, they converge with traditional approaches on the pursuit of a grand narrative or a meta-
theory to explain nationalism in general. Their accounts are still reductionist and essentialist 
because they attempt to relate the national construction process to some specific underlying 
material conditions of modernity. They aim to look for the exact social or material processes 
that make the subjective existence of the nation necessary and possible. Moreover, Anderson 
and Hobsbawm both attempt to explain the process of inventing and imagining the nation in 
one causal master account, which is to be true in all cases or almost cases. Recently, insights 
from new social theories, especially post-structuralism, have transcended the debate on nation. 
Scholars coming from new approaches are against any attempt to explain the nation in terms 
of a single, master variable, but content with an interpretation of the national constitution in a 
specific locale. They refrain from giving an objective definition of the nation as ‘Nothing 
[purely] materials suffice for it’ (Renan, 1990:18) (bracket in original). They embrace the view 
that the nation is subjectively constructed but instead of relating the construction process to a 
material condition, they locate the construction sites in every practices and objects that signify 
the nation, that means giving the nation meanings. They are against any attempt to explain the 
nation in terms of a single, master variable is doomed to fail, but content with an interpretation 
of the national constitution in a specific locale.  
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Going beyond defining the nation as a social construct, post-structuralists conceptualize 
the nation as a form. The substance, the content or the meaning of the nation is to be found in 
the context and the set of practices that signify it. In a post-structuralist approach, the nation, 
like all other political concepts like democracy and modernity, does not have an existence or 
meaning inherent in itself. National identities, and other forms of collective identities, ‘are not 
things we think about but things we think with. As such they have no existence beyond our 
politics, our social relations, and our histories’ (Gillis quoted in Ozkirimli, 2010: 206). It is 
constituted in and through humans’ interactions. However, the construction is not once and for 
all, but is ceaselessly ongoing. Otherwise, it will cease to exist. Post-structuralists treat the 
nation as a perspective (Brubaker, 2004: 77), a claim (Calhoun, 1997) or a symbol (Ozkirimli, 
2010), which is brought into our consciousness, reproduced and naturalized as a thing of this 
world in every time we speak, write, act toward or signify it.  
Nations are constituted largely by the claims themselves, by the way of talking and thinking 
and acting that relies on these sorts of claims to produce collective identity, to mobilise people 
for collective projects, to evaluate people and practices (Calhoun, 1997: 5). 
By invoking groups, they seek to evoke them, summon them and call them into being 
(Brubaker: 2004, 10). 
The processes of investing meanings into the category of nations are not founded on 
any material conditions but are self-fashioning under no universal law. This ubiquitous and 
contingent existence of the nation opens up a wide range of materials and sites for researching 
the nation and requires multiple theories. Culture and language become legitimate sites. In 
Bhabha’s words (1990: 1) the idea of the nation emerges not in any material conditions but in 
those traditions of political thoughts and literary language, and that the nation comes into being 
‘as a system of cultural signification as the representation of social life’. Therefore, it is 
necessary to encounter nation as ‘it is written’, ‘to study the nation through its narrative 
address’ (ibid: 3). Similarly, Billig (2000) insisted on a study of the nation through widespread 
and common everyday ideological habits, especially familiar linguistic acts. According to 
Billig, politicians, newspapers and social scientists are playing a significant role in the daily 
reproduction of the nation. Therefore, their discursive practices offer fruitful places to research 
nationalism.  
Besides displaying the ubiquitous and continuous constitution of the nation, post-
structuralism is also tuned towards exploring the destructive effects and limits of our long 
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taken-for-granted understanding of nations and nationality. effects of our conventional 
assumption of nationality.  
In his seminal book Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity, David Campbell (1992: 11) argues against the conventional literature on the nation 
and the state, which ‘implies the essence of the former precedes the reality of the latter: that 
the identity of a people is the basis for the legitimacy of that state and its subsequent practices’, 
that ‘nationalism is a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy’. National identity, like 
all other identities, is to understand as having no essence, ‘no ontological status apart from the 
various acts that constitute its reality’ (ibid: 9). A such ‘America is the imagined community 
par excellence’ and it is ‘dependent on representation practices for its being’ (ibid: 91). In the 
1998 book National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia, Campbell goes 
beyond the construction of the nation to account for the destruction and violence that the 
conventional assumption of ethnicity and nationality has caused in Bosnia in the early 1990s. 
This seminal book ‘aims to demonstrate that the settled norms of international society – in 
particular, the idea the national community requires the nexus of demarcated territory and fixed 
identity – were not only in sufficient to enable a response to the Bosnian war, they were 
complicit in and necessary for the conduct of the war itself’ (Campbell, 1998: 13). ‘This is 
because inscribing the boundaries that make the installation of the national imaginary possible 
requires the expulsion from the resultant ‘domestic’ space of all that comes to be regarded as 
alien, foreign, and dangerous’ (ibid). In studying the ontology of Bosnia in ‘the array of 
practices through which Bosnia comes to be’ (ix-x), Campbell shows that the Bosnian war is 
in essence the war between two different projects of self-identification to fill in the land deemed 
in need of the nation with fixed identities and territories. The ethnicity-based understanding of 
national identity conventionally held by the whole international community is the root cause 
of the ongoing violence in Bosnia, and at the same time pre-excludes the co-existence of 
heterogeneous ethnic groups from the political imagination. One way towards a peaceful 
solution to the Bosnia situation is to deconstruct the self-contained notion of national identity, 
offering at least the necessary condition for thinking in a less violent, less exclusive manner 
about the existence of others. 
As we have seen, since the 1990s the field of national studies has been broadened both 
theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, constructivism and post-structuralism have joined 
the existing theoretical arsenal of primordialism, modernism and ethnosymbolism to research 
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the nation. The conceptualisation of the nation has travelled from being an inherent entity 
(primordialism), a necessary modern phenomenon (modernism), a social construct 
(constructivism) and to an empty form (post-structuralism) that is filled with substance in 
human interactions. Empirically, the radical re-conceptualisation of the nation under the post-
structuralist approach has enabled scholars to shed light on the power behind and destructive 
violence involved in nation-making projects. Nationalism has been found to be, more often 
than not, ‘a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy’ (Campbell, 1992: 11).  This 
research sets out to apply these ideas of the post-structuralist literature on nationalism in the 
case of Vietnamese nationalism in order to expose not only the constructed nature of the nation 
but also the embedded power relationship between statehood and nationhood. 
With insights from the general discussion about the nation, I will now bring in the 
debate in the literature on Vietnamese nationalism. Before discussing the international 
literature written in English language, I introduce Vietnam’s official historical narrative about 
its nation and history. The knowledge about what is told in Vietnamese historical books about 
the origin and history of the country is essential to grasp the debate in the international 
literature. This is because many of the arguments of foreign scholars emerge in dialogue with 
the story told inside the country.  
2.2. The Official Narrative in Vietnam 
Vietnamese historians and politicians offer a primordialist view of the nation. In the 
official historical narrative, Vietnam is an aged-old ethnic nation with thousand years of history 
and long-established cultural customs (Vietnam’s Government Web Portal - VGWPa). The 
Vietnamese people are traditionally patriotic and is composes of a homogeneous unity. The 
VCP has successfully leading the people in liberating and then unifying the Vietnamese nation. 
These are the main components of the regime of truth and knowledge in Vietnam. In what 
follows I present in more details the history of Vietnam as told in the country’s state-sponsored 
books and textbooks on history. Given the state’s tight censorship in publications of books and 
textbooks in Vietnam, this story is the one knowledge and one truth that contemporary 
Vietnamese people, including me, are growing in. Although some of the details of the narrative 
are presented as facts, it does not mean that I believe so. I only want to present the story as told 




Vietnam is mythically told as an extension of a family which started to settle in the land 
more than 4000 years ago. A popular myth tells the story that the dragon-fairy couple Lac Long 
Quan and Au Co are the ancestors of all 54 ethnic communities in Vietnam. The 100 brothers 
and sisters born out of a 100-fetus womb of Au Co are the first Vietnamese people habiting in 
this land. The first kingdom which was established in the territory of current Vietnam was 
headed by King Hung I, the first son of this dragon-fairy couple. Archaeological evidences 
speak to the existence of human beings in the land from the Old Stone Age (VGWPb). The 
first established civilization in the current land called Vietnam appeared at the time of Hung 
Kings, which last about more than two thousand years from 2879 to 258 BC (Dang, 2016). 
From the 2nd century B.C. to the 10th century A. D., Vietnam was repeatedly invaded and ruled 
by Chinese emperors from the North. In the 10th century, Dinh Bo Linh (924 – 979) was 
declared Emperor, who named the country Dai Co Viet, the first independent state of Vietnam 
after 10 centuries under Chinese control. Vietnam then remained an independent country, 
which defeated numerous invasions attempts from the Chinese and the Mongolians. Since the 
10th century, Vietnam’s territory was expanded southward. Nguyen lords’ policies of land 
reclaim (khai hoang) enabled the Vietnamese to move to what is now the centre and the south 
of Vietnam (MOET, 2007). The Champa kingdom was annexed into the country and the 
Vietnamese people settled in with Chinese immigrants and local people in what used to be part 
of the Khmer land, the Mekong delta. 
On the arrival of the French in 1858, Vietnam was a long-established independent 
country with certain economic achievements and rich cultural traditions of patriotism, 
consolidation, humanity and heroism, which were forged and formed along the length of its 
history. However, the Nguyen dynasty in Hue, the ruling feudal court of Vietnam at the time, 
was unable to protect the sovereignty of the country and conceded the country to the colonizers. 
Several patriots had organized anti-colonial movements against the French authority.  Ton That 
Thuyet (1839 – 1913) instigated the Can Vuong movement in the late 1880s to call for the 
support for the feudal court to fight against the colonial occupation. Phan Boi Chau (1867 – 
1940) set up the Dong Du movement (Travel to the East) early in the 20th century to organize 
young Vietnamese to travel to Japan to study new ideas and methods to help the country regain 
independence. Vietnam in the end of the 19th century and early 20th century was full of such 
anticolonial patriotic movements. Among those young Vietnamese in the fierce search for a 
way to re-establish independence for Vietnam, Nguyen Ai Quoc (1989 – 1969), more 
commonly known as Ho Chi Minh, had found the only right way in the Marxist-Leninist 
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ideology. He established the first unified Communist Party, the Vietnamese Communist Party, 
in February 1930. The VCP was later changed into the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) 
until its dissolution in disguise November 1945. Under the leadership of this Communist Party, 
Vietnam successfully out-threw the colonial government in 1945, establishing a modern 
independent country to be named the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). September 2nd 
1945 is today regarded as the birthday of the present Socialist Republic of Vietnam. However, 
the French came back so the Communist Party resurfaced under the name Vietnam’s Labour 
Party (VLP) leading ‘the resistance against the invasion of French colonists’ (the First 
Indochina War) (Le et al, 2014: 7). Once more time, the Vietnamese Communists succeeded. 
The resounding Dien Bien Phu battle in 1954 put a definite stop to the French colonialism in 
Vietnam. However, out the French went, in the imperialist United States came. The U.S. 
established another state in south Vietnam to be named the Republic of Vietnam (RV). Once 
more time, the VLP led Vietnamese people in a war, this time it is ‘the anti-U.S. resistance for 
national unification’ (the Second Indochina War or the Vietnam War) (Le et al, 2014). With 
support from the Soviet Union and China, the VLP finally defeated the Americans to unify the 
country in 1975. The VLP changed its named into the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) 
and established one party state in the whole Vietnam. The country is named the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam since 1976.  
In the official historical narrative of Vietnam, the Vietnamese people possess traditions 
of solidarity, passionate patriotism and nationalism (Le et al, 2014: 131, 274). ‘Nationalism, a 
traditional spiritual value, is a great momentum of the country, is the durable leaning point for 
Vietnam to make resonating victories in the history, the defence and construction of an 
independent nation’ (ibid). Throughout its long history, big empires of China and Mongol had 
made numerous attempts to conquer the country. China had once established its rule for nearly 
1000 years. However, the Vietnamese always rose up and successfully drove them out of the 
territory. In the 13th century, Vietnam was recorded to even defeat the powerful Mongolians in 
all their three attempts. French colonisation and American intervention are presented as just 
another episode of foreign invasion in the long history of the country. The Communist Party 
followed the steps of national heroes in the fight against Chinese and Mongolian invaders like 
Ba Trung, Ba Trieu, Tran Hung Dao (1228 – 1300) in leading the Vietnamese people against 
these modern invaders. Ho Chi Minh is considered to be another national guardian who are 
worshiped and venerated for their sacrifice in the construction and safeguarding of the nation. 
The leadership of the Party is assessed to be the first and foremost factor in bringing about 
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national independence (Le et al, 2014: 273; MEOT, 2006: 143). Although Vietnamese people 
are patriotic and nationalist, it was Ho Chi Minh and the Communist Party that brought and 
enhanced Vietnam’s traditional strength of solidarity, patriotism and nationalism to a higher 
level in the struggle against the French and the Americans (ibid).  
In the tradition of Marxist-Leninism, Vietnamese historians and educators state that 
socialism and the Communist Party’s leadership are inevitable in Vietnam. Adopting socialism 
is presented as the inevitable, certain and natural continuity of the country’s history and as the 
choice of Vietnamese people (MOET, 2009: 97; Le et al, 2014: 345) 
Proceeding to socialism after the country gained independence, freedom and unification is an 
inevitable development route of the nation, decided by President Ho Chi Minh and selected 
by the national history (Le et al, 2014: 345). 
Marxism conceptualizes human society as a total structure and develops in a liner 
procession from low to high. According to Vietnamese Marxists, socialism is the beginning 
period of communism, which is the highest stage of human development occurring after the 
collapse of capitalism (MOET, 2013). Having successfully leading Vietnam to national 
independence, the VCP is now leading the country to proceed toward the highest stage in the 
history of human developments: socialism. 
The establishment of a Communist Party in leading the workers’ class in the revolution 
to transfer a society from capitalism to socialism is also an inevitability in Marxism (MOET, 
2013: 371 – 373). Therefore, the leadership of the Communist Party in Vietnam is ‘an objective 
matter sprung from the position of workers’ class in history’ (MOET, 2006: 378).  
As we have seen, in the official historical narrative, the Vietnamese nation is ancient 
and unified. The Vietnamese people are traditionally patriotic and nationalism. Ho Chi Minh 
and the VCP are heroic forces that lead these nationalist people in the struggle against foreign 
invaders in the same tradition that other heroes had done in past struggles against the Chinese 
and Mongolians. The Vietnamese revolution is a harmonious combination of socialism and 
nationalism in Vietnam. The relationship between nationalism and socialism is a central topic 
in the international literature on Vietnamese nationalism. The core debate is whether it is 
nationalism or socialism that appealed to the Vietnamese people in their war against the French 
and the U.S.. While the official line in Vietnam has always been maintained that nationalism 
brought socialism to Vietnam, the international literature has much more diverse and dynamic 
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views on this matter. The international literature also stocks multiple views on the ontology of 
the Vietnamese nation. 
2.3. International Literature on Vietnamese Nationalism 
The international literature in the English language on Vietnamese nationalism is 
considerably established with contributions from all the approaches in the general study on 
nations and nationalism. Its development has gone through four main stages. The ‘infancy’ 
started at the middle of the First Indochina War around the 1950s, when the prospect of the 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam was looming (Vu, 2007). Scholars held ambivalent views about 
Vietnam’s national identity. Although the existence of a primordial group was confirmed, the 
overall sense was a negative and doubtful view whether this group could become a modern 
nation and whether Vietnamese communists was nationalist. Academic interest on Vietnamese 
nationalism grew significantly in the mid-1960s when the United States were deepening its 
involvement. This ‘adolescence’ period (Vu, 2007) saw the popularity of the ‘continuity thesis’ 
(Marr, 1981: x), which portrayed an ancient monolithic Vietnamese nation possessing strong 
and persistent customs and cultural traditions. The continuity thesis echoed the official 
historical narrative in Hanoi, presenting the communist government as the legitimate inheritor 
of a unified, homogenous and continuous Vietnam’s patriotic traditions. By early 1980s, this 
view was challenged in the revisionist wave. Attempts emerged to show (many of) past 
happenings were different or even contrary to the story told in Vietnam’s official history. 
Revisionism was the first step toward dispelling ‘the myth of a unified Vietnamese nation 
represented by a single group or monopolized by a single narrative’ (Vu, 2007: 206). To the 
beginning of the 20th century, new scholarship went beyond revisionism to re-conceptualize 
the Vietnamese nation as a social construct and a cultural artefact.  Researches now include a 
wide variety of actors, of sites and of data sources to expose the construction process and the 
power struggle embedded.  
Infancy Stage 
English literature on Vietnamese nationalism began with journalistic works and 
colonial officials’ accounts around the 1950s with scant interest in theory. Being the first 
writings in the English language on Vietnam, the early texts functioned to ‘discover’ Vietnam 
and the Vietnamese, to explain the most typical features of the country and its people to the 
Americans. The dominant view was that the Vietnamese were a primordial group but 
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disagreements existed about whether this primordial group should be conceptualized as a 
modern ethnic nation. To Mus (1949) and Buttinger (1968), what was essentially Vietnamese 
was in the peasants' way of life behind the villages' bamboo. However, while Buttinger (1968: 
172) was content with the common peasants’ way of life as enough to qualify Vietnam as a 
nation, Mus required the participations of the elite in leading national consciousness. In Fall’s 
1963 study, the Vietnamese elite was full of rivalry, intense unity and internal conflicts. This 
fractious elite politics and their doubtful territorial claims led Fall to suspect the existence of a 
Vietnamese ethnic identity and the prospect for a modern nation. This ambivalence about the 
Vietnamese nation went hand in hand with a suspicion on the nationalist nature of the north 
Vietnam’s government. Fall (1963) argued that Vietnamese Communists were driven by power 
and ideology, hence not legitimate governors of the country.  
A different view was held by two Western-educated Vietnamese scholars. To Hoang 
Van Chi and Truong Buu Lam, the existence of the Vietnamese nation as an unquestionable 
fact (Hoang, 1964; Truong, 1967). Both presented repeated episodes of Vietnam’s resistance 
against foreign aggression as evidences of its national identity and consciousness. Hoang 
focused on anti-colonial efforts such as the Can Vuong, Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc, Dong Du 
movements and the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng - VNQDD) in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Truong provided translations of Vietnamese heroic 
documents in the spirit of resisting foreign aggression from China, Mongol and France in order 
to prove Vietnamese nationalism. In these two works, nationalism meant anti-foreigners and 
Vietnam’s history was reduced to patterns of resistance against foreign invasion. This 
conceptualization of an ancient Vietnamese nation with a common history and strong national 
awareness was the new consensus of the international scholarship in the next stage.  
Adolescence Period 
Studies on Vietnamese nationalism since the deepening of the U.S. intervention in mid-
1960s started to converge on the view of Vietnam as a primordial ethnic nation, who possessed 
timeless common qualities. However, scholars diverged in regard to the specific manifestations 
that can be read as essence of Vietnamese traits.  For Marr (1971) and Duiker (1976), it was 
the traditions of revolts against foreign invasions as previously argued by Hoang (1964) and 
Truong (1967). SarDesai (1992) and Hy Van Luong (1992) embraced the thesis of Mus (1949) 
and Buttinger (1968) that the Vietnamese nation existed in the peasants’ life behind village 
bamboos. FitzGerald (1972) combined both elements of village life and ancestor worshiping 
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to be the essence of the Vietnamese nation. While Huynh (1982) pointed out the traditional 
customs to worship ancestors and the communal cults, Jamieson (1995) highlighted the 
endurance of a cosmological perspective about the balance between yin and yang. These 
timeless qualities of the Vietnamese were used as evidences in explaining Vietnam’s success 
in driving out the French and the Americans. Marr called this tendency ‘the continuity thesis. 
There has been a tendency to argue that Vietnamese success in defeating first the French and 
then the Americans was due primarily to traditional strengths, for example, relative ethnic 
and linguistic homogeneity, ancient civilization, and a proud record of struggle against 
northern invaders. (Marr, 1981: x) 
However, there were different ways to attribute the continuity of Vietnamese traditions 
and customs to recent successes in the war against modern Western powers. Jamieson (1995) 
skipped at the agency of the communists, associating Vietnamese’ indomitable fights against 
foreigners to the nostalgic cosmological fight to re-establish the ‘now-impossible’ balance of 
yin and yang in the Vietnamese society. Jamieson’s account was an exception rather than the 
norm. Most works in the continuity thesis reserved a central place for the Vietnamese 
Communists, who were the essential bridge between traditions and a modern nation. While 
patriotism was the traditions of the Vietnamese mass, nationalism was equated with anti-
colonialism or xenophobia and belonged to the realm of elite’s expressions. Communists only 
succeeded when they were able to touch on the Vietnamese tradition of patriotism and, hence, 
to be supported by the mass (Vu, 2007: 191).  
Duiker (1976) offered a typical account of this continuity thesis. He stated that 
Vietnamese people possessed ‘a strong sense of ethnic awareness tempered by thousand years 
of resistance against northern conquests’ (Duiker, 1976: 287). The arrival of the French 
challenged this proud identity, causing a sense of ‘losing country’ among the scholar-gentry 
and disturbance among all other strata. Revolts and resistances were abundant in Vietnam 
almost immediately after the civilization mission of French colonialism just began. 
Communists, like other national groups, ‘wanted to establish Vietnam as a proud nation of the 
modern family of nations’ (ibid:15). What made them stand out was that they recognized the 
need to transform nationalism into a mass phenomenon and ‘Marxism was a tool in this 
process’ (ibid). 
In order to highlight the continuity of the Vietnamese traditions, scholars of this period 
gave a great deal of attention to the history of the country. All major works in this period spared 
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one or two chapters on the pre-colonial Vietnam mentioning the legendary kingdom of ‘Van 
Lang’ ruled by the 19 generations of Hung kings around the 2000 B.C. and 1000 BC, and a 
series of mythic heroes and heroines in the Vietnamese efforts to drive out the Chinese 
invaders. Taylor (1983) devoted a whole book ‘The Birth of Vietnam’ elaborating the origins 
of this ancient nation. Woodside (1976: 2) states that ‘no amount of statistics, rhetoric, or social 
science theory can explain the Vietnamese revolution adequately if its properties of acute 
historical consciousness and cultural pride are insufficiently considered’. The shocks of French 
colonialism did not destroy these properties, but psychologically enlarged the Vietnamese’ 
awareness of self- identity in the modern area. In the language of Smith’s ethno-symbolic 
approach, Sutherland (2006) explained the success of the Vietnamese Communist as the 
combination of the existence of the pre-existing myths, symbols, customs and memories and 
the Communists’ agency in articulating a modern sense of nationhood out of these ethnic 
elements amid an identity crisis in the Vietnamese society in the aftermath of French 
colonisation. 
The continuity thesis in the adolescent stage of the international literature on 
Vietnamese nationalism possessed a ‘new faith in the Vietnamese nation’ (Vu, 2007: 187) and 
a positive view on the legitimacy of the Communist government. Instead of the previous doubt 
on the nationalism of Vietnamese Communists, the new scholarship now portrayed them as the 
bearers of nationalism and true representations of the nation. Towards the 1980s, critique of 
the continuity thesis was voiced and the optimistic faith in the Vietnamese nation was giving 
way to more sophisticated accounts. Marr (1981: x) criticized the continuity thesis for stressing 
the power of tradition at the expense of downgrading historical transformations in Vietnam 
during the colonial period. The endurance of Vietnam’s cultural traditions was achieved at the 
expense of ignoring changes and transformation and simplifying the particularities of regions 
and ethnic communities in the Vietnamese society in its encounter with Western culture. In 
addition, these themes of continuity and unity ‘coincided with Vietnamese communists’ efforts 
to construct a natural teleology of Vietnamese anti-colonialism and nationalism in which 
communism was the logical end’ (Kim, 2002: 4). The debate now moved the focus to elements 
of contingency and spontaneity of past events in Vietnam’s history. The story of a historical 
unified nation, in which all people possess common traditions and share the same 
consciousness of their collective identity, was no longer taken for granted. Revisions to the 
winner’s official historiography and the parallel continuity thesis in the international literature 
started to emerge both from inside and outside Vietnam.  
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The Revisionist Wave 
Revisionist history means ‘a challenge to whatever is the current orthodoxy in the 
interpretation of historical eras and events’ (Elliott, 2008: 278). The last three decades have 
witnessed a reaction against the Vietnamese state’s grand narrative of the nation (Tran and 
Reid, 2006: 15). The revisionist literature aims to undermine the idea of a Vietnamese past as 
‘the single, linear progression of a homogenous whole’ (Sutherland, 2010: 2). The ‘natural’ 
combination between communism and nationalism in the state-sponsored history is also put 
under closer scrutiny.  
 Interestingly, the revisionist wave in the international literature on Vietnamese 
nationalism coincided with attempts by some Vietnamese veterans to tell stories different from 
official narratives in their autobiographies and novels. Bao Ninh’s Sorrow of the War (2011) 
(Nỗi buồn chiến tranh) portrayed not heroic and defiant soldiers in a well-justified war but 
frightened and fragile soldiers in a bloody and ill-defined war. The state’s rhetoric of national 
ideals and heroism in the war against the Americans was absent in the experiences of these 
soldiers who had lived and fought in the battle field. The author commented that the ones who 
loved war were not the young men but the others like the politicians, middle-aged men with fat 
bellies. While Bao Ninh features a contrasting past, Duong Thu Huong’s 1988 novel ‘Paradise 
of the Blind’ (Những Thiên Đường Mù) refuses to buy in the official interpretation of the past. 
Her novel paints a young northerner who regards the inheritance of the country’s revolution as 
the legacy of past crimes rather than victorious achievements. In refusing to stay in her 
lineage’s house she rejects the revolutionary past and saw it as unfortunate happenings which 
foreclose a different possible future that she and her generation are yearning for. 
Just like Vietnamese war veterans, pioneers of the revisionist wave in the international 
literature on Vietnamese nationalism came from a background which participated in the 
continuity thesis. Scholars like David Marr and Keith Taylor changed from seeing Vietnam’s 
history as continuous and its people as homogenous to one ridden with fractions, contingencies 
and fictions. Dissatisfied with reductionist explanations offered in the continuity thesis, Marr 
(1981) steered the focus on fundamental changes in political and social consciousness among 
the Vietnamese intellectuals of in the two decades preceding the August Revolution. The 
Vietnamese were no longer pictured to be stable and static as in the continuity thesis, of which 
Marr himself used to be a proponent. Instead, we saw here a society in the midst of its search 
for a new identity in its encounter with a very much different way of living. Vietnamese 
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intellectuals took the lead in this painful search for a modern Vietnamese self and in bringing 
the revolutionary consciousness to the mass. The ICP’s success was due largely to its 
convergence with the intellectuals. Except for HCM, all ranking ICP leaders of the early 40s 
had been members of the new intelligentsia. However, while portraying a contentious society 
in an identity crisis instead of a homogeneous Vietnamese with common traits, Marr ended up 
with another homogeneous groups within the national self, the intelligentsia and the ICP. They 
shared such a significant amount of ideological consensus that they naturally converged during 
the time of Viet Minh’s Popular Front. Marr (1981: vii) had found what he wanted to find as 
he said in the beginning of the book ‘I suspect there was enough ideological consensus among 
NLF members to enable local cadres to function for weeks and months without specific orders 
from higher echelons’. This ideological consensus among Vietnamese intellectuals and ICP 
members was then refused by Marr himself in his 1995 book, which conveyed more elements 
of contingency and spontaneity to the ICP’s success in August 1945. Marr (1995: 6) argued 
that ‘no one was in control’, the Vietminh were successful because of their quick reaction to 
sudden and spontaneous changes rather than of any adherence to a master plan (Marr, 1995: 
6). Members of the Vietminh and its Popular Front did not share the same ideology, they 
participated and acted for various purposes, in different interests and by diverse manners. The 
ICP were neither a homogeneous group nor share the same level of revolutionary 
consciousness. The story of the August Revolution emerged in a much wider context, ridden 
with unexpected accidents, spontaneous actions and unpredictable results. Similarly, Quin-
Judge (2008) highlights the deep ideological and regional cleavages among the top members 
of Vietnam’s communist party from 1940 and 1960. 
While Marr and Quinn-Judge attack the dominant themes of unity and coherence in the 
Vietnamese state’s historical narrative in the recent ‘revolutionary’ times, a number of scholars 
attempt to raid this narrative far back in the pre-colonial periods. This academic rescuing 
history from the nation conveys three main arguments. Firstly, the notion of an ancient and 
homogeneous Vietnam is disputed. Vietnam is not an age-old entity but has its existence dated 
very recently (Taylor, 2013; Goscha, 2016). The country as it is today was not put under the 
same rule until 1802 when Gia Long, the founder of the Nguyen dynasty, defeated other 
political Vietnamese fractions with the French’s help. Even then the country’s name was 
changed into Dai Viet only 13 years later. The name Vietnam did not become popular until 
1945. In addition, French colonial rule soon divided the country into three different 
administration under the colony of Indochina. Before 1802 and even after that there are always 
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more than one way of being Vietnamese and multiple claims exist to define themselves against 
other Vietnamese places (Li, 1998; Taylor, 1998 and 2013; Goscha, 2016). For example, there 
were two Vietnamese states each with special and distinctive characteristics in Vietnam in the 
17th and 18th centuries. The same can be said with Vietnam in the three decades before the 1975 
unification, which saw the operations of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North and 
the Republic of Vietnam in the South. Moreover, even in the early 20th century, the Vietnamese 
nation had been pursued at different levels other than Vietnam (Goscha, 1995). Most 
Vietnamese used to define themselves as the Annamese and some Annamese used to imagine 
an Indochinese nation, rather than a Vietnamese nation.  
Secondly, instead of seeing Vietnam as a victim of external domination and 
colonisation, Vietnam is depicted as ‘the product of its own colonial history’ (Goscha, 2016: 
9) or ‘a creature of conquest’ (Sutherland, 2010: 63). Vietnam’s history is not only full of 
rivalries and battles among different Vietnamese groups, but also of attempts to conquest 
foreign lands and colonize non-Vietnam people. The once mighty Champa kingdom had 
disappeared to become part of central Vietnam. Part of the Mekong delta in what is not South 
Vietnam used to be land of the Khmer people. The current border between Vietnam and 
Cambodia was not settled until 1845. Tuong Vu (2009b) argued that Vietnam was not a victim 
of the Cold war politics, but the Vietnamese communist intentionally volunteered to fight on 
the side of communism.  
Thirdly, Vietnam, as any country, is far from a homogeneous unity. There are not only 
multiple ways of being Vietnamese, but also there are also non-Vietnamese people, who may 
not want to be Vietnamese, living inside the territory of Vietnam. An ethnic Vietnamese nation 
is not coterminous with state borders (Sutherland, 2014: 61). Vietnam is reported to be 
composed of 54 ethnic groups, out of which the Vietnamese or Kinh is composed of 86%. 
Other 53 ethnic groups do not become ethnic minorities until they are included into the nation 
state of Vietnam. In fact, well into the 20th century, the non-Viet people out-numbered the Kinh 
in the mountainous areas and highlands which accounts for over half of the country (Goscha, 
2016: 4). Although official history claims a brotherhood relationship between Kinh and other 
ethnic groups and since Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese state has always tried to include other 
ethnic people in their state-making process, tensions between Kinh and other ethnic groups in 
Vietnam are often reported. For example, indigenous minorities in the central highlands staged 
wide-scale riots in 2001 and 2004 to ask for their land back from Vietnamese control. This is 
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to say that the making of nation state in Vietnam is very much the project of the ethnic Kinh 
group, not necessarily the common project of all the people living inside the territory. ‘A 
common history’ of the Vietnamese nation ‘lies in the realm of mythology and indoctrination’ 
(Taylor, 1998: 971). 
 Commenting on the making of the nation in Asia, Tagliacozzo, Siu and Perdue (2015: 
2) asserted ‘none of the above-mentioned regions or nation-states is homogeneous by any 
criterion, whether linguistic, cultural, religious, economic or historical’. In fact, ‘the boundaries 
of these nation-states and empires have shifted over time with various historical articulations 
of power and control, and they have always included diverse and mobile peoples within them’  
(ibid). This comment captures very well the main themes of the new histories of Vietnam.  
In addition to perpetuating a nuanced view of one homogeneous and continuous 
Vietnamese nation, the revisionist wave also questioned the juxtaposition between Vietnamese 
communism and nationalism in the continuity thesis. Scholars attempted to show the 
internationalism of Vietnamese communism or its non-nationalist manifestation. Woodside 
(1976) pointed out the Ho Chi Minh’s great enthusiasm for internationalism but ambivalence 
about Vietnamese culture in his early writings. White (1974) and Porter (1972) insisted that 
Vietnamese communists were true revolutionaries, not simply nationalists. Vietnam struggle 
after 1945 was primarily a class struggle for social justice. Turley (1972), Popkin (1979) and 
Race (1972) offered brilliant accounts of the non-nationalist dimensions of Vietnamese 
communism. Their point was that the appeal of Viet Minh and the National Liberation Front 
was based more on communal (village security and welfare) and individual (land) interests 
than on national loyalty (Vu, 2007: 198 – 199). Communists succeeded because they hid their 
class ambition under the talk of nationalism and acted in regard to communal and individual 
interests. Vietnamese communists were not less international revolutionaries than nationalists 
(Vu, 2009b). They have always been deeply committed to a proletariat ideology and world 
view, which makes them voluntarily participate into the Cold war and loyal to communism 
despite pressures for changes after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Vu, 2017). Similarly, Kim 
(2002) provided a different meaning of revolutionary politics from the official narrative. (2002: 
240) argued that ‘the powerful moment of unity between the communists and many within the 
intellectual community was… not in the preservation of the nation’s past and cultural 
achievements but in their very destruction in order for a new Vietnam to emerge into the 
modern world’. Vietnamese politics since the decades preceding the August revolution was 
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characterized by ‘the profound ambivalence and the extreme hostility towards history and past 
intellectual achievements’ (ibid: 7). The sentiments that drew Vietnamese people to the 
national cause in this period of time was a desire for a radical change and for the establishment 
of a new social order. This was, to Kim, the enduring meaning of revolutionary politics for 
many Vietnamese.  
Besides questioning the national credentials of Vietnamese communists, scholars also 
established the national credentials of the non-communist government of the Republic of 
Vietnam, who were pictured as lackeys and puppets in the communist-sponsored history. Ngo 
Dinh Diem, the RV’s president from 1955 to 1963, was found to be a legitimate leader of the 
Vietnamese nation, whose moral and political authority was widely recognized by many 
Vietnamese (Shaw, 2013). Instead of being a traitor to the nation and the people as claimed by 
Hanoi or a corrupt and tyrannical leader as viewed by many American historians, Diem was 
portrayed to be strongly nationalist and independent (Catton, 2002; Edward, 2008 and 2013). 
He embraced his own vision for a developed and unified non-communist Vietnam and was 
keen to establish the connection between his nation state with an ancient Red river civilisation. 
Race (1972) even argued that it was nationalism that caused Sai Gon government to lose the 
war. 
The revisionist wave contradicted the grand historical narrative in Vietnam. Works told 
many histories of Vietnam, which are either different or lacking in the story told by Vietnamese 
communist historians. Revisionists scholars eschewed the teleology of the continuity thesis and 
unfolded the plural and contentious dimension in Vietnam’s past and its nationalism. In the 
revisionist wave, the myth of a unified Vietnamese nation represented by a single group or 
monopolized by a single narrative had been dispelled (Vu, 2004: 206). To the 20th century, 
Vietnam scholars went beyond the dispute on the past to address the deliberate attempts of the 
governments to construct a homogenous nation and to promote Vietnam’s national identity.  
The New Scholarship 
By the turn of the 20th century, a new scholarship emerged in the international literature 
on Vietnamese nationalism, which saw insights informed from new theories like 
constructivism, post-colonialism and post-structuralism. The new scholarship views the 
Vietnamese nation ‘as a modern social construct or cultural artefact’ (Vu, 2007: 177) and 
studied it in ‘the process of identity formation at various sites’ (ibid: 207), such as official 
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historiography, public culture and private settings of individuals’ daily life. In studies of the 
new scholarship, ‘the nation appears as a modern social construct with state playing a central 
role in building it’ (ibid: 210). Vietnam’s official narrative on the nation and the Party’s role 
were broken into parts and their production and maintenance were put under scrutiny.  Scholars 
are now attentive to how disperse elements are put together in the construction of the nation, 
whereby the seemingly continuity and homogeneity are forged, traditions are invented and the 
past is made and remade to maintain the grips of the nation and the appeal of socialism and the 
legitimacy of the Party.  
Going beyond revisionist attempts to present a different past to the one told in 
Vietnam’s official historical narrative, scholars now aim to show the deliberate hands of the 
state in making this narrative. Pelly (2002) follows the efforts of Vietnamese communist 
historians in writing the country’s official historical narrative since the time of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to serve their political purposes. Responding to the colonial 
scholarship which views the Vietnamese as primitive and having no culture of their own, the 
DRV’s historians made every effort to establish national origins and national essence that are 
non-Chinese and pre-Chinese. In addition, Vietnam is posted as a family state in order to 
include the variety of ethnic minorities into the Vietnamese nations. The national past is plotted 
according to Marxist-Leninist paradigms in order to highlight the universal regularities of 
human development with socialism at the highest level. In a similar manner, Salomon and Vu 
(2007) unpacks the production of the national narrative in educational textbooks. The image of 
a unified Vietnam and its continuous history was done through series of silencing alternative 
voices, omitting certain elements and excluding contributions of other actors. To begin with, 
the origins of the nation are found in legends and myths and no attempts is made to separate 
these from more factual accounts (ibid: 352). The tradition of fierce patriotism is forged against 
the Other China at the expense of downplaying the absorption of Chinese elements. The 
tradition of opposing against exploitation is made by the portrayal of an oppressing and coward 
Nguyen dynasty and at the exclusion of their considerable reforms. The picture of a national 
Communist Party was painted in the act of omitting patriotic elements of Ngo Dinh Diem and 
the Southern government in the Republic of Vietnam. The validity of socialism was made by 
attributing the fall of USSR to the imagining threats of ‘peaceful evolutions’ of the capitalist 
camp and by presenting Reforms not as a rupture but a continuity of socialism. This historical 
narrative that Vietnamese youngsters are educated in serves the purpose of justifying the 
communist rule and the leading role of the VCP. In these works, Vietnam’s official 
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historiography is far from being transparent in conveying past happenings but is intentionally 
made in service of political purposes.  
The nation is not only produced in the official state-sponsored knowledge about the 
past, but also in the cultural realm where the memory of the nation’s past is maintained. 
Unfortunately, public culture in Vietnam is also dominantly sponsored by the state. Therefore, 
in many sites of Vietnamese public culture, scholars come across the similar plot told in 
historical books. Prison memoirs (Zinoman, 2001a and 2001b), many shrines and museums 
(Giebel, 2001) and biographies of state figures (Giebel, 2004) are also shown to be the places 
where memory and history are constructed to serve the legitimacy of the present.  
However, in Bradley’s 2001 study of revisionist films about wars produced in the 1980s 
in Vietnam, the state’s project of war memories is shown not to resonate with the memories of 
the people. ‘What joins these works most fully is a common insistence that the ideological base 
of state constructions of war conceals more than it reveals’ (ibid: 222). Some Vietnamese 
people are now too busy calculating their gains in the new market to bother to care about any 
form of war legacies. Some are remembering war dead as their husband, their lovers, their sons, 
not as national heroes. Moreover, despite great efforts to commemorate the heroic dead, the 
state is also criticized for not doing enough for its veterans. Many of them are unemployed in 
the post-war era, or have to live a hard life as a bicycle fixer or trishaw rider.  
National identification also occurs in the more local and private memories. Malarney 
(2001) went to a Vietnamese home to explore the ritual commemoration of a dead family 
member, who was also a war dead. While official rituals function to venerate the exemplary 
life and sacrifice of the dead, the family’s rituals are to attend to the after-life of the dead soul. 
Rozsko (2010) found local contestations over memories in order to be included in the national 
commemoration project. New scholarship in Vietnamese nationalism has brought new insights 
into the politics (the power behind) of memory making and of knowledge (of the past) 
imbedded in the construction of the nation in Vietnam. 
[I]f a community creates and sustains memory, the reverse is also true: memory creates and 
sustains the community… The creation of a common past is a means of defining what and 
who belong, and what and who deserve to be consigned to oblivion’ (Ho, 2001: 228).  
Memory is socially constructed and ‘the past is an eternally unfinished project’ (ibid: 
2). This point resonates in Vietnam’s case. Even though the state aims to tell one story and one 
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truth of its national past, its narrative inevitably encounters local and individual accounts. 
Moreover, even official representations of the past don’t stay the same, they are subject to shifts 
and changes in command of the present’s politics. Works of McHale (2002), Schwenkel (2008) 
and Sutherland (2014) have shown the shifting frame in representing Vietnam’s past. 
With the contribution of the new scholarship, ‘the national scaffolding of Vietnamese 
history began to fully collapse’ (Bradley and Young, 2008: 11). At the same time, the 
Vietnamese nation is reconceptualised as a social construct, ‘the hands of state agents in 
fabricating national myths’ are exposed (Vu, 2007: 210). The construction of the nation is not 
fixed once and for all, but are in a flux with forces at different levels. What is the nation is 
shown to be plural, fragile and contentious?  
Conclusion 
Up until the close of the 20th century, the international debate echoed the grand 
historical narrative of the official discourse in Vietnam. The common plot is that the 
Vietnamese Communists are nationalists before being communists. They found in communism 
the key to consolidate the national strength to drive out all capitalist aggressors. Vietnam as a 
nation has existed since the dawn of history with myths of Lac Long Quan and Au Co and 
myths of Hung Kings. Vietnamese people are highly conscious of their national identity as they 
always fight against foreign invasion. The Vietnamese Communists were able to appeal to 
Vietnamese masses because they are nationalists at heart. The claim to the existence of a 
Vietnamese nation with fully-formed traditions and self-aware people is the basis on which the 
Vietnamese Communists build their legitimacy in calling for rescuing, liberating the country 
and making the people the owners of their country.  
By the turn of the 20th century towards the beginning of the 21st century, the 
international literature started to problematize the conceptualization of the Vietnamese nation 
as an inherent and homogeneous entity and the nationalist credentials of the Vietnamese 
communists. Revisionist studies showed that the Vietnamese nation as it is today was only 
established under one rule in the early 19th century (Taylor, 2013; Goscha, 2016). There has 
been always more than one way of being Vietnamese and multiple claims exist to define 
themselves against other Vietnamese places (Li, 1998; Taylor, 1998 and 2013; Goscha, 2016). 
Moreover, Vietnam has always been home to multi ethnic groups, many of which may never 
want to be included in the nation-making project of the Kinh majority. Vietnamese 
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communists’ nationalist credentials were questioned and their rivals were given a space to 
display their nationalism.  
Insights from new social theories have focussed more on the ontology of the 
Vietnamese nation. Researches no longer claim to a master narrative of a nation, but keep their 
goal modest as the interpretation of the construction of the nation in specific contexts and 
locations.  The national past, myths, traditions and memories are now cracked out of its face 
value to reveal their constructed nature. The new consensus is that the Vietnam nation is a 
social construct and its construction occurs in various places: the acts of writing history 
(historiography), cultural sites like commemoration practices, museum, shrines and war 
memoirs and in people’s daily life practices. The deliberate hands of the state in making this 
nation was also exposed. 
This research is going to contribute the new scholarship in exposing the constructed 
nature of the Vietnamese nation and its role in legitimatizing the socialist state. As seen above, 
this is something already done by quite a few international scholars on Vietnamese nationalism 
in the 21st century. National heroes, the national past and national history have shown to be 
constantly being constructed and renegotiated to maintain and promote the legitimacy of the 
socialist state in present Vietnam. However, this research will approach the construction of the 
Vietnamese nation from a different theory, a post-structuralist discourse theory. Discourse 
theory have been long applied to nationalism, but never to Vietnamese nationalism. This study 
is the first which uses discourse theory to analyse Vietnamese nationalism. By analysing the 
Vietnamese communist discourse through documents in the VCP’s archive, this research 
studies how the communist-led revolution was constructed in the national frame. It examines 
the processes whereby the Vietnamese nation has come into being in the language of the 
Vietnamese Communists and how this construction of the nation contributed to the 
legitimization of the socialist state in the country.  
With this research, I aim to point out a vital place whereby the identification of the 
Vietnamese nation occurs: the writings of the Vietnamese Communist Party and its sponsored 
state. This is where the national and socialist narratives are produced, where the national and 
socialist subjects marry. These writings are produced by and for the consumption of the state-
makers of SRV. They are the world of subjectivities and currencies of thoughts embraced by 
the Vietnamese Communists. Through analysing these documents, my research aims to study 
processes of making meanings of nationalism and socialism among the Vietnamese 
Communists. Adopting the post-structualist approach, this research refuses to adopt pre-
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existing meanings of the nation and socialism. The nation, like socialism and any other political 
concepts, does not possess an inherent meaning but is an empty signifier the meanings of which 
depends on the system of relations and difference with other signs in a particular discourse. By 
analysing the language in its documents since the Party’s first predecessor appeared in Vietnam 
in 1925, I examine the long process of national identification and imagination in the VCP’s 
discourse. It is a historical analysis of the constitution of the nation and the socialist state in the 
communist discourse throughout the long history of the communism in Vietnam.  
Some scholars have studied the official documents of the Vietnamese Communists. 
However, they either rested on a pre-existent national idea of the Vietnamese in order to 
measure the success of the constructed nationalist discourse of the Communists (Nguyen, 
2002) or depicted the Vietnamese Communists as rational actors with full agency who are in 
control of meaning and ideology (Vu, 2009a, 2009b). These are also common features of the 
new scholarship in Vietnam studies. However, in the thoughts of post-structuralism, both 
agents and structures are socially constructed. ‘[A]gents and systems are social constructs that 
undergo constant historical and social changes as a result of political practices’ (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis, 2000: 6). This research will use post-structuralist ideas to refuse to see actors as 
rational and conscious agents with full agency. Vietnamese communists, like other actors, are 
not seen as rational actors who possess or control meaning but are themselves governed and 
controlled by the web of meanings in which they partly contribute to. They are the subjects of 
their own discourse, the Vietnamese communist discourse, the first and key victims of its 
productive power. 
In addition, the bulk of the new scholarship was laid on the recent processes of writing 
history and forging a particular memory (interpretation) of the past which glory the national 
origins and the leadership of the Party in after-war Vietnam. ‘[T]he wartime period remained 
largely untouched’ (Bradley and Young, 2008: 12). Although the name ‘the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam’ did not appear until 1976, one year after the second Indochina war terminated, the 
construction of socialism began long before peace and the national construction of the 
Vietnamese communists was initiated much earlier in the anti-colonial struggle. A very limited 
number of works have explored the constructing process in pre-unification Vietnam. Kim 
(2002) analyses the making of cultural policies and Pelly (2002) studies the process of writing 
the country’s history. This is to say that pre-unification Vietnam is under-explored in the new 
scholarship. This research aims to remedy this limitation in the existing literature on 
Vietnamese nationalism by exploring the process of national construction in the pre-unification 
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Vietnam. It studies how the revolution led by the communists in Vietnam is constructed in 
national terms throughout the lifespan of Vietnamese communism, covering the colonial and 
war-time Vietnams. In the next chapter, I introduce the theoretical framework and 





















Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
Introduction 
This thesis sets out to study how the revolution led by the communists in Vietnam is 
constructed in national terms. It examines the constitution of nationalism in the Vietnamese 
communist discourse by using the theory of a post-structuralist discourse analysis. In this 
chapter, I present the theoretical and methodological framework of my research. I first 
introduce the set of theories on which this research is premised. In the second section, I 
elaborate on the formulation of my research objects when applying the theoretical framework 
to the case of Vietnamese nationalism. Here I also state the time frame and the objectives of 
the research. In discourse analysis, theory does not only orient the formulation of objects for 
investigation but also informs the selection of research methods. Methods of collecting and 
analysing data are presented in the third section. In the final section, I self-reflect on my role 
as a researcher and on the truth value of the interpretation offered in this project.  
3.1. Theoretical Framework 
Amid the proliferation of ‘discourse about discourse’ in the social sciences (Howard, 
2000: 2), there are several conceptualizations of discourse and various ways to do discourse 
analysis. ‘The meaning, scope and application of discourse is relative to the different 
theoretical systems in which it is embedded’ (Connolly, quoted in Howard, 2000: 3). My 
approach to discourse stands post-structuralist and is heavily drawn from the discourse theory 
of Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe and the genealogical approach of Michel Foucault. 
While the former provides conceptual tools to theorize how discourse is constituted and 
operates in making a society, the latter equips me with a radical understanding of discourse in 
relation to power, knowledge and history. In what follows, I introduce the basic assumptions 
of post-structuralism and my understanding of discourse, before elaborating on Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse theory and Foucault’s genealogy. 
Post-structuralism 
Post-structuralism is a theory that is concerned with the process and practice of making 
and reproducing meanings. ‘Meanings control us, inculcate obedience to the discipline 
inscribed in them’ (Belsey, 2002: 4). Many other social theories including hermeneutics and 
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constructivism also have their focus on meanings. However, instead of reading meanings from 
observations, in the author’s interpretations and in the actors’ mind, post-structuralism locates 
meaning in ‘what goes on language’ (ibid: 70). This is because actors do not exist 
independently of systems of meaning but their identities are constituted as such within the web 
of meanings (Finlayson and Martin, 2006: 159). Language is no longer seen as detached 
transmitters of meanings, but ‘the origin of ideas’ (Belsey, 2002: 7). Therefore, language itself 
becomes a legitimate site to do social research. However, language, in post-struturalist sense, 
is to be ‘understood in the broad sense of the term to include all signifying systems, including 
images and symbols’ which give us access to information (Belsey, 2002: 3). 
This focus on meaning is developed from structuralism, which argues for the relational 
and differential nature of meaning. The meaning of a sign does not reside in itself, but in the 
relation to and difference from other signs. The relationship between signifier and signified is 
not natural as ‘the value of a word is not determined merely by the idea that it represents, but 
by the contrasts inherent in the system of elements that constitute language’ (Howard, 2000: 
21). This is the core argument of structuralism inaugurated by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1974: 68) and developed further by Claude Levi-Strauss (1968: 87), who argues for 
an analogy between language and society. Accordingly, the meaning of any social phenomena 
is decided by the relations with other social phenomenon in the social structure. Post-
structruralism inherits this relational and differential theory of meaning, but criticizes the fixing 
of meaning and structure in structuralism. Although ‘a sign gets its meanings from its 
relationships with other signs in a particular context, every sign can break with that context and 
function differently in new situations’ (Howard, 2000: 39). To post-structuralism, the meaning 
of a sign is not permanently, but only temporarily, fixed in a context, but it can potentially 
acquire new meanings when positioned in different relations.  
Discourse in the post-structuralist sense is the analytical concept to denote the system 
of relations and differences which produce meaning. This study embraces this post-structuralist 
understanding of discourse.  
Discourse  
In the absence of a centre or origin, everything becomes discourse (Derrida, 1978: 280).                                                
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At the less abstract level, the concept of discourse refers to ‘the systems of meaningful 
practices that form the identities of subjects and objects’ (Howard and Yannis, 2000: 3-4). At 
a higher level of abstraction, discourse is understood in this study to be ‘a particular way of 
talking about and understanding the world’ (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 1). In a bit more 
detail, it is ‘the means to organize a society into a structured totality, in order to give it stability 
and meaning’ (Sutherland, 2005: 191). The concept of discourse embraced in this study has 
five characteristics. 
First, everything in this world, from physical objects to social identities, is constituted 
as objects of discourse because it all requires a discursive construction to render it meaningful. 
The meaning and identities of objects, actors, social phenomena and society are to be located 
a system of relations and difference found in discourse. Meaning and identities are discursive 
in the sense that their production are always within discourse. This understanding of discourse 
does not deny the physical existence of an object, but any extra-discursive meaning outside 
discourse. To make this point clear, it is worth quoting Laclau and Mouffe at length. 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do 
with whether there is a world external to thought, or with realism/idealism opposition. 
An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense 
that it occurs there and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity 
as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath 
of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that 
such objects exist externally to thought, but rather different assertion that they could 
constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence. 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108) 
The concept of discourse in this study does not only recognizes the physical existence 
of objects or social phenomena but also affirms that this physical existence is part of the 
discourse itself. However, instead of viewing meaning of objects or social phenomena as 
causally governed by the material conditions as in realist accounts, the post-structuralist theory 
of discourse applied here proposes that the constraint the reality imposes on the construction 
of meaning is quite loose (Weldes, 1996: 286). The reality of objects and events might give 
rise to the construction of meaning, however, how the meaning is constructed is to be located 
in the systems of relations and differences in a particular discourse.  
Second, this research embraces a broad concept of discourse which ‘includes all social 
institutions, customs, practices and language’ (Sutherland, 2005: 191). In other words, 
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discourse includes everything that signifies. Things which signify, in post-structualism, are not 
only language, but also physical objects, social behaviors, practices, institutions and social 
events. This broad concept of discourse opens up various sites and places as legitimate sources 
of data for social research. Everything can be ‘read’ as ‘texts’ where meaning production takes 
place.  
Third, a discourse is a temporary fixing of meaning in the undecidable discursive field. 
It is an attempt to construct a totality of an identity or a social formation, to construct a center, 
to create its limits. The totality of a society, for example, is produced primarily through the 
construction of an enemy or an Other who is threatening the existence and purity of the society 
being constituted. Finding that Western thinking is always based on binary distinctions, Derrida 
(1976: 313-16) argues that because the outside is required for the definition of the inside, it is 
constitutive of the inside rather than separately detached from the inside. Thus, any society and 
social identity constituted in a discourse involves the construction of a constitutive Other. 
The notion of a constitutive Other lead us to the fourth characteristic of a discourse: it 
is contingent, temporary and precarious. A discourse is a temporary totality and, at the same 
time, ‘a reduction of possibilities (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 27). The temporarily fixed 
meaning and identity established in a discourse is the result of the exclusion of all other possible 
meanings that signs could have had and the exclusion of all other possible identities that 
subjects could have had. The outside is both constitutive and potentially destructive of a 
discourse. The excluded possibilities constitute the limits of a discourse, or the boundaries of 
the frontiers of a social formation. It is this very existence of the frontiers, the others and the 
excluded possibilities that reveal the contingency, the precariousness, the non-necessary 
character of a discourse. However dominant a discourse appears to be, it is only a temporary 
closure that is subject to pulling and pushing forces in various directions. To say that a 
discourse is contingent does not mean that it is completely arbitrary or could be changed easily. 
Every articulation has a new element but also carries with it some traces of the existing 
structure. In those cases where a discourse has sedimented as naturalized knowledge and 
attainted the status of common senses, it is by no means easy for a new articulation which 
establishes a new relationship between elements to be accepted.   
Fifth, it is in discourse that the relationship between power and knowledge is imbedded. 
Discourse produces knowledge and subjects of its knowledge and in doing so it tacitly allows 
certain course of action and excludes others. Therefore it has real social effect in the sense  that 
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it orients social actions and policies. Campbell (1998: 13) points out that the national 
commonsense in the international society, ‘the idea the national community requires the nexus 
of demarcated territory and fixed identity’, is complicit in enabling the conduct of the war and 
the horrendous violence involved in the Bosnian war. 
These five characteristics are the underlying philosophical assumptions of discourse 
applied in this research. My understanding of how discourse is constituted and how it strives 
to construct a society in a structured totality is drawn from the discourse theory of Laclau and 
Mouffe. 
Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe 
Laclau and Mouffe have constructed their theory by combining and modifying two 
major theoretical traditions: post-structuralist and post-Marxism. From post-structuralism, 
Laclau and Mouffe inherit the theorization of the contingency of meaning and the de-
centredness of structure. These analytical tools, when utilized to supplement the theorization 
of the society, identification and subjectivization of post-Marxism, open the way for a radical 
discursive conceptualization of the society and politics. While developing their theory, Laclau 
and Mouffe manage to eliminate the last remnant of economic reductionism and determinism 
of post-Marxism, to go beyond Derrida's obsessive focus on linguistic texts and blur Foucault's 
distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices (Howard, 2000). The result is a 
full-blown discursive research program which theorizes the entire social world as engaged in 
a constant struggle to fix meaning and subject all social phenomena to the analysis of discourse. 
Central to the constitution of discourse in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is the 
concepts of articulation and nodal points. ‘Articulation is every signifying practice that 
establishes a relation between elements such that an element can be identified’ (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985: 105). Elements are empty signs floating in the discursive field. An articulatory 
practice turns an element into a concrete moment in discourse by linking it with nodal points, 
which are ‘the privileged discursive points’ or points of crystallization around which signs are 
ordered (ibid:112). The function of nodal points is to arrest the meaning of a sign by stopping 
its sliding signification, or to turn elements into concrete moments of a particular discourse in 
articulations. A discourse is the structured totality resulting from articulatory practices. It is ‘an 
attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to constitute a centre’ (ibid). In the Vietnamese 
communist discourse, one of the foundational nodal point is ‘revolution’. Within this discourse, 
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the struggle led by the Vietnamese communists against the colonial government became a 
revolution, not acts of rebellion. Farmers and workers became potential revolutionaries while 
the feudal court were anti-revolutionary.  
In opposition to the positivist view that social actors have given interests and identities 
and society has a given structure, discourse theory insists that social actors are constituted as 
subjects and society is constituted as a total structure in discourse.  
Political identities are not pre-given but constituted and reconstituted through debate 
in the public sphere. Politics doesn’t consist in simply registering already existing 
interests, but plays a crucial role in shaping political subjects.  (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: xvii) 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, human beings has no ‘status of essence’ and ‘subjects 
cannot… be the origin of social relations… as all experience depends on the precise discursive 
condition of possibility’ (ibid: 115-116). Discourse makes available subject positions by which 
individuals are produced as social actors (Howard, 2000: 108). Any individual can have 
multiple different subjection positions, for example, a man can be a father, a son, a husband, a 
worker and a member of a nation. How these subject positions are ordered, what subject 
position is to be embraced and act accordingly is a matter to be interpreted in a particular 
discourse.  
The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe conceives of society as ‘a symbolic order’ 
(Howard and Starvrakakis, 2000: 5) and discourse as ‘the means to organize a society into a 
structured totality’ (Sutherland, 2005: 191).  However, they prefer to speak of ‘social 
formation’ as an empirical referent’ to study society (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 143).  
… (A) formation manages to signify itself (that is, to constitute itself as such) only be 
transforming the limits into frontiers, by constituting a chain of equivalence which 
construct what is beyond the limits as that which is not. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 
193-194) (italics in original) 
A logic of equivalence is the condition of possibility for the existence of every social 
formation (ibid). Social actors are all particularities with multiple different identities and 
interests. When a set of particularities establish a relation of equivalence by creating purely 
oppressive forces to represent the totality of a chain, a social formation is being constituted. 
The logic of equivalence establishes a purely negative identity so that by negating the same 
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force, multiple subjects which are otherwise plural and different can take on the same identity. 
‘The different characters of social identities collapse as they become inscribed in chains of 
equivalence that construct them in terms of certain sameness’ (Torfing, 1999: 125). If a, b, c 
are all – d, they are equal in relation to do. The negative force (-d) is the limit of that social 
formation, constituting its political frontiers. The logic of difference, in contrast, attempts to 
reduce negation and to expand the discursive order by breaking the existing chain of 
equivalence. While a popular project employs the logic of equivalence, seeking to divide the 
discursive space into two opposite, clear-cut camps, a democratic project employs a logic of 
difference weakening social antagonism, implying a plurality of political space (Torfing, 1999; 
Howard and Stavrakakis, 2000). The Vietnamese communist discourse in the 1920s and the 
1930s shows a strong operation of the logic of equivalence, which attempted to split the 
Vietnamese population along the line separating between ‘the oppressed’ and ‘the oppressors’. 
By investing on the construction of a common negative force, the communist discourse tried 
to weaken the internal differences of farmers and workers and organize them into a new social 
formation of ‘the working people’. 
A hegemonic formation is a social formation, the order and unity of which have been 
naturalized and taken for granted. The systems of meanings which enables the construction of 
a hegemonic formation has been stabilized as common senses. A hegemonic discourse is a 
discourse, in which the system of meanings it proposes has been widely received and relatively 
fixed. It has ‘brought about and institutionalized a certain vision of the world, of social and 
political reality’ (Norval, 1996:4). 
The concept of hegemony in discourse theory is built upon and at the same time a break 
with the Marxist tradition. Classical Marxists defines hegemony as a temporary alliance of 
differences and social groups with pre-determined identities and interests. Post-Marxists, like 
Gramsci, use hegemony to refer to the process of production of a new collective identity 
(Torfing, 1999: 108), or the transformation of a particular interest and demand into those of a 
collective or a universal (Howard, 2000: 109). In Gramsci’s theory, ‘the hegemonic processes 
take place in the superstructure and are part of a political field’ (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 
32). However, ‘it is still the economic conditions which control the result of this hegemonic 
process in the last instance because it is the economy that determines people’s true interests 
and the division of society into classes’, which are ‘objective groups to which people belong 
whether they know it or not’ (ibid). To Laclau and Mouffe (1983: 139), ‘hegemony is, quite 
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simply, a political type of relation, a form, if one so wishes, of politics’ (italics in original). A 
hegemonic relation is a relation ‘by which a certain particularity assumes the representation of 
a universality entirely incommensurable with it’ (ibid: xiii). In discourse theory, hegemony 
does not only denote leadership, authority and influence but also include a constructivist aspect. 
‘That is to say, the political as well as moral-intellectual leadership of a hegemonic force (state, 
class, movement, or other) hinges on the construction of discursive formation that provides a 
surface of inscription for a wider range of demands, views and attitudes’ (Torfing, 1999: 101).  
As with any discourse, a hegemonic project also requires the institution of nodal points 
‘that partially fix the meaning of the social in an organized system of differences’ (Torfing, 
1999: 109). For example, a nationalist discourse will certainly involve putting forward the 
concept of the nation as the nodal point to structure the symbolic order of a national formation. 
The condition for the emergence of a hegemonic formation is structural dislocation. 
Dislocation involves ‘the disruption of the structures by forces operating outside it’ (Laclau, 
1990: 17). They are ‘events that cannot be symbolized by an existent discursive order’ 
(Howard, 2000: 111). Dislocations reveal the contingency of the existing discourse, shatter 
existing interests and identities and induce a situation of crisis or identity crisis for subjects of 
the existing discursive structure. Social antagonism is a discursive response to the structural 
dislocation of the social order (Torfing, 1999: 131). The transformation from ‘myth’ to ‘social 
imaginary’ captures the formation process of a hegemonic discourse.  
The construction of social antagonism is essentially the process ‘detecting a cause of 
the dislocation that can serve as an enemy’ (Torfing, 1999: 131). Social antagonism plays an 
important role in the construction of mythical spaces and social imaginaries, both of which aim 
to reconcile the society in the face of structural dislocations. ‘Myth is a principle of reading of 
a given situation. The objective condition for the emergence of myth is structural dislocation. 
The work of myth is to suture that dislocated space through the constitution of a new space of 
representation’ (Laclau, 1990: 61-64). Myth functions to offer solutions to the crisis by 
introducing a new symbolic order for people to identify with, a surface on which unsatisfied 
demands and aspirations are inscribed as satisfied.  ‘The concrete or literal content of myth 
might include some vision of a promised land or ideal society… myth is a metaphor for an 
absent fullness – that is, a fullness which cannot be realized at present (Torfing, 1999: 115).’ 
If myth continues to dominate, the fullness it creates becomes the unlimited horizon of 
inscription of any social demand and any possible dislocation. That is when myth is 
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transformed into a social imaginary. ‘A social imaginary is a horizon in the sense that it is not 
one object among other objects, but rather the condition of possibility for the emergence of any 
object’ (Torfing, 1999: 115). A myth becomes a social imaginary when it successfully puts 
forward itself as a horizon of intelligibility ‘delineating what is possible, what can be said and 
done, what positions my legitimately be taken, what actions may be engaged in’ (Norval, 1996: 
4). Laclau (1990: 64) names the Christian millennium, the Enlightenment and positivism’s 
conception of progress, the classless communist society as examples of social imaginaries. Not 
any discourse putting itself forward as the embodiment of fullness will be accepted. Its 
acceptance depends on its credibility and the compatibility between its proposals and the basic 
principles informing the organization of a group.  
The Vietnamese communist discourse appeared in Vietnam in the 1920s when the 
country was in a structural dislocation after decades of French colonization. Anti-colonial 
discourses had introduced the national myth, which constructed French colonialists as the 
social antagonism, who were destroying and killing the Vietnamese people. The communist 
discourse inherited this myth and articulated a socialist myth to introduce another level of social 
antagonism, which was class exploitation. The story of how the Vietnamese communists rose 
to power is the story of how these two myths transformed into social imaginaries in Vietnam. 
While discourse theory offers a detailed theorization of how discourse is constituted 
and constitutes a structured society, Foucault’s genealogical approach provides a critical view 
of power, knowledge and history in relation to discourse. 
Foucault’s Genealogical Approach 
Foucault’s genealogical approach is ‘a form of history which can account for the 
constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects’ (Foucault, quoted in Howard, 
2000: 72). It is the historical study that ‘examines the historical emergence of discursive 
formations with a view to exploring possibilities that are excluded by the exercise of power 
and systems of domination’ (Howard, 2000: 49). Foucault’s genealogy entails a radical view 
of power, knowledge and history. 
Power in the Foucauldian sense is a productive force that produces and ‘provides the 
conditions of possibility for the social’ (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 13). Foucault’s 
productive power stands in contrast with the conventional concept of power as an oppressive 
force owned by a materialist force like the state, the army or the police. ‘What makes power 
hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh on us as a 
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force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms 
knowledge, produce discourse' (ibid). In The History of Sexuality (1990), he argues that the 
‘juridico-discursive’ conception of power in Western societies fails to examine what he calls 
the ‘normalizing functions’ and ‘disciplinary technologies’ of power, which has prevailed from 
the 17th century onwards. As productive power is embedded in knowledge and discourse, the 
study of discourse or the knowledge constituted in discourse are also the study of the operation 
of this new form of power.  
Foucault’s genealogy holds a critical view of knowledge and truth. The knowledge and 
the regime of truth constituted in discourse are not neutral and apolitical. They govern what is 
normal and accepted, therefore limiting the possibilities of actions within the accepted regime 
of knowledge and truth. The constitution of knowledge and of truth is at the same time the 
constitution of relations of power embedded in discourse. 
Power and knowledge directly imply one another… there is no power relations 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that 
does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. (Foucault, 1990: 
27).  
In addition, Foucault’s genealogy views history as ‘effective’ as opposed to the 
traditional concept of history as a linear and continuous development (Foucault, 1984b: 88). 
‘The development of humanity is a series of interpretations’, composing of both continuities 
and discontinuities (ibid: 85). In the genealogical approach, Foucault sets out to study ‘the 
history of the present’, which is not a search for origins of  the present-day phenomenon, but 
to reveal ‘the power relations upon which it depends and the contingent processes that have 
brought it into being’ (Garland, 2014: 372).  It is because things and events ‘have no essence 
and that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms’ (Foucault, 
1984b: 78) and ‘nothing in  man – not even his body – is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis 
for self-recognition or for  understanding other men (ibid: 87-88). Genealogy proposes to study 
the historical formations of discourse in order to account for the constitution of subjects, 
knowledge and power embedded in discourse.  
One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, to 
arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a 
historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of 
history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of 
objects, etc., without having to make references to a subject which is either 
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transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness 
throughout the course of history.                                         (Foucault, 1984a: 59) 
The theoretical insights of post-structuralism, in particular the discourse theory of 
Laclau and Mouffe and the genealogical approach of Foucault’s genealogy, inform my 
understanding of discourse and how it operates. This theoretical framework, when applied to 
study the case of Vietnamese nationalism, orients the formulation of objects of investigation 
for this research.  
3.2. The Case of Vietnamese Nationalism 
Research Objects 
[F]or discourse theorists…, objects of investigation are not given in experience, but 
constructed within particular theoretical frameworks. (Howard, 2000: 136) 
Applying the theoretical framework of discourse discussed above to study how the 
communist-led revolution in Vietnam is constituted in national terms, this research approached 
the nation as ‘an empty signifier’ and nationalism as certain articulations of the empty signifier 
of the nation as Torfing (1999: 192) proposed. Conventional thinking tends to ‘treat ethnic 
groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed’, 
and take these bounded groups as ‘the basic constituents of social life’ and ‘fundamental units 
of social analysis’ (Brubaker, 2004: 8). On the contrary, my standpoint is that these groups are 
not given and that social life is not naturally organized into these seemingly discrete, bounded 
groups. Instead, people are made into these groups through a variety of discursive practices or 
articulations of nationalism that enable them to identify with these groups. This 
conceptualization of the nation as an empty signifier is not to dispute its reality or discount 
their significance but to construe their existence in a different way. Just as Brubaker (ibid) does 
with ethnic common sense, nationalist common sense in Vietnam is what I want to explain, not 
what I want to explain with. I want to investigate how that the communist-led revolution is a 
national cause has been taken for granted as common sense, as a historical natural fact in 
Vietnam.  
As discursive practices, nationalism strives to provide the ‘nation’ with ‘a particular, 
substantial embodiment’ (Torfing, 1999: 193). ‘Nationalism tends to construct the nation-as-
this and the people-as-one’ (Torfing, 1999: 193) in the form of predicative statements.  
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However, ‘in the final instance the homogenization and substantialization of the nation can 
only be obtained through the discursive construction of ‘enemies of the nation’, which are 
simultaneously outside and inside the nation’ (ibid, 193).  
It is necessary to emphasize that, as with all nationalism, national identification with 
the nation is based on the fantasy of the enemy: an alien which has insinuated itself 
into our society and constantly threatens us with habits, rituals – indeed, discourses 
– that are not of our kind. (Laclau, 1994: 211) 
As a sign and articulatory practice, nation and nationalism are to be located in a 
particular discourse. Nationalism tends to construct the nation as a symbolic order of a society 
or a social formation2.  It often begins a myth to introduce the nation as a new space of 
representation, a principle to read a particular situation. When a nationalist myth has become a 
social imaginary, the nation has become as a nodal point in that particular discourse. The social 
reality of the nation has been accepted as natural.  
The study of the construction of the Vietnamese nation in this research is delineated in 
the communist discourse. Instead of seeing the growth of communism in Vietnam as inevitable 
in the emergence of the proletariat or as a political movement governed by rational actors, this 
research accesses Vietnamese communism as a discourse, which is the world of meanings and 
the sense of reality accompanying the appearance and expansion of communism in the country.  
Appearing in Vietnam in the turbulent years of the 1920s, the communist discourse was 
one out of several attempts to restructure a society dislocated in the process of colonialization. 
As a discourse, the communist discourse attempted to confer certain subject positions to the 
Vietnamese in their identity crisis, to convey a certain sense of identities to the Vietnamese, a 
particular understanding of the world and of their place in this international system. Out of 
many signs which were given meaning in this discourse, the nation was the focus of this study. 
                                                        
2 A social formation is understood in the way proposed by Laclau and Mouffe (1983: 193-194). 
‘… (A) formation manages to signify itself (that is, to constitute itself as such) only be 
transforming the limits into frontiers, by constituting a chain of equivalence which construct 




It aims to find out how the nation is constructed as a social reality in the communist discourse 
and how the communist-led political project was constituted as a national revolution.  
To sum up, applying the theoretical framework of discourse theory discussed above 
into the Vietnamese case, two objects of analysis are formulated for this research: the 
communist discourse and the Vietnamese nation. The study of the Vietnamese nation is 
delimited within an examination of the Vietnamese communist discourse. At the same time, 
the examination of the Vietnamese communist discourse is focused on those articulations 
which produce meaning and significance to the nation, which are approached as nationalism 
as explained above.  
Temporal Dimension 
In temporal terms, this study is a historical analysis of nationalist discursive practices 
in the Vietnamese communist discourse. Although the problem of the research (that the 
communist-led revolution in Vietnam is a national cause) is posed as a present one, it solves 
the problem not by examining the current manifestation of the communist-sponsored 
nationalism (several existing studies have done so), but by going into the historical context of 
the problem. Applying Foucault’s genealogical approach, this research offers a ‘history of the 
present’, which is not a search for origins of  the present-day phenomenon, but to reveal ‘the 
power relations upon which it depends and the contingent processes that have brought it into 
being’ (Garland, 2014: 372). 
This study analyses the communist discourse in Vietnam since communism first 
appeared Vietnam in the mid-1920s until the present. During this time frame, communism grew 
to be a leading force in the country, successfully driving out the French and the United States, 
maintain its monopolistic rule in independent Vietnam. This study also goes beyond the 
timeline of the history of communism in Vietnam, to look at nationalism in pre-communist 
colonial Vietnam3. The Vietnamese communist discourse is rooted itself not only in the 
international ideology of communism but also in the specific cultural and political context of 
colonial Vietnam. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how the Vietnamese identified 
themselves and the world in their encounter with the modern West under French colonialization 
                                                        
3 French colonisation began in Vietnam in 1858 and ended in 1954. Colonial Vietnam here 
refers to Vietnam during this time period.  
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before communism appeared in Vietnam in order to bring out such a context. This makes the 
time scale covered in this research is the entire recent history of Vietnam, which starts from 
the beginning of French colonialism in 1858 until the present time. The beginning of French 
colonialism is regarded here as the first encounter of Vietnam with the modern West4.  
Within the limited scope of a PhD thesis, this study is able to cover such a long time 
scale because it is not a historical research to recover historical details, but a historical study of 
the present in the Foucault’s genealogical sense. Under the genealogical approach, I aims to 
show those possibilities which were excluded in the communists’ project of national 
construction, the continuities and discontinuities in this project, the power and the regime of 
knowledge embedded in it. In studying nationalism in colonial Vietnam before the appearance 
of communism, I will be able to reveal the numerous attempts of identification amid social 
dislocations occurring in the process of colonization, some of which survived a short life while 
others were carried on a bit longer or inherited by the communists. Within the communist 
discourse, I will pay attention to the redefinition of the national space and the displacements of 
the limits of social division. I will study the knowledge that made possible the construction of 
the nation in this communist discourse and its political implications. Moreover, because this is 
a historical study of the present, it is also vital to examine the discourse in its present tense to 
show how the discursive formations in the past are brought up in the current era and participate 
in the present power/knowledge nexus.  
Research Objectives 
As a study of nationalism in Vietnam since its encounter with the modern West, this 
research aims to expose the constructed nature of the modern Vietnamese nation and display 
the political characters of this national construction. In conceptualizing Vietnamese 
communism as a discourse and Vietnamese nation as an empty sign, this study accounts for 
the process whereby the meaning and significance of the nation come about and what role this 
nation imaginary plays in relation to the rise to power of the communists in Vietnam. It argues 
                                                        
4 Although Vietnam’s contacts with European trade and missionaries dated much 





that that the communist-led revolution in Vietnam is a national cause is a constructed story, not 
an objective, historical fact as told in the country. It also argues that this national construction 
has contributed to making the hegemonic rule of the communists in Vietnam possible and 
durable. 
 In addition, it shows that at the core of the VCP’s rule is the struggle to create 
meanings, to generate knowledge, to produce common senses and to make truths. These 
seemingly naturalized objectivities, once constituted, work to discipline individuals, to channel 
their thoughts and behaviors, to turn them into the kind of subjects required for the monopolist 
rule of the VCP. The communist discourse has acted as a structure that limits actions and 
imagination in Vietnam for decades. 
This research is critical in revealing the contingent nature of the communist discourse 
and, therefore, the VCP’s monopolist rule. Analyzing the construction of the Vietnamese 
nation is a strategy to reveal this contingency. By showing that the nation has no center, that it 
is made of something outside itself, that its boundaries can be and have been shifted, the view 
of an essential and inherent nation is deconstructed. As the core nodal point ‘nation’ of the 
communist discourse is attacked, its regime of truth is made manifest as a political project 
rather than an objective unchangeable fact.  
As stated earlier, this study shares the Foucauldian genealogical view of history, which 
acknowledges that the present is the result of contingent political decisions and processes, not 
the inherent law of history or development. Taken into this case, the monopolistic rule of the 
VCP is not an inevitable certainty of history, but just a contingent phenomenon. Vietnamese 
politics could have been different and still can be different. However, it should be noted that 
this study stops at the recognition of the contingency of the VCP’s hegemony and the existence 
of other possibilities for political organization and imagination. It does not provide comments 
on the quality of the current political organization, on whether the current state of affairs is 
bad, or not so good, or should be changed for the better. The formulation of a recipe or 
procedure for an alternative is not among the purposes of this research.  
3.3. Methodology 
Data and Data Collection 
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As this research studies nationalism in the Vietnamese communist discourse, the 
possible data sources are all those sites which make up and relate to the communist discourse. 
Data for this research are written documents and books, which are composed of three types. 
The main source is primary texts written by the Vietnamese Communists in the Vietnamese 
language. The secondary materials are the academic books in English language that contains 
translations of related writings or linguistic practices of the Vietnamese and Vietnamese 
communists. The last data source is general materials on Vietnam’s politics and history, which 
provide knowledge about Vietnamese communism and nationalism and Vietnam’s history and 
politics.  
The main source for the primary data of the first type is the archive of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party, which is available online at http://www.dangcongsan.vn/tu-lieu-van-
kien/van-kien-dang.html, under the section entitled The Party’s documents (Văn kiện Đảng) in 
the e-newspaper of the Vietnamese Communist Party (Báo điện tử Đảng Cộng Sản Việt nam). 
Within this section, the data is collected from three subsections: The Complete Collection of 
the Party’s Documents (Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập), The Documents of the Party’s Congress (Văn 
kiện Đại hội) and The Resolutions of the Party’s Central Committee’s Plenums (Nghị quyết 
Hội nghị Ban chấp hành trung ương). This archive is the collection of the written documents, 
speeches and letters of the VCP throughout its history since the Youth League in the later half 
of the 1920s. Documents of this type were first made public in the forms of printed volumes in 
1995. Before 1995, many of these documents were classified as secret and access was limited 
to inside the circle of the Party’s members (Vu, 2000). Until now, the whole collection of the 
VCP’s documents is consisted of 59 printed volumes, all of which are available online under 
the sub-section entitled The Complete Collection of the Party’s Documents in the link 
addressed above. 
During the course of this research, there is a change in the way documents in The 
complete Collection of the Party Documents are presented in the Party’s e-newspaper, making 
the access much more difficult than it used to be. When I collected the documents in 2013 and 
2014, all the documents are available at a separate link and I could just copy and pasted the 
documents directly from the website. However, since 2015 the documents are no longer 
available on its own but are available only together with the whole volume it belongs to. All 
documents of one same volume were collapsed into one word file, which now has to be 
downloaded and technically dealt with before it becomes readable.  
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This archive is vast and it is impossible to read and analyze all documents in it within 
the framework of a PhD project. I therefore selected documents that are produced in the key 
meetings of the Vietnamese Communists, which are the National Congress and the Plenums, 
both of which are organized and run by the Party’s Central Committee, the highest authority 
within the VCP. The National Congress is the most important meeting of the VCP, when a 
large number of high-ranking members meet to assess past events, make guidelines for the 
future and vote for a new Central Committee. Up to the present, the VCP has held 12 National 
Congress, three in the war-time and the rest in the post-independence period. Plenums, or 
plenary meetings or plenary sessions, are held between National Congresses and involve fewer 
Party members. During the war time, when the VCP did not hold the National Congress 
regularly, plenums were when important decisions and policies were made. Therefore, for the 
post-independence period, I choose only documents of National Congresses because they are 
held regularly every five years. For the pre-1975 period, I choose documents from both the 
Party’s Plenums and the National Congresses. However, Plenums were only held regularly 
since the late 1930s, so for the period before Plenums’ documents were written I skimmed 
through the volumes of Party’s documents and selected important documents based on my 
knowledge about the history of the VCP. These documents of the VCP in its online archive 
make up the main part of my data corpus. Besides the online archive in the VCP’s e-newspaper, 
the corpus of primary data for this research also includes documents from some other websites 
of the Vietnamese government on law and history, which are also seen as part of the communist 
discourse. These primary documents are listed in the Appendix at the end of this thesis. 
Written documents of the Vietnamese communists are the perfect data to study the 
communist discourse because they are ‘the official internal voice’ of the VCP (Holcombe, 
2010). These writings are the first and key place where Vietnamese communists absorb and 
produce linguistic elements to conceptualize themselves, the nation and the outside world, 
where the communist subjectivities are produced and communist subjects are hailed. They are 
produced for the consumption of the Vietnamese Communists before reaching the Vietnamese 
mass. These writings are an important place where the Vietnamese communist discourse is 
constituted.  
Although there is concern over the accuracy of these documents, they remain legitimate 
data for the purpose of this research. It has been pointed out that many of the published 
documents had been edited in different ways before being brought to public (Vu, 2000). 
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However, this study is not a historical analysis aiming to recover what ‘really’ happened in the 
past, but a genealogical study into the worldview, the pool of meanings circulating among the 
Vietnamese communists. Therefore, the VCP’s archive suits the purpose of this research.  
Besides these primary data, this study also uses secondary data from the existing 
literature on Vietnam. Several works in English have studied Vietnam’s culture and worldview, 
and thus contain important writings and linguistic practices of the Vietnamese people and 
Vietnamese communists. These works form the secondary materials for this research. The data 
of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 in this thesis, which study the identity crisis and different 
identification projects in pre-communist Vietnam respectively, mainly comes from secondary 
materials of this type. They also use materials that are important historical writings of dominant 
figures in Vietnam in this period, which can be assessed online in various websites. They are 
Phan Boi Chau’s History of the Loss of Vietnam (Việt Nam Vọng Quốc Sử) (1905), Phan Chu 
Trinh’s speech Morality and Ethics of East and West (Đạo đức và Luân Lý Đông Tây) (1925) 
and Nguyen Ai Quoc’s The Indictment of the French (Bản án chế độ thực dân Pháp) (1925). 
Good discourse analysis requires good knowledge of the case in research (Hansen, 
2006). Discourse is not a stand-alone phenomenon but is rooted in the historical and social 
context where it arises. Moreover, the theory of discourse in this study assumes that physical 
objects and events are part of the discourse itself. Therefore, in order to be able to understand 
the historicity of discourse, it is essential to have a good grasp of the historical events and 
developments which had occurred. Given the strict control of the Vietnamese state on 
historiography, Vietnamese historical books only provide a partial knowledge and are treated 
here as part of the communist discourse itself. Therefore, throughout the time of this research, 
I tried to read standard works in the English language on Vietnam’s history and politics in order 
to equip myself with a more informed knowledge of the history of modern Vietnam. 
Methods of Analysis  
Out of the three types of data discussed above, the first type, the archive of the VCP is 
subject to the analysis. While the third type is read for a better grasp of historical events, the 
second type is to supplement the primary data in the archive.  
When sorting out documents as described above, I at the same time ordered them in 
chronological order and put them into sets which correspond to different historical periods in 
Vietnam’s history. I then had five sets of documents in hand, which are documents from 1925 
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to 1945, 1945 to 1954, 1954 to 1975, 1975 to 1986 and from 1986 to present. In doing this, I 
understand that changes in discourse do not always correspond to key historical turning points 
and this is reflected in the findings of this research. However, grouping documents is inevitable 
in order to be able to handle and analyze such a vast corpus. In this case, I chose to put them 
in a temporal order as I only have one topic ‘nationalism’ to look for.  
After having the documents in groups, I began the meticulous process of reading and 
analysis using the methods of predicate analysis, metaphorical analysis, deconstruction, 
juxtaposition and genealogy. Besides, Althusser’s notion of interpellation (to be explained 
below) and those concepts of discourse theory discussed in the theoretical framework are also 
applied in analyzing and interpreting the data.  
As discourse is ‘a particular way of talking about and understanding the world’ 
(Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 1) (italics in original), the first step to analyze a discourse is to 
find out what knowledge is constituted in it. This establishes the key subjects and objects in 
the discourse, how they are presented and what characteristics they are attributed to. Predicate 
analysis and metaphor analysis are applied to do this first step. ‘Predicate analysis focuses on 
the language practices of predication – the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to the 
nouns’ (Milliken, 1999: 232). By analysing predicates, we come to know the attributes or 
qualities of subjects and objects. Metaphor analysis is to find out the list of those ‘metaphors 
which are used regularly in the language practice of a group of society’ (ibid). The assumption 
under this method is that metaphors are not adornments to a description, they are partly 
constitutive of the object itself. They construct the meaning of objects, elicit our feelings and, 
at the same time, order the trajectory of our action or behaviors towards these objects.  
How people come to identify with the subject positions produced in discourse is the 
second issue of discourse analysis. The concepts of interpellation and hailing refer to this 
identification process. ‘Interpellation refers to the dual process whereby identities or subject-
positions are created and concreate individuals are ‘ hailed’ into or interpellated by them’ 
(Weldes, 1996: 287). For example, in the case of a national discourse, words such as the nation, 
the country, or the people should be looked at to draw out the ‘nationalist assumptions within 
their own conventional usage’ (Billig, 1995: 94) as they evoke the existence of the communities 
in the imagination of the audience and makes available the subject position as a member of that 
community. Word such as ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ evoke the sense of belonging to that community 
and silently insert the audience as a national subject.  
Discourse is only a temporary fixing of meanings. The order and the structure of the 
seeming society that a discourse strives to constitute are contingent. Deconstruction, 
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juxtaposition and genealogy are the methods to reveal this contingency. Deconstruction is to 
undermine the philosophy the discourse assists and the hierarchical opposition on which it 
relies (Butler, 2002: 25). Juxtaposition method is to point out events and issues that the truth 
in discourse fails to address or to show accounts which do not share the same definition. 
Genealogical method is based on Foucault’s genealogical approach, which involves historical 
study of discursive practices in order to show that things have had different meanings in 
different times. These approaches do not only show that the world could in principle be 
interpreted differently but also point out that the world has been and is being interpreted in 
different ways (Milliken, 1999). 
In addition, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory provides central tools to read and 
interpret data in this research. The theoretical concepts, which account for the process whereby 
a discourse strives to create a society in a structured totality, which are ‘dislocation’, 
‘hegemony’, ‘social antagonism’, ‘myth’ and ‘social imaginary’, are of particular importance 
in this research. (Discourse theory and its theoretical concepts have been introduced in the 
section ‘Theoretical Framework’ in this chapter). 
Translation 
This research studies a discourse produced in the Vietnamese language and presents the 
analysis in the English language. Most of the data is in a language different from the language 
of research, so there is a lot of translation involved.  As a study of discourse requires a careful 
handling of the meanings of words and their possible connotations, I did all the translation of 
the primary data involved myself. Although there are existing translations to many documents 
in the data set, I do not take them for granted or rely on them. While doing translation, I referred 
and cross-checked with existing translations, however, the final translations are mine. 
Translation is not an objective, value-free or clear-cut process. In many cases, there may be 
many equivalent terms in the target language to one term in the source language. In other cases, 
exactly equivalent words may not be available. Within my translations, I try the best to preserve 
the original meaning and connotation of the original word in the translated version. 
Regarding secondary data, which I use as data mostly for chapters 4 and 5, I used a lot 
of existing translations. This is because either I did not have access to the original documents 
or the original documents are in Chinese characters or in French. In these cases, the available 
English translated documents became the data of the research. In all cases that I had access to 




3.4. Self-Reflection  
As a reflexive researcher, I recognize that my background, personal interests and 
political preferences will inevitably leave their footprints in this project throughout different 
stages of the research. My background earns me some advantages in this project. With my 
general education in Vietnam and tertiary education specialized in Vietnamese politics, I am 
quite familiar with the language of the Vietnamese Communist Party and the official narrative 
of the country’s history. I know in advance what kind of documents are crucial in the Party’s 
archive and I am in control of the language of the data. However, this background is also a 
disadvantage because I am part of the culture where the communist discourse occurs. As I am 
very familiar with this discourse through my education, it is more difficult for me to take issue 
with the common sense and taken-for-granted knowledge to be investigated in discourse 
analysis. In order to solve this problem, I tried to read as much as possible about post-
structuralism and discourse in order to be more theoretical in reading the data.  
It is by seeing the world through a particular theory that we can distance ourselves 
from some of our taken-for-granted understandings and subject our material to other 
questions than we would be able to do from everyday perspective. (Jorgensen and 
Phillips, 2002: 22-23) 
I also tried to read international literature in the English language about Vietnam and 
its history to enhance my knowledge about various narratives, views and perspectives, which 
are different from the official narrative that I grew up with in Vietnam. 
In addition, my philosophical and theoretical assumptions have let me to frame the 
research question and choose the methods in this particular way. As ‘no social scientist can 
ever represent a political event or issue independently of the form chosen for the task’ (Bleiker, 
2001: 532), I acknowledge that my research is just one representation of Vietnamese politics 
deeply influenced by post-structualist thought and my understanding of discourse. I do not 
claim to conduct a value-free or objective investigation. However, this study provides a novel 
interpretation of nationalism and communism in Vietnam through a vigorous application of a 




CHAPTER 4: FRENCH COLONISATION AND THE IDENTITY CRISIS IN 
VIETNAM 
Introduction 
French missionaries and trade appeared in Vietnam in the 17th century. By the time the 
Nguyen dynasty was founded in 1802, the French had become prominent in the country’s 
politics. However, the colonisation did not begin until August 1858 when a Franco-Spanish 
squadron launched an attack in Da Nang, then a substantial commercial port in the centre of 
Vietnam. By 1884, Vietnam had fully become a colony of France under the Patenotre treaty. 
In this treaty, Vietnam officially recognised France as its protector, who would represent 
Vietnam in its relations with other countries and in dealing with the Vietnamese living 
overseas. This treaty divided the country into three regions: Cochinchina as France’s colony in 
the South, Tonkin in the North and Annam in the Centre as France’s protectorates. The French 
Indochinese Union, which included Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, was established in 1897 
with Cochinchina as its capital. By the turn of the century the French colonial government 
considered the pacification of Indochina accomplished (Marr, 1971: 76). A colonial 
administration had been in place to prepare for programs of colonisation. 
This chapter introduces Vietnam at the time of the arrival of the French and the identity 
crisis that French colonialism induced among the Vietnamese elite and intellectuals in order 
to, together with chapter 5, contextualize the background where the communist discourse 
arrived and thrived in the country. In contrast to the official historical narrative in Vietnam 
which tells a continuous and unified country disrupted by French colonisation, this chapter sets 
the scene of a multi-ethnic, fractious, disunited and young Vietnam or even of multiple 
Vietnams before and during the colonial period. By demonstrating the heterogeneity in the land 
presently called Vietnam, it shows that both the nation-making and the state-making were the 
projects of particular groups among the various people living in the country. After all, the 
making of a nation in Vietnam was dominated by the Kinh ethnic majority and this nation-
making project may have less or no resonance with many ethnic minorities. However, as this 
research is about the process of nation and state making in the discourse of the Vietnamese 
communists, this chapter and the next one are dedicated to tell the discourse of the Kinh 
Vietnamese elite and intellectuals, through whom communism penetrated and nested in 
Vietnam. Therefore, although the terms ‘the Vietnamese’ or ‘the Vietnamese identity’ are used, 
they are used under the recognition they refer to only a part of the people living inside the 
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Vietnamese territory. In the recognition of the multiple ways of being Vietnamese and the 
multiple experiences that French colonisation might have generated on different segments or 
ethnic groups in Vietnam, this chapter capitalizes on the identity crisis among the ethnic Kinh 
majority or the elite within the Kinh majority to be more exact because their discourse enabled 
the later emergence of the communist discourse which is the focus of research in this study. 
According to discourse theory, the identity crisis, which in this case occurred among the elite 
Vietnamese Kinh, who were deeply governed by Confucianism, entails structural dislocations 
which reveal the contingency of the existing elite discourse and gives rise to new myths to re-
structure the society in crisis.  
This chapter consists of two main parts. The first one introduces the land which is 
presently called Vietnam and the heterogeneous people inhabiting that land around the time 
French colonisation began in order to contextualize the nation and state making in Vietnam as 
the projects of the elite and intellectuals of the Kinh ethnic major group. The next one 
introduces the identity crisis generated by French colonisation among the Kinh elite and 
intellectuals, who then initiated different ways to identify with a nation, which will be discussed 
in chapter five.  
4.1. Vietnam at the Time of the French Arrival 
The country called Vietnam ‘that appeared at the beginning of the 19th century 
stretching from the southern border of China to the eastern border of Cambodia had never 
existed before’ (Taylor, 2013: 398). When the French missionaries and tradesmen first came 
to Vietnam in the 17th century, they found not a unified, clearly-bounded country but a 
fractious and multi-ethnic land called Dai Viet with territories in making. Although the Le 
dynasty was in authority in title at the time, the real power was wrested between the northern 
Trinh lords and the southern Nguyen lords. The more than century-long division, during which 
the Nguyen marched further southward, annexing the Central Highlands and into the Mekong 
Delta, was temporarily ended with the establishment of the Tayson dynasty (1770 – 1802). 
With the French’s help, the remnants of the Nguyen Lords, led by Nguyen Anh (king Gia Long 
reigned 1804 – 1820), defeated the Tay Son and unified the country under the name Vietnam 
for the first time in 1802 and established his court at Hue where his ancestors had ruled in the 
17th century.  
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Although Gia Long had unified the country under the reign of one ruler, it was until the 
reign of his son, Minh Mang (1820 - 1841), that attempts were made to centralize governance 
in Hue over the whole country. The viceroyalties at both Hanoi and Saigon were abolished and 
the administration in provinces were reorganised to be more directly under the authority of the 
royal court. It was until the year 1832 that the last Cham tributary kingdom to the north of the 
Mekong river was officially dissolved, marking the total annexation of Champa5 into 
Vietnamese rule which began since the 15th century. The Vietnamese also only withdraw from 
Cambodia, terminating its conquest of the Khmer6 land at the Vinh Te Cannals, which is now 
the current border between Vietnam and Cambodia, in 1847 under the reign of Thieu Tri, Ming 
Mang’s son and successor. During the 18th century, when the Mekong Delta came under 
Nguyen’s control on paper, there were still at least four forces competing for dominance in the 
region (Tana, 2006: 151). 
The new country of Vietnam not only had just appeared at the beginning of the 19th 
century during the rule of the Nguyen dynasty, its politics was also full of internal discord and 
greatly subject to foreign influence. After all, the French, especially the young missionary 
Pigneau de Behaine (1740 – 1799), played a key role in bringing about the consolidation of 
Nguyen Anh in the Nguyen’s struggle against the Tay Son. Membership in the early court of 
Gia Long was reportedly not only multi-ethnic but also multi-national and full of factionalism 
(Wilcox, 2006). In Gia Long’s court in his later reign of the whole Vietnam, there was ongoing 
tensions between the northern men with their classical educations and pragmatic southerners 
(Taylor, 2013: 402). However, Gia Long’s talented manner in dealing with court politics was 
able to keep both sides at bay. By contrast, Minh Mang’s centralisation policies and his more 
authoritarian manner provoked a serious of rebellions from various sections including northern 
ex-followers of the Le, Chinese merchants, Christians, ethnic minorities in the south and even 
ex-supporters of Gia Long’s court. Since Minh Mang’s reign, the Nguyen dynasty was wrecked 
with unrest and rebellions in many parts of the country. The court was also divided as different 
factions within the Nguyen family supported different claims to the throne. In the 1840s and 
                                                        
5 Champa refers to the once thrived kingdom made up of various independent principalities 
of Cham people in central and southern Vietnam from the 2nd century to the mid 15th 
century.  
6 The Khmer Empire was a powerful Hindu-Buddhist empire in Southeast Asia from the 9th 
century to the 15th centry. Its greatest capital city, Angkor, is in present-day Cambodia. 
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1850s as European powers gained momentum, ‘Vietnam slipped into a ferment of 
insubordination without effective leadership’ (Taylor, 2013: 445).  
This is to say that in contrast to the state-sponsored national narrative which viewed 
French colonisation as an interruption into an age-old unified Vietnam, Vietnam as it is today 
was recently established with the help of the French in 1802. While this narrative is premised 
on unity, disunity is a strong feature throughout the history of Vietnam. Before 1802 and even 
after that there are always more than one way of being Vietnamese and multiple claims exist 
to define themselves against other Vietnamese places (Li, 1998; Taylor, 1998 and 2013; 
Goscha, 2016). Contemporary Vietnam is the creature of Dai Viet conquest of Champa and 
Khmer land to the south, which was not finished until the 19th century. Not long after the 
establishment of the whole Vietnam under one rule, the country was soon divided by the French 
into three regions under different administrations in the Indochinese Union, which also covered 
Cambodia and Laos. This colonial geographical designation left a lasting effect on the national 
imagination of a number of Vietnamese anti-colonial activists. The communists had originally 
pursued an expansionist vision of an Indochinese Federation not a Vietnamese nation (Goscha, 
1995). Not long after the Vietnamese communists declared the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam in Hanoi in 1946, the State of Vietnam headed by the former Emperor Bao Dai was 
created in Saigon in 1949 and was later renamed as the Republic of Vietnam in 1955.  
Moreover, the land which covers the territory of Vietnam today has been inhabited by 
a wide variety of different ethnicities. Therefore, there were not only various competing claims 
to be Vietnamese within the Kinh ethnic majority, these national narratives may not resonate 
with Vietnam’s other ethnic minorities. An ethnic Vietnamese nation is not coterminous with 
state borders (Sutherland, 2014: 61). Vietnam is reported to be composed of 54 ethnic groups, 
out of which the Vietnamese or Kinh is composed of 86%. Other 53 ethnic groups do not 
become ethnic minorities until they are included into the nation state of Vietnam. In fact, well 
into the 20th century, the non-Viet people out-numbered the Kinh in the mountainous areas and 
highlands which accounts for over half of the country (Goscha, 2016: 4). These ethnic 
minorities’ experience of French colonisation might be very different from the experience of 
the Kinh. And indeed, as the next section will tell, the experiences of French colonisation were 
multiple among the Kinh Vietnamese themselves. 
Heterogeneous and fractious as Vietnam might be at the time of the French arrival, 
colonisation induced an acute identity crisis among the Vietnamese elite, which includes 
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members of the royal court, Confucian scholars and local leaders. This identity crisis among 
the dominant Vietnamese Kinh might not occur among all the people living in the Vietnamese 
land at the time, an account of it is crucial for an insight into the anti-colonial milieu based on 
which the communist discourse and the embedded national narrative latter emerged and 
thrived. The next section introduces the beginning of French colonialism in Vietnam and the 
identity crisis it entailed. As mentioned in the introduction, despite the acknowledgement that 
this identity crisis occurred only among a particular group within the Vietnamese population, 
an account of this identity crisis is crucial as it was the condition of possibility for the arrival 
of communism into the country and its subjects started the discourse of anti-colonialism based 
on which Vietnamese communism was built up. Although it is acknowledged here that the 
various identities which might exist in Vietnam at the time, the identities in focus are those of 
the elite within the Kinh majority, who were dominant in the country politically and culturally 
when the French arrived.  
4.2. The Identity Crisis of the Vietnamese Elite 
Marr (1971, 1981) had given a brilliant account on the challenges that the Vietnamese 
identity came under in the colonisation process as opposed to the common causal interpretation 
which ‘emphasizes economic or material aspects’ (Marr, 1971: 4). Although this research 
conquers with Marr’s focus to talk about ‘man’s eternal need to formulate potent reasons for 
this existence’ (Marr, 1971: 3), the two diverge on the conceptualization of identity and how 
to account for identification. While Marr studied the identity on ‘spiritual and psychological 
grounds’ (1971:5) or ‘political and social consciousness’ (1981: 3) to be located in human 
minds, this research locates the constitution of identities in discourse. Economic and material 
events and processes of colonisation are part of discourse, in the sense that they gave rise to 
articulations of meaning. However, ‘[N]none of them were other than brute facts, awaiting 
interpretation (Norval,1996: 51). This section will analyse how the ‘brute facts’ of French 
colonization were articulated in the discursive space of Vietnam. 
Upon the violent encounter with the French, the Vietnamese inevitably had to engage 
in a process of contemplation over the identity of the invaders in order to work out appropriate 
actions to deal with them. In defining the other, the Vietnamese were also pondering upon the 
definition of their own self. In the discursive space in Vietnam in this early colonial period, a 
sense of the Vietnamese identity was noticeable among the Kinh elite and intellectuals in the 
representation of the French as different and exclusive. However, the traditional elite discourse, 
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which was informed greatly by Confucianism, was still able to order the field of intelligibility 
in the country until the end of the 19th century. The Vietnamese, both those resisted against and 
collaborated with the French, were still guided by the Confucian concepts of Heaven and 
Righteousness. Collaborators justified their actions with Righteousness in avoiding the 
sufferings of the people ‘who were put under their care by Heaven’ and resistant leaders 
claimed be righteous in protecting the country ‘endowed by Heaven’. However, by the turn of 
the century, this collective identity was subject to self-appraisal. For the first time, the 
Confucian knowledge and education were articulated to be useless and the traditional way of 
living to be backward. The old Vietnamese identity or the traditional elite discourse were being 
dislocated. Colonisation and all the changes that came with it rendered the concept of Heaven 
and Righteousness obsolete. By the turn of the 20th century, the Confucian discourse was no 
longer able to structure the field of intelligibility in colonial Vietnam. While contributing to 
the dislocation of the Vietnamese elite discourse, the colonial discourse with the myth of 
‘mission civillisatrice’ ‘failed to exercise a hegemonic grip over the minds of the Vietnamese’ 
(McHale, 2010: 63).  
French Arrival and the Vietnamese Identity 
The relationship with the other is the very site where its (the self’s) original identity takes 
shape (Epstein, 2010: 337). 
The role of the self/other dichotomy in the production of social identities, especially 
collective identities, has been considerably established in the IR literature since Edward Said’s 
Orientalism (1978). The other has been asserted to have ‘the status of an ontological necessity’ 
(Baktin quoted in Neumann, 1999: 13) or a constitutive lack. In colonial Vietnam, the French 
colonists was found to play the role of the other against which the modern Vietnamese identity 
defined itself. Upon the violent appearance of the French, the Vietnamese were forced to 
contemplate the identity of the foreigners. As Marr (1971: 7) remarks ‘… groups seldom 
ponder their commonality actively until faced with internal cleavages or the menace… of 
outside intervention’. In the attempts to contemplate these strange people, the Vietnamese were 
at the same time pondering on their own identity. 
Foreign intervention provoked diverse reactions among the Vietnamese (Truong, 1967: 
2). There were numerous recorded resistance attempts, headed by either the court’s generals or 
partisans. The strongest resistance movement in this early colonial period was ‘Serve the King’ 
movement (Can Vuong). It was sparked by the Royal Edict on Resistance of the 12-year-old 
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king Ham Nghi (reigned 1884 – 1885) and his Regent Ton That Thuyet (1839 – 1913). After 
the death of Tu Duc (reigned 1847 – 1883), the internal division within the Vietnamese feudal 
court reached its peak. Ton That Thuyet struck the French troops in July 1883. The coup failed. 
He then fled with Ham Nghi and issued the Royal Edict on Resistance. The king was arrested 
in 1888 and Ton fled to China, but the movements still went on well into the next century. 
However, many members of the feudal court chose to actively cooperate or just go with the 
wind. It is not an exaggeration to state that without the cooperation of a significant segment 
within the Vietnamese population, the French would not possible to establish their 
colonialization.  
There was a popular tendency in the existing literature to divide the Vietnamese 
population along two lines of collaboration and resistance in reaction to foreign intrusion 
(Truong, 1967). Nevertheless, there was no clear-cut line to separate between collaboration and 
resistance. Although one side might choose to cede to some French demands, while the other 
denied any compromise, they all went through a painful process of defining the invaders, 
reassessing the identity of their country and themselves in relation to this collective idea.  
A sense of a Vietnamese identity was denotable in the Vietnamese writings in this first 
episode of the encounter. This identity was consolidated through the constitution of the French 
as difference and otherness. While defining the difference helps the identity to take shape, 
turning the difference into otherness, which poses the greatest threat to the integrity and 
certainty of that identity work to secure that identity (Connolly, 1991). In the Vietnamese 
discourse in this early colonial period, the French were represented as both different and with 
elements of otherness. The dominant representation of the French was to be racially and 
culturally different and militarily superior. Racially, the French had different appearance. 
Culturally they had a different way of living.  
Your eyes are blue, marine blue. Your nose pointed up, up to the sky. Your buttocks were 
comfortably lodged against the ass’s back. Your mouth whistled noisily to the dogs. Your 
house was full of bottles and bottle fragments. Your garden had nothing but grass (Nguyen 
Khuyen, 1874 in Truong, 1967:107). 
What is the meaning of life when you live with heretics who throw away the incense pot and 
thrust off the altar? This thought enhanced the sadness. 
What is the meaning of life when you live with the enemy militia, sharing favourless wine 
and nibbling bread? This sound worsens the shame.  
69 
 
You preferred to die fighting the enemy and return to our ancestor in glory rather than survive 
in submission to the Occidentals and live with barbarians in misery (Nguyen Dinh Chieu, 
1861).                                                   
The fist quotation is an excerpt from a mock oration at the funeral of the French general, 
Francis Garnier, who launched the first attack at Hanoi and was killed by Chinese and 
Vietnamese rebels in 1874. In this oration, Garnier was described to have different appearance 
and different lifestyle from the Vietnamese. The second quotation is taken from ‘the Elegy for 
Righteous Fighters in Can Giuoc’7, which was written to commemorate those who died fighting 
the colonizers in Can Giuoc, a rural district in South Vietnam, in 1861. In this verse, the French 
were pictured as a different type of humans, who ate bread and drank favourless wine, which 
were not the type of food and wine the Vietnamese had. What made the French even more 
different from the Vietnamese was the action of throwing away the incense pot and thrusting 
off the altar. Having an altar at the centre of the house, lighting incense and worshiping in front 
of the altar were then (and are still now) principal Vietnamese practices in the tradition of filial 
piety. Filial piety is one of the four core virtues of Confucianism, which had been the official 
ideology of feudal Vietnam for hundreds of years. The virtue of filial piety asks people to obey, 
to be grateful to and be responsible for their parents and ancestors. In this tradition, the altar 
and the incense signify the gratitude and the connection to the ancestors. Not lighting incense 
and not having altar at home was deemed unacceptable as it meant deviation from the tradition 
of filial piety. This explains why Christianity was seen then as threatening to Vietnam’s 
spiritual life and moral order and why the Vietnamese feudal court was hostile towards Western 
missionaries since the 16th century (Truong, 1967). In fact, the French defended their 
intervention in Vietnam with the rhetoric of stopping religious harassment and protecting 
Catholics (ibid). In the 19th century Vietnam’s discourse, the French were very often associated 
with Christian missionaries and, therefore, were likened to ‘heretics’ because of not practicing 
the worship of ancestors. 
In this elegy, those Vietnamese people, who drank Western wine, ate bread and did not 
worship ancestors, was articulated as sad and ashamed. Sharing life with the Occidentals were 
associated with misery. What in these practices made life meaningless? There is nothing 
essentially bad in and of themselves. These practices only acquire the meaning of sadness and 
shame when positioned in the relation of difference to the way of life that Vietnamese people 
                                                        
7 This elegy is included as a representing literary piece of Vietnamese literature in this early 
period of colonisation in the grade-11 national textbook on literature. 
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had long embraced. There is no reason why people who drink ‘favourless wine’ and eat bread 
cannot be happy. Why is it not possible for people to respect their parents and ancestors without 
having an altar and lighting incense? What made the French unbearable to live with was the 
obsession or the will to preserve our way of life, rather than something intrinsic to the nature 
of the French.  
Besides the discussion of their racial and cultural differences, the French were 
represented consistently with superior wealth and military power in the language of both 
collaborators and outright opponents. After his trip to France in 1863 to negotiate the return of 
the three southern provinces which were ceded to the French in 1862, the Grand Counsellor 
Phan Thanh Gian (1796–1867) reported to King Tu Duc that ‘their wealth and strength are 
beyond description’ (Tran My Van cited in Jamieson, 1995: 46). Upon his return from France 
he was assigned the post of governor-general of the remaining southern provinces. In 1867, 
when the French were enlarging their southern possession, Phan ordered his troops not to resist 
but to lay arms. This is part of what Phan wrote in his surrender letter before taking his own 
life: 
The French have huge battleships, full of soldiers and armed with powerful cannons. Nobody 
can resist them. They go where they choose; the strongest fortifications collapse under their 
attack. (Phan Thanh Gian, 1867 in Truong, 1967: 88) 
The relationship between Vietnam and the French was said to be between the fawn and 
the tiger in this letter. The analogy of France with fierce animals like tigers and dragons was 
very popularly used in the Vietnamese discourse in this period. Ton Tho Thuong (1822-1877), 
one of the first and highest Vietnamese participators in the French administration in Vietnam 
of his time, wrote: 
It is indeed not easy to play with the mouth of the tiger or the jaws of the dragon. The 
dragonfly is not aware of the power of the spider’s web until it is caught in it. (Ton Tho 
Thuong, 1866 in Truong, 1967: 85) 
Phan Thanh Gian and Ton Tho Thuong were well aware of the superiority of France 
over their country and perceived that there was no point in fighting against these foreigners. 
All they would get in return would be the unnecessary suffering of the people and their forces. 
In his surrender letter, Phan Thanh Gian (1867) pondered: 
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And I said to myself: I would be senseless for you to assail your enemy as for the fawn to 
attack the tiger. You would only draw suffering upon the people whom Heaven has entrusted 
to your care.  
Not only those who approved collaboration perceived the French as materially superior, 
proponents of the resistant side also did. Nguyen Dinh Chieu (1861), besides calling the 
foreigners Occidentals, barbarians and heretics, made the same analogy of the French to tigers 
and big sea fish. Hoang Dieu (1882 in Truong, 1967: 111), the viceroy of northern Vietnam 
and commander of Hanoi citadel when the French launched their second incursion into North 
Vietnam in 1882, said before he died: 
The enemy troops surrounded us, numerous as ants. The Western cannon exploded, deafening 
as thunder… We were weak while they were strong.  
The analogy between the colonisers and predators turned the French’s difference from 
the Vietnamese into the relation of exclusion.  The French were turned from a difference to an 
otherness. The French emerged as a totally different race but higher in the food chain, who was 
capable of swallowing up the Vietnamese. The existence of these foreigners was presented as 
threatening the very existence of the Vietnamese. 
In this first episode of Vietnam’s encounter with the French, the colonisers were 
represented with elements of both difference and otherness. They not only looked and lived 
differently. What was particularly worrying is that their existence was threatening the very 
existence of the Vietnamese. Metaphors such as ‘Occidentals’, ‘barbarians ‘and ‘heretics’ were 
in place to describe the French. The relationship between the Vietnamese and the colonizers 
was juxtaposed with that between the fawn and the tiger, or between the dragonfly and the 
spiders’ web. In this very attempt to contemplate these Westerners that they were encountering, 
the Vietnamese were, at the same time, contemplating their own identity. The unfolding of a 
different way of existence in front of their eyes functioned as a reflection for the Vietnamese 
to read and/or reassert their identity into being.  
However, recognising the role of the French in enabling the sense of a Vietnamese 
identity take shape still owns the answer to a question. What that constituted the French as 
Occidentals, heretics, barbarians and miserable to live with? Was it the skin and eye colour, or 
the modern weapons of the French? An answer from the theoretical framework of the post-
structuralist discourse analysis would require more than the description of the physical and 
material conditions into the realm of meaning of the Vietnamese people before and at the time 
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the French came. It is to the traditional Vietnamese discourse, the one that functioned as the 
organising ideational structure governing the discursive field in Vietnam at the time of the 
French’s arrival, that I will now turn to. This pre-colonial discourse will also help to settle a 
relating puzzle as to understand how some Vietnamese still fought the Westerners despite of 
the knowledge about the enemy’s thunder-like might and a guaranteed death. 
Confucianism as the Traditional Vietnamese Elite Discourse 
Vietnam has always been a country of multi religions and various indigenous beliefs 
besides of being multi-ethnic. At present, there are six popular religions, three of which, Cao 
Dai and Hoa Hoa and Protestantism, were founded recently early in the 20th century when 
French colonisation was on. Other three, Buddhism, Christianity and Muslim exerted their 
influence in the country much earlier. Other religions exist here as well. In addition, each in 
the 54 ethnic groups has their own indigenous beliefs and traditional customs. Around the time 
the French arrived in Vietnamese politics in the 18th century, as noted before, there existed 
different ways to be Vietnamese and many regional differences. Even during the period when 
Vietnam was unified by king Gia Long after 1802, pluralism was a strong feature of the country 
(Wilcox, 2006). ‘The search for the ‘real’ Vietnam or for the ‘cultural core’ of being 
Vietnamese is bound to fail’ (Taylor, 2013: 625). This is in tune with the comment of 
Tagliacozzo, Siu and Perdue (2015: 2) that none of the regions or nation-states within Asia ‘is 
homogeneous by any criterion, whether linguistic, cultural, religious, economic or historical’. 
Therefore, it is not possible to account for a traditional Vietnamese culture which can resonate 
with all the people living inside the state border of Vietnam at any time. However, it is possible, 
and this case necessary, to talk about a dominant feature of the high culture within the elite 
Vietnamese Kinh or at least a group within the Kinh elite around the start of French 
colonisation in the country. This section gives an account of this elite Vietnamese discourse, 
Confucianism, which governed the subjectivities and worldviews of the Kinh elite during their 
first encounter with the modern West.  
While Buddhism was more popular in the Vietnamese royal court during dynasty of Ly 
(1009-1225) and Tran (1225-1400), Confucianism exerted an increasing influence since the 
late 15th century and became dominating since 1802 when the Nguyen dynasty acquired power. 
Perceiving recent Vietnamese history as decadent and disorganized, Nguyen rulers ‘sought to 
make Neo-Confucianism the foundation of the national culture’ (Jamieson, 1995: 11). 
Confucianism, with its hierarchical system of values and education, was the most popular 
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organising philosophy of the Vietnamese royal court during the Le dynasty (1428 – 1788) and 
the later Nguyen dynasty. Examinations in Confucian classics were used to fill bureaucratic 
positions at all levels of the administration. Chinese characters were the administrative and 
literary written language of the elite. ‘Confucianism was the ideology of the rulers’ (Taylor, 
2013: 9) However, the assimilation of this Chinese cultural import remained the asset of the 
Vietnamese elite ‘because only the elite could afford the luxury of a long-term education in the 
Confucian classics, the bulk of the people remained outside the pale of sinincization’ 
(SarDesai, 2008: 17).  ‘The mass retained the Vietnamese language, customs and religious 
beliefs rooted in animism and ancestor worship’ (ibid).  This is to say Confucianism functioned 
as a popular elite discourse at the time the French arrived. 
However, the influence of Confucianism indeed varied across regions in Vietnam and 
among regional members of the Nguyen court. While the north was the cradle of Confucianism, 
its popularity decreased towards the far south. During the reign of the Nguyen dynasty, the 
bulk of Confucianists in the country came from the North. Graduates from the central provinces 
adjacent to Hue started to appear in the 1830s, but ‘graduates from further south were extremely 
rare’ (ibid: 417). In Gia Long’s court, the first court of a Vietnam which possessed the territory 
pretty much like present Vietnam, there were tension between Confucian northerners and 
pragmatist southerners who bore different perspectives on education (ibid: 398-403). During 
Tu Duc’s reign (1847 – 1883) when French colonisation officially started, Confucian men, 
especially from Nghe An and Ha Tinh, were more prominent (ibid: 438). Even though Tu Duc 
was himself a devoted Confucianist and Confucianism was more popular in north Vietnam, 
unrest and rebellion were more endemic in the north than other parts of the country. It is 
because, as mentioned above, Confucianism had always remained the ideology of the rulers. It 
did not help the elite to develop a common touch but, on the contrary, enabled the elite to 
remain isolated from the mass. 
Although recognizing the diversity of cultural streams and the varying influence of 
different religions or ideologies over different regions and among different factions in the royal 
court in pre-colonial Vietnam, in this research I laid the focus on Confucianism and viewed it 
as the traditional Vietnamese elite discourse because of its domination and popularity in the 
ruling court at the time of the French arrival. 
Originated in China before Christ, Confucianism is one of the central ideologies to 
conceptualize, to organise and to govern society in many Asian countries including China, 
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Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. Confucianism revolves around an orderly and unified 
structure of society and the unity of the self. This structured society is centred upon the concept 
of Heaven (Tian) and is composed of five sets of patterned relationships: king – subject, father 
– child, wife – husband, brothers, friends. Heaven refers to the transcendental divine force, 
which creates, watches and judges society and its populace. In order for a society and for each 
individual to thrive, human beings have to behave in line with the moral standards according 
to the wish of Heaven. Human beings are rational actors, who are able to and have to perfect 
their morality in line with each set of social relationships. Five moral constants of a proper 
person (người quân tử) are Humanness, Righteousness, Proper Rite, Knowledge and Integrity 
(Nhân, Nghĩa, Lễ, Trí, Tín). Confucianism proposes to govern society with morality and the 
perfection of morality of human beings is the way to build an ideal society. Family is the 
nuclear of this society, the key place to nurture the morality of individuals.  
Confucian concepts of Heaven and Righteous had long acted the role of nodal points in 
the elite discourse in Vietnam. In the past, the existence of Vietnam was justified by referring 
to these truisms (Vuving, 2001: 63). 
In the mountains and rivers of the southern empire, the Southern Emperor dwells. 
Its sovereignty is of nature's will and is allotted in the Book of Heaven. 
What gives the invaders the right to trespass? 
They shall, in doing that, see themselves in total failure! 
(Ly Thuong Kiet, 1077) 
Under the mandate of heaven, the emperor state, 
…Righteousness brings in peace 
The army’s task is to fight cruelty 
Our ancient Dai Viet  
Has long had a civilisation 
Territories with rivers and mountains has been demarcated  
The North’s traditions are different from the South’s 
Since the dynasties of Trieu, Dinh, Ly, Tran established an independence 
Together with the Han, the T’ang, the Sung and Yuan, each side reigns a domain  
Strong and weak it may vary 
Heroes always exist.                                                      (Nguyen Trai, 1428) 
The first poem is recorded in the Vietnamese history as written by Ly Thuong Kiet 
(1019 – 1105), the general and admiral of the Ly Dynasty, in 1077 in order to boost his soldiers’ 
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morale in the fight against the Song invaders. The second one is written by Nguyen Trai (1380-
1442), the chief minister of King Le Loi (ruled 1428 – 1433), to proclaim the pacification after 
the withdrawal of the Chinese Ming. These pieces are now considered as the two early 
declarations of independence of Vietnam in its official historiography and made compulsory 
literary pieces in high school. In both of these verses, a sense of sovereignty was detected that 
a southern emperor and a southern civilisation reigned the southern territory. The right to 
sovereignty and existence of the southern empire is taken as a matter of course or a matter of 
nature. These matters of course are justified in relation to transcendental concepts or truism. In 
the first poem, the truism, ‘the supreme source of authority’ (Vuving, 2001: 65), is Heaven. In 
Nguyen Trai’s verse, the source of strength is not only the cosmological force of Heaven, but 
also the essence of an ancient civilisation which crystalizes in the moral constant of 
Righteousness.  
These two concepts of Heaven and Righteousness were found to be in their usual 
operation as the discursive centres of the Vietnamese in their early encounter with the French. 
Faced with the coming threats from the French, these two concepts were articulated to be not 
only the ultimate centre to justify the existence of the Vietnamese but also the ultimate protector 
of its destiny.  
As for us, we are loyal and grateful subjects of Vietnam. We are intimately bound to the 
customs and habits of our country, and we are determined not to give up these customs and 
habits though we encounter death. We trust fully in Heaven, Earth, and the Spirits of our 
country, who well understand our destiny in this world and who will grant us their protection. 
(Hoang Hoa Tham, 1890 in Truong, 1967:138)                                 
…China… is a thousand times more powerful than Vietnam, could not rely upon her strength 
to swallow us, it was surely because of the destiny of our country had been willed by 
Heaven…’            (Phan Dinh Phung, 1886 in Truong, 1967: 125)   
The authors of these lines were popular resistance leaders in the Can Vuong movement. 
Both these resistance fighters conceptualized the political entity where they belonged to as 
Vietnam8. In the tradition of Ly Thuong Kiet and Nguyen Trai, they referred to Heaven as the 
guardian of their country. The French were juxtaposed with China and its future was linked 
                                                        
8 Although the quotations contain the concept of the country, it is a translated word, not an 
original usage. Given that I don’t have the original versions of the documents and don’t’ have 
knowledge of the original language, the country here should be undertood as a general 
political entity, not as a country per se.   
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with failure as Heaven was in Vietnam’s side. Even if the resistance fighters died, they would 
‘become powerful spirits who have fought the enemy’ and they would not be ‘at fault with a 
thousand generations to come’ (Nguyen Quang Bich, 1888 in Truong, 1967: 129-130) because 
their action was deemed in line with the Confucian moral constant of Righteousness. 
Righteousness denotes that in all circumstances a person should act properly in the 
interest of the people and the country.  In the Royal Edict on Resistance (Chiếu Cần Vương), 
King Ham Nghi reminded his mandarins and the Vietnamese people of the moral obligations 
to their king.  
The officials of the court should abide only by righteousness. Knowing righteousness, they 
should live and die by it (King Ham Nghi, 1885 in Truong, 1967: 116 – 120).                                    
In response to his edict, Can Vuong movement was organized throughout the country 
and lasted for a few decades. Participants of this movements were not blind to the power and 
strength of the French troops. On the contrary, they were well aware of the discrepancies 
between their force and the enemies’. Nguyen Quang Bich, in his 1888 ‘Reply to a French 
Summon to Surrender’, commented that ‘our effort to oppose your country with a resistant 
movement was composed of a few partisans and a thousand or so exhausted troops’ (in Truong, 
1967: 129-130).  Phan Dinh Phung (1886 in Truong, 1967: 125) frankly assessed his situation 
to be worse than the situation described in an old Vietnamese saying ‘take the arm of the locust 
to halt the carriage’.  
However, the material characters of the French weapons did not constraint the actions 
of resistant fighters, but the Confucian concepts of Heaven and Righteousness did. Despite 
being aware of the power imbalance between the French and themselves, the resistant fighters 
still fought against these militarily superior invaders because this course of action was deemed 
morally accepted or righteous in the Confucian discourse. The idea of constructivism rings its 
bell in this point. People act towards objects on the basis of the meanings that objects have for 
them, rather than being governed directly by them (Fay quoted in Weldes, 1996: 279 – 281).  
The language of Righteousness and Heaven were also spoken by people who supported 
peaceful compromise with the French. After spending several years in France and Europe, 
Nguyen Truong To (1827-1871) advised the king to compromise to the French and presented 




Our country has the protection of Heaven above it, the support of the Earth under it. These 
are astronomical and geographical foundations. In this world our country is, after all, an 
independent country. (Nguyen Truong To, 1866 -1868 in Truong, 1967: 93) 
Nguyen Truong To supported reforms and temporal accession to French demands with 
the aim to ‘accumulate our strength, waiting for the day when we shall go into action… Nothing 
is too late…’ (ibid: 91).  
Perceiving the French’s power as tiger-like, Phan Thanh Gian miserably surrendered 
and self-declared to be a traitor to his king. He then chose to take his own life as the French 
flag ‘should not fly over a fortress when Phan Thanh Gian still lives’. His reason to surrender 
was that if not ‘you would only draw suffering upon the people whom Heaven has entrusted 
you to your care’ (in Truong Buu Lam, 1967: 73-74). So not fighting the French was 
articulated to be in line with the relationship of a subject to Heaven, who ordered the care of 
the people. Twenty years after the death of Phan Thanh Gian, Hoang Cao Khai also spoke the 
language of Heaven and Righteousness in advising Phan Dinh Phung to stop fighting against 
the colonial government. In the letter to request Phan Dinh Phung to surrender, he spoke 
highly of Phan’s loyalty to the Kinh and blamed Phan for the hardship of hundreds of families 
in their province. Hoang (1886 in Truong, 1967: 121-127) predicted that if Phan pursued the 
struggle, ‘not only will the population of our village be destroyed but our entire country will 
be transformed into a sea of blood and a mountain of bones’. So not resisting the French was 
associated here with the survival of the people and the country, which was in line with the 
virtue of righteousness. In this letter, the current status of Vietnam as the colony and 
protectorate of France was also associated with the will of Heaven.  
Concepts of Heaven and Righteousness were the discursive nodal points that governed 
the Vietnamese in their first period of encounter with the French. The Confucian discourse still 
managed to structure the society and govern its subjectivities in Vietnam in the early period of 
colonialization. However, it is in this very moment of dominance of the Confucian discourse, 
its contingency and its lack of a centre are already revealed. The fact that two opposite courses 
of action (resistance and collaboration) were referred to the same Confucian concepts showed 
that these Confucian concepts do not have an inherent fixed meaning, but its meanings are 
constructed in the relation with other elements and are open for interpretations. When 
‘Righteousness’ and Heaven’ are juxtaposed with the king and the country, resisting the French 
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becomes a desirable course of action. When these words are put alongside the people, 
collaborating with the French to avoid the people’s suffering becomes a legitimate choice.  
Three decades after the French’s arrival, the Confucian discourse was still in business 
in the Vietnam’s discursive space. Nodal points ‘Heaven’ and ‘Righteousness’ were still able 
to play their roles in structuring the societal order. Anti-French Vietnamese converged on the 
preservation of the Vietnamese way of life. Phan Dinh Phung and other patriots of this 
generation ‘sought only to restore the old order by clinging to traditional values’ (Ho, 1992: 
20). ‘The partisans fought to recover the independence of their country, to avenge their king 
and to safeguard their traditional pattern of life’ (Truong, 1967: 29). Even collaborators with 
the colonizers were not questioning the value of the country’s Confucian identity. However, 
‘by the turn of the century, the authority of Confucian ideology and social institutions and of 
the scholar-gentry class… was beginning to erode’ (Duiker, 1981: 8).  
Dislocations of the Confucian Discourse 
… Our rivers and mountains have died, living only increases the humiliation, Confucian 
guardians have disappeared, learning is a waste! ... (Phan Boi Chau, 1905) 
As the 19th century drew to a close, the Confucian discourse was disintegrating as the 
colonisation process got underway. France’s military power and its numerous social and 
economic changes worked to dislocate the Confucian order, shattering the Vietnamese existing 
identity as subjects of Heaven’s protection and governed by Righteousness. The two concepts 
were no longer served as the points of identification that had held the Vietnamese together for 
hundreds of years. By the first decade of the new century, ‘the traditional Vietnamese scholars 
realized full well that their accustomed world was gone forever’ (Jameison, 1995: 52). A sense 
of losing the country, losing the soul and identity was pervasive among the new generation of 
scholar-gentry after the turn of the century (Marr, 1971: 96). Different from the previous 
scholars like Nguyen Dinh Chieu and Phan Dinh Phung, who aimed to preserve the traditional 
Vietnamese way, the new generation admitted the loss and articulated the need for reforms, for 
changes to the Vietnamese traditional way of living. Many social movements were launched 
to campaign the Vietnamese about the backwardness of old customs and the redundancy of old 
knowledge, which used to be regarded as elements of a proud civilisation in Vietnam’s second 
declaration of independence written by Nguyen Trai in 1428. People were now asked to self-
renovate and study modern subjects. 
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The nodal points of the traditional elite discourse, Heaven and Righteousness, the 
supreme source of authority or the ultimate guarantee of Vietnam’s strength, collapsed in 
Vietnam’s encounter with French military power. ‘Both armed resistance and righteous 
abstention had become meaningless’ (Jamieson, 1995: 55). The loss of Can Vuong movement 
put a stop to the outright resistance against the colonizers led by ‘soldiers of Righteousness’. 
Those who wanted to live with the old ways had no choice but seek refuge in the countryside 
and found themselves increasingly lonely. A popular mandarin of his time, Nguyen Khuyen 
(1835-1909), tried to forget the country’s matter by immersing himself in the beauty of nature 
and the simplicity of village life. Those mandarins like Nguyen had come to recognise their 
inability toward the loss of their country into the hand of the French. Working for the French 
was considered outrageous, fighting certainly led to death, the only acceptable behaviour was 
what they had done. Together with the feeling of losing the country, they felt that the righteous 
mandarins of their generation were outgoing. In his poem, Nguyen Khuyen (1902) complained 
about the lack of friends to drink with: ‘I have nice wine, but no good friends’. In the same 
poem, he moaned: ‘You are old, I have turned old too’. Vietnamese Confucian-trained scholars 
in the first decade of the 20th century were like ‘ducks out of water’, who were pushed out of 
their usual habitat. Nguyen Khuyen’s cry for his friends was the cry for his generations and the 
age-old ideology of Confucianism. Traditionally, the Vietnamese highly appreciated 
Confucian scholars. Mastering Confucianism was the only way to earn respect and 
employment in the administration of the feudal court. The colonial rule rendered the old 
education and these Confucian learners less desirable and even redundant. It was no longer 
regarded as an adequate means of living, neither the means of social upgrading. Western 
education and the ability to speak French was getting more valuable.  
What good are these Chinese characters? 
All those Ph.D.’s are out of work. 
Much better to be a clerk for the French: 
You get milk in the morning and champagne at night. 
                                                    (Tran Te Xuong quoted in Jamieson, 1995: 55) 
Besides eroding the old Confucian learnings, grand constructions of modern 
infrastructures under French colonisation also symbolically dislocated the traditional 
Vietnamese discourse. Under the frenzied program of building a modern transport system 
during the reign of the infamous governor Paul Doumer (governed 1897 – 1902), the first iron 
bridge was built over the Red river, where in legend resided a dragon symbolizing one of the 
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guardians of Vietnam. This French bridge plunged into the very heart of the symbolic dragon 
(Jameison, 1995: 56) as if the age-old identity of the Vietnamese were dislocated at its very 
centre.  
By the first decade of the 20th century, movements for modernisation were gaining 
momentum in Vietnam. For the first time, the old way of life was condemned publicly and 
bluntly by Confucian scholars. The call for renovation by respected paragons of Neo-
Confucian virtues must have struck more Vietnamese people than by French collaborators. The 
most prominent voices were Phan Boi Chau (1867-1940) and Phan Chu Trinh (1872-1926). 
Phan Boi Chau founded an Association for the Modernisation of Vietnam (Duy Tan Hoi) in 
1904 and launched the Eastern Travel Movement (Dong Du) a year later. His aim was to 
encourage young Vietnamese to study modern ideas instead of the Confucian classics in order 
to liberate Vietnam from the French colonial rule. The Dong Du movement had enabled 
thousands of young Vietnamese to Japan to observe and learn from ‘the miracle of the rising 
sun’. As a Confucian scholar, Phan Boi Chau looked to establish an independent monarchy 
with a monarch that he already had in mind, Prince Cuong De (1882-1951), a direct descendant 
of the maker of the Nguyen dynasty – King Gia Long (ruled 1904 – 1820). Besides urging 
Vietnamese people to acquire greater knowledge, Chau insisted on throwing out the French 
rule by the means of armed rebellion. His inclination to violence separated him from his close 
friend Phan Chu Trinh. 
 Phan Chu Trinh held a peaceful approach, which emphasized self-renovation instead 
of direct armed struggle. He launched a campaign for modernisation by setting up schools 
teaching modern subjects such as Maths, Science, Geo-History, Business and Physical Exercise 
in central provinces. Trinh wrote boldly ‘… not omitting Chinese character, it is impossible to 
rescue the country’ (quoted in Dinh Xuan Lam et all, 2014: 162-164). The degree of the old 
examination was also said to be valued at one cent (ibid). Traditional customs like drinking 
rice wine and superstition were heavily criticized.  
While three decades earlier Nguyen Dinh Chieu resolutely refused to cut his hair, this 
neo-Confucian figure eagerly urged people to ‘go out and cut your hair’ (quoted in Jamieson, 
1995: 60). 
We have awakened, and the entire country is modernizing. So go out and cut your hair! Don’t 
leave and more land for that stupid gang of parasites to colonize on top of your heads, from 
which they can such your blood! Wouldn’t it feel wonderful to be rid of them? (ibid).  
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Hair is traditionally regarded as a gift from the parents and ancestors and leaving hair grow long is to 
show the moral debt and filial piety to them. Against this background, the haircut movement  became a 
potent symbol of the renovation movements. 
The misery and hardship which Vietnamese people were enduring were attributed to 
the illiteracy of the people, not to the exploitative policies of the colonial government. Although 
Trinh sometimes called the Westerners ‘licensed robbers’, he appeared to be optimistic about 
the humanity of the French. He once said Vietnam would be France’s friend and ally if the 
latter helped his people with literacy, freedom and sovereignty and protected his people’s right 
(Dinh Xuan Lam et al, 2014: 162-164).  
Under the influence of the renovation trend, a movement for mass education, called 
Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc in Vietnamese, was set up by a group of neo-Confucian scholars led 
by Luong Van Can (1854-1927) in Hanoi in 1907. Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc started as a private 
school which offered free education to all students, male or female, rich or poor, in a variety 
of subjects from Confucianism to modern subjects like History and Law. Diverse scholars from 
different background and viewpoints, including Nguyen Van Vinh (1882-1936) and Phan Chu 
Trinh, were invited to give public speeches and numerous publications were produced and 
circulated. It soon developed beyond the frame of a private school to the scale of a national 
movement for mass education. Classes were delivered in several provinces in the North and in 
the Centre of the country.  
However, these self-renovation movements did not last long before the French carried 
out brutal suppression actions. In face with peasant uprisings against heavy tax and forced 
labour in the central region and attempted poisoning of French soldiers in Hanoi in 1908, the 
colonial government closed all classes, forbade publications and violently retaliated alleged 
agitators and modernisers. Phan Boi Chau was sentenced to death in absentia while he was in 
Japan. Under French pressure, the Vietnamese were deported from Japan, ending the Travel 
East movement.  Phan Chu Trinh and leaders of Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc were arrested. In 
September 1907, Kinh Thanh Thai (reigned 1898 – 1907), the first monarch to cut his hair in 
the French style and to learn to drive a car, was declared insane and later exiled to Reunion 
Island in 1916. These brutal crackdowns ended the Vietnamese intellectuals’ naïve hope to 
self-renovate under the French rule. French repression played a part in the failure of the colonial 
discourse and the failure of its ‘mission civilisatrice’. 
France’s ‘Mission Civilisatrice’ and Its Failure 
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One of the bywords of the French colonial discourse in late 19th century and early 20th 
century was ‘mission civilisatrice’. Similar to the U.S. phrase ‘the white man’s burden’, the 
French term ‘mission civilisatrice’ justified colonisation as a mission to civilize the native in 
the colonies. With this principle, colonisation did not just mean a mere governing of colonial 
people, but as the completion of a humanistic duty to bring Western civilisation to those who 
were perceived as backward and inferior natives. In Vietnam, by the last decade of the 19th 
century, the French had established a complete direct colonial administration to begin its 
mythological civilising mission. They made profound changes in Vietnam in all aspects. The 
Confucian exam systems was replaced with a Western education teaching French and 
romanticized script (chu quoc ngu) and populating Western culture. Modern transport systems 
of road and railways were built connecting provinces throughout the country. Electricity was 
brought in. Cities were re-designed with parks, boulevards, hotels and grand buildings. 
Toward the end of the 20th century, the French rhetoric of ‘mission civilisatrice’ was 
taken by a number of the Vietnamese population. Imitating the French was perceived as s a 
way forward to modernise the outdated Vietnamese way of life. As early as 1876, Truong Vinh 
Ky (1837-1898) commented that the Hue court was incapable of carrying out reforms to help 
people out of their misery (Jamieson, 1995: 70-71). In his eyes, only the French were capable 
of implementing the enormous task of lifting up a weak nation. As a first and most dedicated 
advocate of modernization in his time, through the Gia Dinh journal, the first newspaper in 
Vietnam, Truong laid the first foundation for the spread of ‘quoc ngu’, a writing system with 
romanised alphabet created by a French missionary in the 17th century. Nguyen Van Vinh was 
his immediate inheritor, who contributed greatly to the popularization of ‘quoc ngu’ to the mass 
with the Indochina journal. Vinh attributed the country’s misery to the ignorance of the people 
and asserted ‘although the colonial government has not taken us to the apex, still, compared 
with the past, it has been 100 times better in giving us a breath of freedom and a taste of 
democracy’ (quoted in Jamieson, 1995: 74). He preferred the French rule over the traditional 
elite rule and the Japanese and Chinese models. In his series of articles ‘Examining Our 
Defects’ (ibid: 75), he attacked Vietnamese traditional practices like particular modes of 
conversation, superstition, gambling hobbies as ‘faults’ and encouraged people to change and 
modernise their lives.  
However, France’s repression and economic policies went against the rhetoric of 
civilisation and progress. The infamous governor-general Paul Doumer was reported to have 
written: ‘When France arrived in Indochina, the Annamites were ripe for servitude’ (Karnow, 
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1997: 127). His governorship laid down the foundation for an Indochina’s economy relied 
heavily on monopolies and taxation. He created official monopolies on alcohol and salt, 
encouraged the usage of opium and assumed total control of all the finances (ibid). While 
banned in France, opium accounted for one third of the income of Indochina (Jamieson, 1995: 
62). A quota system was established to compel the purchase of alcohol in every village. A salt 
worker had to rebuy salt at 6 to 8 times higher than his selling price. The dispossession of land 
from Vietnamese peasants for plantations was accelerated. Under Doumer’s governorship, 
while Indochina was transformed from a financial loss to a profitable enterprise (Karnow, 
1997: 127), large numbers of Vietnamese were driven to unendurable depths of poverty 
(Jamieson, 1995: 62-66). Provoked primarily by economic and social conditions, the first series 
of peasant rebellion broke out in 1908 in Southern Central provinces from Quang Nam to Phu 
Yen.  
In the first decade of the 20th century, there appeared links between French colonisation 
with exploitation and slavery in the discursive space in Vietnam. 
 [The French] treat our people like garbage, in the beginning using terror to chase them, in the 
end pushing them into the trap like cattle. The meek are made into slaves, the strong-minded 
are thrown into jail. The physically powerful are forced into the army, while the old and weak 
are left to die! Externally the French speak of their ‘protectorate’ in order to deceive the world 
powers. The common people see the blade and block before them and are paralyzed with fear. 
The land is splashed with blood. The whole country has a tragic hue. (Phan quoted in Marr, 
1971: 108) 
Besides destroying the Vietnamese materially and physically, the French were also 
articulated to destroy the Vietnamese’s soul and their status as a normal human being.  
In your eyes, we are savages, dumb brutes, incapable of distinguishing between good and evil 
(Phan Chu Trinh, quoted in Karnow, 1997: 122).  
While early French commanders showed some respect, the French of the new century 
saw the Vietnamese inferior and childlike (Marr, 1971: 96). The colonial language was 
dominated with juxtaposition of the Vietnamese alongside animal or savage images (ibid). By 
the second decade of the 20th century, the dissatisfaction and hatred towards the supposed 
French ‘mother’ had become entrenched among the Vietnamese. The French colonial presence 
insidiously undermined the feelings of self-esteem, self-worth, and self-satisfaction (Jamieson, 
1995: 97). Even men of high education and working in the colonial administration remained 
resentful as whatever their position was, the natives’ salary would always be lower than a 
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lowest ranking French (ibid). ‘… [A]mong the comfortable upper-middle-class elements in 
Saigon’, even ‘men who had long advocated moderation and Franco-Vietnamese cooperation 
began to confront the colonial government with increasingly insistent demands for concreate 
political reforms’ (Jamieson, 1995: 97).  
The myth of ‘mission civilisatrice’ was not able to restructure the Vietnamese society 
after the dislocation of the Confucian order. Economic and social problems under the French 
colonisation were represented in a way that put the blame on the colonists, disrupting the 
French rhetoric of its civilising mission. While in the first decade, the Vietnamese intellectuals 
realized the redundancy of their traditional Confucian ideology, in the next two decades, they 
became convinced that France’s mission civilisatrice was ‘a cruel hoax’ and that ‘France 
wanted to keep the Vietnamese people ignorant and weak’ (Marr, 1971: 62). From naïve 
movements for self-learning and self-renovations, political activities of the Vietnamese had 
become more sophisticated and varied. They realized more realistically ‘how difficult it would 
be for Vietnam to become a modern, prosperous and independent nation’ (Jameison, 1995: 65).  
Conclusion 
 During the 17th and 18th centuries, when the West came to trade and spread Christianity, 
there were multiple Vietnams and the south was still an open land with numerous power 
centres. With the help of the French, Gia Long unified for the first time the land of present 
Vietnam under one rule in 1802, establishing the Nguyen dynasty. The making of the 
Vietnamese nation was a project dominated and controlled by the Kinh majority. Confucianism 
remained the organising ideology of the Nguyen court and the Vietnamese elite although its 
influence shrank towards the south.  
After four decades in operation, French colonisation had induced an acute identity crisis 
among the elite and intellectuals of the Vietnamese Kinh majority in colonial Vietnam. While 
the Confucian discourse in Vietnam was disintegrating, France’s colonial discourse was 
struggling to structure the dislocated Vietnamese society. Amid this identity crisis, a sense of 
modern Vietnam among Vietnamese elite was emerging via-a-vis the French colonists and the 
old backward self. The struggle between these discursive processes was the principle struggle 
in colonial Vietnam until the 1920s. At the core of this identity crisis in colonial Vietnam was 
a struggle to define a collective identity and individual identity in relation to this collective. In 
the elite discourse of the Vietnamese Kinh elite and intellectuals, a sense of sovereignty and a 
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sense of a collective identity had already existed. Vietnam had been referred to as a political 
identity with distinct culture and inherent rights of existence. The Confucian discourse 
conceptualized the Vietnamese as a group of people whose existence and order was given and 
at the same time protected by Heaven and Righteousness. Colonisation revealed the emptiness 
of these nodal points, dislocating the old organizing discourse and disrupting the identities of 
those Heaven subjects. The civilizing myth in the colonial discourse was attempting to 
symbolically tie Vietnam with the civilized France. However, colonial abuses and repressions 
blocked the Vietnamese’ identification within the colonial system. The search for a new 
collective identity moved beyond the French model and resulted in a number of identification 

















Chapter 5: Identification Projects with the Nation 
Introduction 
Vietnam in the 1920s was ‘the testing ground for all manners of ideas and movements’ 
(Huynh, 1982: 36). This is the time when it ‘becomes clear that different actors are trying to 
promote different ways of organising society’ as ‘struggle takes places between particular 
discourses’ (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2012: 36). By the 1920s, the traditional discourse informed 
by Confucianism appeared to have lost its salience. A number of identification projects 
emerged, attempting to conceptualize a modern Vietnamese nation. Old sacred concepts of 
Heaven and Righteousness were no longer able to structure the society in Vietnam. Even the 
monarch king has lost its symbolic significance. The search which went on in Vietnam from 
the 1920s is the search for a new way to organise the society in the modern world that the 
Vietnamese had encountered. It is the search to define identities at both the collective and 
individual levels.  
This chapter aims to account for the different ways that the Vietnamese were trying to 
organise their society, to conceptualize their selves and the collective identity that they 
belonged to. The four sections correspond to the five main identification projects going in 
Vietnam around the 1920s. The last generation of Confucian scholars of Phan Boi Chau and 
Phan Chu Trinh was the first ones who introduced a modern conceptualization of the nation as 
an extension of a family and as being threatened by the French. The king no longer occupied 
the locus of symbolic power and in its place the concept of the people, which was articulated 
to be a Vietnamese biological breed, was erected. While Phan Boi Chau articulated the French 
as an absolute Other whose existence meant the termination of the Vietnamese nation, 
collaborators and reformers put forward a vision of a Vietnam under the French tutelage. The 
French were described as the only force that could lift up the country to modernity. While the 
scholar gentry approached the national problem from the above, from the duty of the righteous 
man towards their country, the new generation of intellectuals contemplated the problem from 
below, from their personal dilemma of not being able to find a decent job matching their 
education and level of intelligence, of being refused the human dignity they learned about in 
Western literature, and of seeing the injustice in the everyday occurrences. The new 
intellectuals started to suspect and question the values and reality of French colonisation, which 
was seen as the cause of their personal dilemma and blocking their identity. This was how 
radicalism came about. Radicalism approached the national myth at the individual level and 
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exhorted the Vietnamese youth to leave traditions and families behind to go in an intense search 
of a novel ways to solve the perceived problem. The revolutionary wave came to Vietnam’s 
politics in this radical anti-colonial atmosphere. While all revolutionary organisations 
converged on the need to fight with the French and on the means of violence to achieve this 
end, the Youth League stood out as the only revolutionary group that went beyond the national 
myth. Besides constructing antagonism between the Vietnamese and the French colonists, the 
Youth League articulated a new antagonism between different social classes inside the 
Vietnamese population.  
5.1. The Last Scholar Gentry: A Family Nation  
 The last scholar gentry was the generation of Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh, who 
symbolized the bridge between Confucian and modern Vietnam. This generation grew up in 
Confucian texts and matured with Western philosophy through Chinese translations around the 
first and second decades of the 20th century. As mentioned in the previous chapter, they are the 
first classically-trained scholar generation that called for self-appraisal of the old Vietnamese 
self. They urged the Vietnamese people to leave behind backward customs and behaviours, to 
drop Confucian education for new ways of life and modern knowledge. They were the first 
intellectual generation that looked beyond the Confucian ideology for new ways to define the 
Vietnamese identity in the ongoing encounter with the French. As the traditional Vietnamese 
discourse was disintegrating, together with the Confucian concepts of Heaven and 
Righteousness, the relationship between the Vietnamese and the king, one of the five central 
social relationship in the Confucianism, was broken down to give to rise to the link between 
the country and its people. It was in the writings of these last classical scholars that the King 
was displaced form the centre of a Vietnamese collective identity. In place of the King, the 
concept of the people was erected as the central point of identification. The country’s existence 
was no longer justified in the natural way governed by Heaven or the timeless morality 
principle of Righteousness. The right of existence of Vietnam was now justified by reference 
to the existence of a people, who belonged an extended family living in the same territory.  The 
making of the people was the key discursive articulation of the discourse of the generation of 
Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh preparing the foundations for the making of a modern 
nation in later periods.  
 The first step towards imagining a modern nation is to ‘cut off the king’s head’ 
(Foucault, 1984a). In the discourse of these last Confucian scholars, the king stopped being 
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symbolically at the centre of a collective identity. The king was now presented to be an 
authoritarian force, misusing public power into private hands. Being loyal to the king was no 
longer a desirable course of action.  
What is a king? King is the main ruler of a country, the leader of a tribe or a hero who had 
drove out invasion and self-claimed to be the lord; or a rebel who killed a lineage of an 
existing king in a chaotic time and self-put himself/herself into that role; or a person fighting 
with other fellow countrymen to hold power; or a foreigner invading for benefits. To sum up, 
a king is a person who uses the rights of other people as his own, public power as private 
power, taking other people’s land or public land as his own, private land… 
There is no ethical tie between the King and the people. The fact is that the king and his aides 
are cooperating to oppress the people. (Phan Chu Trinh, 1925) 
This is a quote from a famous speech of Phan Chu Trinh Eastern, Western Morality and Ethics 
(Đạo đức và luân lý Đông Tây) in Sai Gon in 1925. In this quote, not only the king but his aids, 
which means members of the feudal administration, were articulated to be antagonistic forces 
of the Vietnamese people. The association between officials of the feudal court with oppression 
had been present in the Vietnamese popular culture for hundreds of years. A popular saying, 
which was also a traditional lullaby, goes: 
Kids, bear in mind this sentence 
Night-time robbers are foreign invaders, day-time robbers are the court’s officials. 
This existing articulation was used, reproduced and widely circulated in the discourse of the 
last scholar gentry to the detriment of the legitimacy of the feudal court. To replace the 
symbolic centre of the king in the feudal societal structure, the concept of the people was 
‘invented’ to be the ultimate source of legitimacy of the existence of the Vietnamese as a 
collective entity.  
In the discourse of these last scholar gentry, ancient myths were commonly enacted to 
construct the common origin of the Vietnamese. People were reminded that they were 
descendants of Lac Long and Hong Bang. In Vietnam’s history, Hong Bang refers to the 
ancient Vietnam in the time of seventeen Hung kings spanning from around 2879 to 258 BC 
(Dang, 2016).  
Our soul is descended from the lineage of Lac Long. We are children of the Vietnamese house, 
member of the same yellow race (Nguyen Quyen, quoted in Marr, 1971: 98) 
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The land of Hong Lac must be renewed, awoken, to be again truly a thing of beauty (Phan Boi 
Chau, quoted in Marr, 1971: 149) 
Lac Long or Lac Long Quan, a descendant of the dragon race, and his fairy wife, Au Co, 
are reportedly the primitive ancestors of the Vietnamese people. The eldest son of this couple, 
out of their 100 children born from Au Co’s 100-fetus womb, is the first Hung King9. Although 
these stories were in Vietnam’s historical records since as early as the 15th century (ibid), 
several details are not factual but mythical, such as the ‘dragon’ Lac Long Quan, the ‘fairy’ Au 
Co, the 100-fetus womb and the 2621-year longevity of only 18 kings10. However mythical 
these stories are, they were used as evidence of the common roots and the family ties among 
the Vietnamese. These mythical stories about the origins of the Vietnamese people started to 
be popularized in Vietnam in the early 1900s when printed materials, especially historical 
books, were on the rise. They were later and are now still being commonly used by the 
Vietnamese communists and historians as evidence of the ancient origin and family tie of the 
Vietnamese people. 
The Vietnamese people were to be understood as a human breed or a race, an extension 
of a family. The country was said to have been constructed from blood, sweat and tears by 
ancestors of ‘a human breed who shared the same blood, spoke the same language and lived in 
the same territory’ throughout the last 4000 years (Phan Chu Trinh, 1925). The concept of the 
country (nuoc) was articulated to be something related to each and every individual but, at the 
same time, something more valuable and more eternal than individuals’ life.   It was equated 
with the families, with children, with their labour, with the future and with the race.  
As individuals, we may die but our country will not be lost. If we die our country remains, 
then the product of our labours, our children and grandchildren, our relatives, our reputations 
will remain and never be lost… On the other hand, suppose that our country is lost and we 
remain… Then we will be forced to endure the destinies of servile buffalo and horses. The 
product of our labours will be seized, our children and grandchildren will be despised by 
foreigners, our lineages, our beloved race will gradually be wiped out.... (Phan Boi Chau 
quoted in Marr, 1971: 228) 
The conceptualisation of the country in this way made it normal and even desirable to sacrifice 
one’s life for the existence of his/her country if the latter was endangered. And the country that 
                                                        
9 There is disagreement on who is the first Hung King, whether it is the first son of Lac Long 
Quan or his father, king Duong Vuong. 
10 New arguments have emerged, saying that it is not 18 generations of Hung kings, but 18 
sub-lineages of Hung kings.  
90 
 
was defined as an extension of a family, a collective of related lives and efforts was ‘indeed’ 
in danger. That danger reportedly came from the French.  
 The French, who was deemed different and unbearable to live with in the 19th century, 
was becoming a totally other that was killing the Vietnamese to the verge of extinction. The 
History of the Loss of Vietnam written by Phan Boi Chau in 1905 was the first document that 
displayed the brutal and exploitative practices of the French colonial government in Vietnam 
systematically. Such a content would never be received with harsh punishment from the 
colonial government in Vietnam. This book was written in Chinese and printed in Japan. 
France is a powerful civilized country but it has invaded and exploited such a small and poor 
country like Vietnam. The French self-declared to be a civilized race, but they have come and 
killed the much weaker Vietnamese people. What a shame to the national pride and politics 
of France! I am afraid that people will not believe in what I am going to say. (Phan Boi Chau, 
1905: 49) 
Contrary to the rhetoric of protection and civilisation, French policies were said to make the 
Vietnamese miserable, dump, weak and blind (Làm cho khốn khổ, làm cho ngu dốt, làm cho 
hèn yếu, làm cho đui mù). Chau’s book elaborated on French tax policies, which were 
reportedly robbing the Vietnamese to complete destitution. From the only two kinds of taxes 
before the French came, 14 types of taxes were levied targeting almost every activity of the 
Vietnamese. The feudal court was described without agency and the its sovereignty had been 
lost to the colonial government as Vietnamese kings were either deposed and exile abroad or 
tightly controlled inside his own place. French presence was associated with destitution, ill 
justice and illiteracy for the Vietnamese.  
The idea that the French were driving the Vietnamese to the verge of extinction made 
its first appearance in this document. This discursive articulation reflected the influence of 
Social Darwinism, which emphasizes struggle and competitions, rather than the static moral 
ideology of Confucianism. The Vietnamese country was juxtaposed with the Vietnamese race, 
which can exist and go extinct as a living species. ‘Will Vietnam lose its life? The Vietnamese 
species will turn into the micro-organisms in water, like the ants in fire…’ (ibid: 71). France’s 
successful conquer of Vietnam and hence this current miserable situation of the Vietnamese 
people was blamed on the feudal court. The Nguyen dynasty was reported to be incapable as 
the rulers and coward in facing with the invaders. They were quoted to have stated: ‘Vietnam’s 
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feudal court agree to pledge for France’s protectorate…’ after the invaders launched the first 
few attacks.  
In the similar vein that the feudal court was criticised, the traditional family ethics of 
Vietnamese culture were also being criticised in Phan Chu Trinh’s 1925 speech. The 
authoritarian atmosphere of Vietnamese families, where children were asked to do at their 
parents’ wishes, were deemed responsible for the servitude tendency of the Vietnamese people. 
The Vietnamese were asked to think beyond and go outside these backward chains of family 
and the king-subject relationship to discuss the country’s business (ban viec nuoc). Both Phan 
Chu Trinh and Phan Boi Chau tried to shame people to think and act for the country, and in 
doing that to imagine about the nation.  
Although both Phan Chu Trinh and Phan Boi Chau contributed to a new 
conceptualisation of the Vietnamese country as a timeless collective composed of a common 
human breed, the later embraced self-renovations under the French rule and the former 
articulated the vision of a country free of the French colonists.  Phan Boi Chau made the first 
attempt to form political groups to drive out the French. The League for the Restoration of 
Vietnam (Viet Nam Quang Phuc Hoi) was founded in 1912 from members of his old 
organisation ‘the Association for the Modernisation of Vietnam – Duy Tan Hoi) and followers 
of his Eastern Travel. Its mottos were ‘driving out the French, restoring Vietnam and setting 
up the Vietnamese Republic’. Just like before, Chau still preferred violence though his goal 
was now the establishment of republic, rather than a monarchy. A number of attempted 
assassinations, killings and bombings aimed at the French in 1912 and 1913 were alleged to be 
carried out by the League. Phan Boi Chau was soon arrested in 1913. By 1917, the Vietnam 
Restoration Association had disintegrated without achieving any significant political 
successes. Phan’s followers and old members of the Vietnam Restoration Association 
regrouped into the Society of Like Hearts (Tam Tam Xa) in Canton, China in 1923. Its moto 
was to ‘restore the Vietnamese to their dignity as human being’ (Ho, 1997: 64). This Society 
was the foundational base of the Youth League that Nguyen Ai Quoc later erected in 1925 in 
terms of both membership and symbolic devotion. Ho Tung Mau and Le Hong Son became 
central figures of the Youth League and later the Indochinese Communist Party. New members 
of the League had to take an oath of loyalty in front of the grave of a devoted member of the 
Society of Like Hearts, Pham Hong Thai, who had carried out a failed attempt to assassinate 
the Governor-General of Indochina, Merlin.  
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 The discourse of these last scholar gentry laid the discursive foundations for the 
conceptualisation of a modern Vietnamese nation as a family nation free of a monarch but full 
of the Vietnamese people. At the centre of the new national structure was the Vietnamese 
people, who were articulated to be one same human breed with a common origin. The scholar 
discourse marked the beginning of the imagination of a national community with fellow 
countrymen living and sharing the same experience. However, by the 1920s this modern way 
of articulating the nation still had not a long way before reaching the Vietnamese mass. The 
History of the Lost Vietnam, like most of Phan Boi Chau’s writings, was in Chinese and 
published overseas. Phan Chu Trinh’s speech ‘Eastern, Western Morality and Ethics’ was 
spoke in front of students and intellectuals. Given the strict regulations on speech and 
journalism and the illiteracy of the Vietnamese at the time, the novel conceptualisation of the 
nation was only an elite phenomenon among young intellectuals. Political activities in this 
period were also still limited inside the circle of scholars, whether of classical and modern 
training. Marr (1971) reserved that until the end of the 1920s, the French regime remained a 
fact of life in Vietnam: powerful, grim and seemingly eternal. The master-slave mentality 
between the colonisers and the indigenous had become entrenched. The French were able to 
crack down all attempts to rebel, none of which amounted to a major challenge. Anti-French 
activists more than often ended up in Conlon island, ‘the deadly symbol of anticolonial 
resistance for three generations’ (Marr: 1971, 234).  Until the third decade of the 20th century, 
the dominant theme inside the country was still collaboration rather than resistance.  
5.2. Reformers and/or Collaborators: A Nation under French Tutelage 
Accounts of colonial Vietnam in the beginning of the 20th century more than often 
feature anti-French sentiments and activists; however, these men were in fact a few tilting at 
windmills. Without its native supporters, the colonial system could not have survived for long 
(Marr, 1971: 274). The colonizers must have enjoyed the collaboration of a significant number 
of the Vietnamese in order to consolidate their position and rule Vietnam for nearly a century. 
The institution and power of the monarchy was becoming hollow after the transfer of 
sovereignty from the court to the colonizers marked by King Ham Nghi’s flee from the Hue in 
1885, which then sparked a country-wide Can Vuong movement. Three out of the five kings 
reigning between 1885 to 1926 were deposed and exiled overseas by the French. This is to say 
those mandarins who stayed in the court must have accepted and adhered to the colonial rule. 
By the 1920s, the court’s mandarins were no longer the traditional elite selected by rigorous 
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Confucian examinations, they were now more like government employees loyal to the French 
master. Collaborations with the colonial administration also included ‘scholars of New 
Learning’ (Tai: 24-25) in the Tonkin and the emerging native wealthy bourgeoisies in the 
Cochin china. Scholars of New Learning were those French-educated interpreters or civil 
servants who acted as cultural brokers between Vietnam and France. In the Cochin-china 
colony, France’s economic policies gave rise to a new class of wealthy bourgeoisie including 
businessmen, landowners and civil servants. A common thread underlining all these groups of 
Vietnamese collaborators was the vision of a Vietnamese nation under French tutelage 
although the content of their program may vary. They all despised the backwardness of their 
own culture, recognised French superiority and accepted the colonial presence in Vietnam. For 
these men, the French protectorate was beneficial and even gracious. 
Although the colonial government has not taken us to the apex, still, compared with the past, 
it has been 100 times better in giving us a breath of freedom and a taste of democracy. 
(Nguyen Van Vinh, quoted in Jamieson, 1995: 74). 
… [I]t can be satisfied with the present regime which suits our collective aspirations much 
better than the ancient regime could have… we come to respectfully but firmly ask of the 
protector nation: “Educated us, as you educated your own children…” (Bui Quang Chieu, 
quoted in Tai, 1992: 44) 
Although many of them advocated reforms, the collaborators did not envision a 
Vietnam free from colonial rule. These men sought to struggle in the cultural realm rather than 
in political sphere. Nguyen Van Vinh (1882 – 1936) and Pham Quynh (1892 – 1945), two 
prominent scholars of New Learning in Tonkin, were true reformers before collaborators. The 
two men were both devoted to modernising the Vietnamese society and their fellow Annamites. 
They played vital roles in promoting the vernacular romanized script as the common writing 
medium (quoc ngu) of the Vietnamese language replacing the Chinese characters and the 
French writings. Nguyen Van Vinh was also among the key sponsors of the Tonkin Free School 
and the self-renovation movements in the first decade of the new century. In 1913, he launched 
the first journal in quoc ngu in Vietnam, the Indochina Review, in which he translated French 
literature and Vietnamese classics into the vernacular script. With a series of articles entitled 
‘Examining Our Defects’ (Jamieson, 1995: 75), he attacked nearly everything Vietnamese 
from the practice of betel-chewing to the long-hair style. Pham Quynh was not a mere 
assimilationist either. While Phan Boi Chau vowed to work for the survival of the nation, Pham 
Quynh opted for the survival of the national culture (Tai, 1992: 48). He sought to promote and 
preserve Vietnamese literature and its language as the national essence of Vietnam.  
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Unlike the Northern literati who sought to lift up the morality and culture of the 
Vietnamese mass along Western standards, the Southern bourgeoisie were more concerned 
with engaging the authorities in dialogue for the promotion of their class interests. They did 
not demand for outright national independence, but aimed to increase Vietnamese autonomy 
within the framework of continued French rule. In 1917 they formed the Constitutionalist party 
(Đảng Lập Hiến) in order to protect and maximize their hard-won economic and political 
rights. However, while activating for their bourgeois rights, they also contributed to deepening 
the identity crisis among Vietnamese youths. The voices of the native bourgeoisie, the two 
journals: La Tribune Indigene (Dien dan ban xu) edited by Bui Quang Chieu and La Echo 
Annamite by Nguyen Phan Long, brought to public the brutality and corruption of the colonial 
government. While Phan Boi Chau wrote ‘the History of the Loss of Vietnam’ as a book in 
Chinese characters and in Japan, the native bourgeoisie criticised the French via newspapers in 
French language inside the country. This new coverage was able to reach more Vietnamese, 
many of which were now literate in French. One example was the Truong Cao Dong affair 
(Tai, 1992: 150). It was triggered by the publication of Truong Cao Dong’s letters in La Echo 
Annamite in 1926 denouncing the appalling working and living conditions of coolie labourers 
sent to Cochinchina from Tonkin and Annam. This led to the deportation of the author, Truong 
Cao Dong, back to Annam. The event underlined the lack of political freedoms under the 
colonial rule, in this case, the freedom of speech and freedom of travel. The Vietnamese ‘could 
be treated like lukewarm aliens on their own soil’ (Tai, 1992: 150). The incident invoked 
widespread protests among students and workers.  
Advocating or criticising the French, reforming or assimilating, these men might be, 
they contributed significantly to the process of widening a sense of the Vietnamese identity 
among the Vietnamese people, especially the French-educated youth of the 1920s. The 
proliferation of the printing industry and the vernacular quoc ngu in Vietnam owned dearly to 
these collaborators. While criticising the French to lobby for their groups’ interests, the 
constitutionalists’ publications that displayed French corruption and brutality inflamed a sense 
of comradeship among the Vietnamese people. The Vietnamese, especially the literate youths, 
did not only become aware of the experiences of their fellow men around the country but also 
saw themselves in the pictures of victims of French abuses and enabled them to imagine 
themselves as future victims. In fact, the Truong Cao Dong affair was one of many events that 
radicalized the Vietnamese youth. In return, the radicalism and the violence that resulted from 
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it, which occurred at the end of the decade, sent these reformers and/or collaborators into final 
dependent alliance with the French (Marr, 1971: 275). 
5.3. Radicalism: Individual Freedom and the Nation 
Radicalism is the word that was used by Tai (1992) to describe the political trend among 
Vietnamese youth in the 1920s. It describes their dissatisfaction with traditional and colonial 
authorities and their yearning for individual freedom and self-realisation. The youth in the 
1920s were the first products of French education, the first generation of modern Vietnamese 
intellectuals. While Phan Boi Chau and Chan Chu Trinh read Western philosophical texts 
through Chinese translation, the 1920s Vietnamese youth enjoyed direct access. Absorbing 
Western values and ideals in the original writings throughout their education, they were in the 
position to contemplate the hollowness of France’s mission civilisatrice and the constraining 
manner of traditional values. The identity crisis that began in Vietnam around the turn of the 
century as described in the previous chapter became deeply entrenched and acute among this 
generation. However, while the scholar gentry approached the issue of national independence 
at the collective level, the radical youth saw in the national problem the means to emancipate 
themselves from social constraints. It was personal concerns that led the radicals to fight 
against the colonial system. The symmetry between the national struggle for independence and 
the individual struggle for emancipation was first articulated by radical youths (Tai, 1992: 3). 
In the wake of the WWI, financial burdens darkened the already bleak economic 
situation of Indochina, which had been always heavily dependent on monopolies. From the 
pre-war focus on transport and infrastructures, the colonial economic policies moved to 
investment on agriculture. The establishment of rice, rubber and coffee plantations was 
accelerated, with recruitments of workers to follow suit. Peasants were increasingly losing 
lands to giant consortiums. The working conditions in rubber plantations were especially 
appalling. In addition, Annamites were recruited as coolies for labour work and as volunteers 
serving in Western battles. The new recruitment was added to the already long list of hatred 
policies of the colonial government. Justice was widely miscarried towards the natives. To 
make the matter worse, students and civil servants suffered daily ill-treatment and petty 
humiliations by their Western teachers and superiors (Tai, 1992: 114). The humiliation that 
some Vietnamese felt at the turn of the 20th century was magnified in the 1920s as the new 
generation of young intellectuals now judged the situation with Western values and ideas. The 
young ‘yellow gentlemen’ hurt even more at the manner of servitude of their fathers, their 
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teachers and even the mandarins of the court displayed towards the French. Another catalyst 
that amplified the antagonism was the development of a print industry. The second and the 
third decade of the 20th century was the beginning of a print industry in Vietnam with 
newspapers and journals appearing in all three regions with a much more lively scene in the 
colony of Cochinchina than in the protectorates of Tonkin and Annam. The growing of 
newspapers and journals brought cases of the colonial authority’s corruption, ill justice and ill 
treatments of Annamites to public. With journalistic value, stories of what had happened for 
years now acquired the power to galvanise the public into action (Tai, 1992: 114). 
Although most of the printing was in French, the Vietnamese youth of the 1920s was 
literate in this language through their French education. Aware of the Western principles of the 
rights of Man, the young generation saw both the colonial and traditional authorities 
unacceptable. The corporal punishment by their parents and teachers which were deemed 
normal in the past now became unbearable. They went on strikes against their teachers and the 
colonial government for their ill-treatment of themselves and of their fellow men. What hurt 
these proud young intellectuals even more was to witness the humiliation and servility of their 
parents and the Vietnamese mandarins towards the French. The identity crisis turned acute 
when they were unable to find a job equal to their ability despite possessing a Western 
education. Young men of the 1920s contemplated profoundly and painfully the discrepancy 
between the ideals they studied and the rights they should have enjoyed with the realities they 
were being through. They perceived the current colonial status quo as repressing their own 
individual freedom and self-realisation. They were ready to diverge from the path that their 
parents had arranged for them to fulfil their aspirations.  
The man who played a central role in the outburst of radicalism among the Vietnamese 
youth in the 1920s was Nguyen An Ninh (1900 – 1943), ‘the most European man’ in Indochina 
(Tai, 1992: 72). Educated entirely in French schools, having studied a law degree in France 
from 1920 and 1923, Nguyen An Ninh had read Western philosophers extensively and 
experienced principles of humanity and equality in France. Ninh’s politics brought a rupture to 
Vietnam’s reactions to colonialism in the early 1920s, the dominant tone of which was 
moderation and compromise since the turn of the century. He protested loudly against both 
French colonialism and Confucianism and called for violence. Ninh attacked French rhetoric 
on its civilising mission with French weapons. In the pamphlet entitled France en Indochine 
written in French, he elaborated on the absence of those rights that were proclaimed in the 1789 
Rights of Men in France in Indochina. In the tradition of Phan Boi Chau’s History of the Loss 
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of Vietnam, Ninh displayed the oppression and exploitation of the Vietnamese by the colonists 
and pointed to the hollowness of ‘the European prestige’.  
The European prestige is based neither on the moral nor the intellectual superiority of the 
European over the Asians. It is based on the colour of the skin… It is the European prestige 
that proposed that a European, as idiotic as he can be, could be a boss over a Vietnamese… 
It is the European prestige that added to the prestige of the conqueror that explains the 
advantages and privileges granted to Frenchmen: high salaries, innumerable scholarships…; 
the right to monstrously immense concessions of land, a thousand acres for a European and 
forty for a Vietnamese, etc., etc.   (Nguyen An Ninh, 1925) 
The French were presented not as superior but as a bunch of greedy and violent bandits. The 
pamphlet told a story that while Darles, ‘the butcher of Thai Nguyen’, who killed hundreds of 
the Vietnamese, was fined one hundred franc, Luong Ngoc Quyen, the organisers of the revolt 
against Darles’ monstrosities had his limbs rotten in chains in a one-meter-high cell. French 
men in the colonial government were said to enjoy extravagant expenses and have the right to 
put the indigenous people in jail without trail. In sum, ‘France cannot take care of her colonies’ 
(Nguyen An Ninh, 1925). 
In his famous speech The Aspiration of Annamite  Youth on 15 October 1923, Ninh 
denounced the idea of France’s mission civilisatrice and criticised the Vietnamese 
Confucianism as ‘an article of exportation’ composed of a narrow morality and stifling ideas 
(Tai, 1992: 78).  
…[T]he so-called elite trained in the Chinese classics has been forced to cling to Confucian 
ideas like shipwrecked people to a raft. (Nguyen An Ninh, 1923 quoted in Tai, 1992: 78) 
He called his contemporaries to ‘flee from their fathers’ house’, to escape from society and 
even to leave the country to discover liberating means (ibid). He asked his generation to go 
into action and to be ready for sacrifice. To Ninh, violence was the only recourse. Ninh had 
gone out of the hesitance between reformism or resistance to arrive at the collusion that taking 
arms was the only way forward for the Vietnamese to get out of the existing crisis. ‘In order to 
eliminate the regime of slavery imposed by France on Indochina there is only one way, that is 
to combat violence with violence as in a bull’s fight...’ (Nguyen An Ninh, 1925). 
However, Ninh’s politics was short of an agenda for how to do violence and short of a 
program for post-independence. It had neither an ideology to analyse the current society and 
to organise actions nor a vision for the future. Although Ninh had established a symmetry 
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between the national struggle for independence and the youth’s own efforts to emancipate, his 
politics still retained the elite tendencies of Vietnamese traditional politics, which glorified 
idealistic heroism. Politics in this elite sense was understood as something to be done for the 
mass not by the mass. ‘It is then the duty of the more courageous and the more devoted 
Vietnamese to think of methods of struggle that fit the time and to devise a form of resistance 
that is capable of fighting oppression’ (Tai, 1992: 191). While Ninh recognised the inevitability 
of violence and sacrifice, he pondered at the thought of human loss of a Bolshevik-style 
revolution. He called people into action, but ‘was uncomfortable with the inherently 
authoritarian nature of political parties’ (Tai, 1992: 188).   
In the radical trend embodied by Ninh politics, the conceptualisation of a nation free 
from the colonial yoke, which was articulated in Phan Boi Chau’s writings, was reaffirmed. 
While Phan Boi Chau approached the concept of the nation at the collective level of the people, 
Nguyen An Ninh came from personal concerns for freedom and self-achievements. Although 
Ninh’s politics still remained essentially an elite phenomenon like, radicalism was successful 
in articulating the traditional family and the colonial government as repressing chains to the 
self-emancipation of the Youth. Thousands of students went on strikes against their teachers 
against their parents’ wish. They were now ready to leave the family and the education their 
parents had arrange for them behind to search for ways to liberate themselves. It was in this 
situation that the Vietnamese Youth turned themselves in revolutionary organisations which 
appeared in the second half of the 1920s.  
5.4. The Revolutionaries: Violence and the Nation 
Vietnamese politics got revolutionized in the second half of the 1920s. Under the 
influence of communism, Sun Yat Sen’s Three Peoples’ Principle and the French Revolution’s 
ideals, revolutionary groups appeared in Vietnamese politics. Three dominant revolutionary 
organisations at the time were the Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League (Hôi Việt Nam 
Thanh niên Cách mạng– Thanh Nien), the Revolutionary Party of the New Vietnam (Tân Việt 
Cách mạng Đảng – Tan Viet) and the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng 
- VNQDD). They were the first generation of revolutionaries in Vietnamese politics, who put 
an end to the radical period. These revolutionaries had settled unanimously on the means of 
outright violence and on the need for organisations. They had been aware of the weakness of 
the elite tendencies of previous anti-colonial movements and showed attempts to involve the 
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mass. Although they bore different conceptions of the nation and revolution, they converged 
on a symmetry between national and social issues.  
 The Youth League was the pioneer organisation of revolutionaries in Vietnamese 
politics. It was founded by Nguyen Ai Quoc (1890 – 1969) from old members of Tam Tam Xa 
in 1925 in Canton, China. New recruits had to go through a training course which last 
somewhere between three weeks to four months, in which they studied about revolutionary 
theories, Chinese and Russian revolutions, about capitalism and the stages of human evolution, 
about national liberations movements in other countries and about world situations. Nguyen Ai 
Quoc prepared training materials himself and was the main lecturer. Le Hong Son and Ho Tung 
Mau, previous members of Tam Tam Xa, were teaching assistants. After the course, new 
members had to take an oath of loyalty in front of the tomb of Pham Hong Thai, also a member 
of Tam Tam Xa, who had carried out a failed attempt to assassinate the Governor-General of 
Indochina, Merlin. The most promising were sent to either Whampoa Military Academy or the 
Workers’ University of the East in Moscow, while the rest were sent back to Vietnam. The 
League published periodicals to promote its ideals and recruitments. Its weekly journal, the 
Youth, published in quoc ngu, was the League’s public platform and was circulated 
clandestinely inside Vietnam. In 1927, Nguyen Ai Quoc collected his lectures into a handbook 
entitled ‘The Road to Revolution’ (Đường Cách mệnh) in quoc ngu. It was then served as the 
key training documents of the League. Under the leadership of its headquarter in exile the 
League expanded rapidly. As early as the beginning of 1926, it began to form cells inside the 
country. By 1929, it had bases in almost all provinces of Vietnam with the membership 
totalling 1,700. Its training materials and periodicals were widely circulated in Vietnam. At the 
same time, existing anticolonial organisations inside the Vietnam were changing their 
orientation toward the revolutionary tide.  
In Annam, the Revolutionary Party of the New Vietnam (Tan Viet) was reformed in 
1928 from the existing political group named Phuc Viet. Phuc Viet was established in Annam 
in the early 1920s from ex political prisoners and students. Tan Viet recruited among 
intellectuals, civil servants and petty bourgeoise. In the beginning, Tan Viet was indecisive in 
terms of ideology, judging communism too high the Kuomintang’s Principle of Three Peoples 
too low (Dinh et al, 2014: 271). Its agenda was to ‘lead workers, peasants, soldiers and the 
mass inside the country and liaise with oppressed nations outside the country in order to uproot 
the imperialism towards the establishment of an equal and loving society’ (Dinh et al, 2014: 
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271; MOET, 2014c: 120). ‘Unable to choose among different options, the Phuc Viet thus tried 
to be everything at once, nodding in the direction of Marxism for the sake of appearing in tune 
with the times, but also espousing essentially neo-traditionalist ideas of progress’ (Tai, 1992: 
148). In Tonkin, the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD) was established in 1927 among 
urban petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals from the Nam Dong publishing society. Its ideology 
was a combination of Sun Yat Sen’s Three Peoples’ Principle and the French Revolution’s 
ideals. It was definite on the goal of a national revolution, but not resolute on a post-
independence program and on whether to participate into the world revolution (Dinh et al, 
2014: 275).  
This first generations of revolutionaries in Vietnam shared a common orientation to 
overthrow the French colonial government by means of violence. All were conscious of the 
need for organisation and mass participation. All competed for the same membership among 
intellectuals and petty urban bourgeoisie inside Vietnam (Tai, 1992: 185). The rhetoric of these 
three organisations inherited many discursive strategies of previous anti-colonial generations 
of Phan Boi Chau and Nguyen An Ninh. The nation was conceptualized as a family nation, 
which was being endangered by the French colonialism. In the tradition of ‘the History of the 
Loss of Vietnam’ and ‘France en Indochine’, the French played the role of the Other in the 
identification of a Vietnamese national identity.  
The French imperial in the masks of ‘civilization’, ‘enlightenment’ used warships, cannons 
to conquer our nation brutally and violently. They fired our cities. They burned our home 
countryside. They raped our compatriots. They robbed our wealth. They grabbed our country 
to make their colony. They enslaved our 20 million people in the fate of horses and buffalos. 
Imperialism robbed our country with the sole purpose of enriching themselves. They sneaked 
all our farm land. They controlled our forest and mines. They kept all sea ports. They took all 
rivers. They had all commercial rights. They owned all production modes. They inflict 
increasingly higher taxes… All our country’s wealth, all our peoples’ sweat and tears are all 
drawing into their hands (Youth League, 1929a). 
The French, although they are of a different race from ours, came to conquer our country. 
Under the pretext of protecting us, they made a colony of our country. They have at their 
service corrupt mandarins and civil servants who behave like hunting dogs towards the 
people. They tried to destroy us with drugs and alcohol. Their cruelties equal only those of 
snakes and wild beasts. They steal all our possessions, including our real estate… 
(Vietnamese Nationalist Party: 1927). 
All tried to shame the Vietnamese into action as previous anti-colonial activists did. 
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… And yet the twenty-five millions of Hong Lac’s children are as intelligent as anyone else. 
What a shame that they have accepted for more than seventy years the role of beasts of burden. 
To live in these conditions is a shame. It is better to die rather than to lead such a life. 
(Vietnamese Nationalist Party, 1927) 
Annamites are not very resourceful. They are easily satisfied. They always put the blame on 
the fate or wait for the heaven and the Buddha. They don’t know that if they don’t help 
themselves, the heaven and the Buddha will never come to their help. There are people who 
shiver at the sight of the French. They do not think that these people are also the human beings 
like themselves. Why do we have to think low of ourselves? (Youth Journal, 1925, online) 
However, there were differences among these revolutionary organisations in their view 
on the nation and post-independence programs. While VNQDD viewed the conflict in Vietnam 
in pure national term between the Vietnamese nation and the French colonists as previous anti-
colonial generations did, the Youth league adopted a much more sophisticated 
conceptualisation of the Vietnamese nation. According to Huynh (1982: 85), ‘the general, 
naïve assumption of the anticolonial literati had been that whoever was Vietnamese was ipso 
factor anticolonial, including those who were actively collaborating with the French’. This 
assumption could be read from Phan Boi Chau’s History of the Loss of Vietnam, in which he 
included all Vietnamese including Christians and French interpreters in the list the possible 
segments of the Vietnamese population that could rise against the colonial yoke. To the Youth 
League, for the first time, the Vietnamese ‘we’ was categorized into the revolutionary forces 
(workers and peasants), their friends, allies and their enemies (Huynh, 1982: 85). While 
Nguyen Thai Hoc, the leader of VNQDD was reported to abhor the idea of setting class against 
class (Tai, 1992: 218), the Youth League spoke the language of class and categorized the 
Vietnamese based on the concept of oppression.  
In the Vietnamese language, the Marxist term ‘proletariat’ was translated as ‘vo san’, 
which literally meant ‘properly-less’. As this research is the study of the creation of meaning, 
I decide to use the literal version of the word, rather than the official translation, in the attempt 
to preserve the precise connotation that the word might incur to a Vietnamese. This is to say 
that the word ‘property-less’ in this research is the translation of the English word ‘proletariat’. 
It was also the first revolutionary group that introduced the Marxist concepts of revolution, 
class and capitalism into the Vietnamese language to conceptualize the ongoing situation in 
Vietnam. 
In the world there are two classes: 
A. The capitalists (not working but benefited). 
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B. Workers and peasants (working hard but receiving nothing) 
An Annam worker, working in Hon Gay cold mine for 11 hours a day, from the beginning of 
the year and the end, he earns only 3 cents a day, does not have enough food and clothes, has 
no medicines at pain, no coffin at death. 
By contrast, the owner of the mine never touches his hand in any work, however, he has plenty 
of food and clothes, travels by horse and cars, earns tens of millions of dongs in profit (in 
1925 he gained 17000000 dong). Let’s ask who generated this 17 million dongs, the Western 
owner or the Annam worker? While our peasants do not have field to farm, Western 
plantations takes up 122000 acres of fertile fields in the Central Region and 150000 acres in 
the South. 
Our people do not have enough to eat, many starve to death in some places while plantation 
owners sell rice for nearly 1000 million francs (in 1925 they sold rice for 911,477,000 franc).                                                           
(Nguyen Ai Quoc, 1927: online) 
The Youth League was the first and the only organisation at the time that emphasized the 
importance of an ideology and was able to articulate a common one. It also made it clear the 
indispensability of a Leninist Party. 
Nowadays, there are many ideologies and isms, but the most genuine is Leninism. 
The lessons from Russian Revolution are: If a revolution is to succeed, there must be a mass 
base (workers and peasants), a unified, scarifying and durable party. It is essential to adopt 
Marxism and Leninism. (Nguyen Ai Quoc, 1927: online) 
The Youth League was the only organisation at the time that possessed a clear post-
independence program. Its motto was to sacrifice lives, interests and minds to do a national 
revolution (crushing the French and wresting independence for the land), then to do an 
international revolution (ousting imperialism and implementing communism) (Dinh et all, 
2014: 266). 
The Youth League is a revolutionary group representing working Annamite people, leading 
those people to fight with the ruling class… in order to destroy the present unequal society 
and to build a society, in which every has to work, has their basic needs met, have freedom 
and equality, which is communism (Youth League, 1929b: online). 
Toward the end of the decade, while VNQDD stayed as a group of revolutionary 
patriots, the Youth League and Tan Viet became communist and ended up merging into a 
unified Vietnamese Communist Party in 1930. Under the influence of the Comintern’s new 
line of proletarianization set out in the 6th World Congress in September 1928, members of the 
League became dissatisfied with the nationalist and patriotic tone of the organisation and 
attempted to break with the League to form communist parties. The Indochinese Communist 
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Party and the Annam Communist Party were formed from the League’s regional branches in 
1929. Tan Viet also became communist and reformed as the Indochinese Communist League 
in the same year. Facing the fractioning of the Communist movement, in February 1930, 
Nguyen Ai Quoc held a unification conference in Hong Kong with delegations from newly-
established regional communist parties. A common ccommunist Party was formed to be named 
the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). The Indochinese Communist League was also later 
admitted. While the Youth League and Tan Viet were reforming themselves into the 
ccommunist shell, a different fate was awaiting the Nationalist Party.  
In February 1929, VNQDD carried out the assassination of Bazin, the director of the 
General Office of Indochinese Manpower specializing in recruiting coolies for rubber 
plantations. After Bazin’s assassination, the colonial government carried out a brutal 
crackdown, resulting in the arrest of a great number of the Party members and followers. Faced 
with this destructive blow, the leadership resolved to wage a general insurrection as a last resort 
with the idea: ‘Even if we do not become victors, we still become true Human’ (MOET, 2014c: 
122). All the remaining forces of the party was called to revolt in Yen Bai, Phu Tho, Son Tay 
and some other northern provinces in February 1930. This revolt amounted to the biggest 
challenge to the colonial authority since the pacification of Indochina was considered 
completed in the 1890s. However, the French swiftly suppressed the revolt within matters of 
days, most of the top leaders were imprisoned and executed, including the leader Nguyen Thai 
Hoc. This blow brought the Party to the brink of extinction, marking a defeat for Vietnamese 
revolutionary patriots. ‘From this point on, there was no ideological alternative to international 
communism as the leading force in the Vietnamese revolution’ (Huynh, 1982: 98). In 1925, 
Marx-Leninism was only one of many political theories introduced to Vietnam; by the end of 
the decade it had become a leading ideology with an organisational home. Since then, 
‘communism remained an integral part of Vietnamese nationalism’ (ibid: 89) 
Conclusion 
 The identity crisis induced by the French colonisation was essentially the emptiness of 
a symbolic power to hold the society together as the traditional ideology and its concepts of 
the heaven and the king lost the grips on the mind of the Vietnamese people. The first few 
decades of the 20th century saw a number of attempts to reorganise the society in its unity, all 
converged on the idea of a people nation. The concept of the nation functioned as the symbolic 
collective entity, to which the Vietnamese were articulated as belonging to. Instead of 
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conceptualised the legitimacy and power of the nation as endowed by immortal universal forces 
of the Heaven and the King, the right to existence of the country was now reasoned on the 
concept of the people. The Vietnamese people were articulated to be a human breed or a family 
in extension. While the Confucian scholar Phan Boi Chau put forward a vision of an 
independent Vietnam without the French, reformers and collaborators imagined a country 
under the French tutelage. Young Vietnamese of French education converged with Phan Boi 
Chau’s vision but came from their individual concerns for freedom and self-achievements. 
However, these identification projects were more like a combo of elitist articulations and short 
of a coherent background of meanings to conceptualize other related social phenomena and the 
situation as whole. The mythical national space in these elitist identification projects, which 
were incapable of thinking in terms other than that of the Vietnamese and the French, failed to 
recognise and articulate the deep sense of dislocation experienced by the bulk of the 
Vietnamese mass, the peasants behind ‘the village bamboo hedges’. Revolutionary groups, 
which appeared in Vietnam’s politics in the late 1920s, converged on the national myth of 
previous anti-colonial politics, which told a story of a nation being threatened by the French 
and of an ethical need to drive this enemy out of the country by the means of violence. 
Revolutionaries were also more aware of the need to appeal to the mass in their national 
construction projects. Among these revolutionary organisations, the Youth League brought 
about a new approach to conceptualizing the ongoing identity crisis beyond national terms. By 
introducing a new category of class to provide new forms of identification and construct 
antagonism, the Youth League was on the way to reach the Vietnamese peasants and newly 
urbanized workers in its political project. The Youth League was the beginning of the 
Vietnamese communist discourse, which was becoming dominant in the Vietnamese discursive 








Chapter 6: The Vietnamese Communist Discourse: Bring the Mass In 
Introduction 
Communism entered Vietnam in the revolutionary upsurge of the anti-colonial politics 
in the second half of the 1920s. The communist movement initiated by the Youth League was 
among various identification projects going on in Vietnam amid the identity crisis. By the time 
the communist organisations appeared in Vietnam, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
nation had become a dominant term in the political discourse of Vietnam. However, the 
communists went beyond the national myth to circulate a socialist myth to ‘read’ societal 
dislocations and construct antagonism. With the Vietnamese communist discourse, a whole 
new world of linguistic resources and meanings were brought into the discursive space of 
Vietnam for people to conceptualize the world around them and their position in it.  
The communist discourse was essentially a political project to restructure the unity of 
the society which was being dislocated in the process of colonisation. The nodal point that tied 
the communist discourse together in its early existence in Vietnam was the signifier 
‘revolution’ with its meaning articulated as ‘the change from the bad to the good’ (Youth 
Newspaper, 1925: online). The political project of the Vietnamese communists was hailed as 
a revolution which was not only a struggle for national independence but also for social 
betterment. This revolution was necessary as the current situation was read as miserable and 
this revolution was destined to succeed as the Marxist law on the development of human society 
had pointed out. The construction of social antagonism based on oppression was widened to 
the Vietnamese mass, particularly peasants and workers. Two myths were introduced in the 
communist discourse for the Vietnamese to read their situation and also to guide actions. The 
national myth, which articulated a Vietnamese nation being exploited by the French colonists 
to the verge of extinction, was activated in the same tradition of previous anti-colonist projects. 
The socialist myth introduced the problem of class exploitation and invited people to become 
subject in the building of socialism which was said to bring an end to class exploitation. While 
the national myth defined only the French as the enemies, the socialist myth added the 
Vietnamese feudal landlords and native bourgeoisie as internal others to be excluded. The 
socialist myth conceptualized the nation as composed of various classes, whose interests were 
different from those of the nation. The Vietnamese communists claimed to represent the 
interest of the working class. Although it constructed antagonism among different groups 
within the Vietnamese, the socialist myth brought the constructed social antagonism against 
106 
 
the French closer to the Vietnamese mass. The myth of the nation was brought closer to the 
Vietnamese mass through the articulation of the French as class enemy in the socialist myth. 
Within the Vietnamese communist discourse, the French became a double enemy of the 
Vietnamese peasants and workers: a national enemy and a class enemy. The Vietnamese mass 
was discursively taken into the political realm in the communist discourse. The socialist myth 
functioned as a bridge to bring the political project of the Vietnamese communists closer to the 
mass. 
This chapter analyses the communist discourse in its infancy period in Vietnam from 
the mid-1925s to the early 1940s. The first section of the chapter introduced the early writings 
of the mastermind of Vietnamese communism, Nguyen Ai Quoc or Ho Chi Minh, before he 
formed the Youth League in 1925. It is in these writings that saw the first association between 
Vietnam’s existing anti-colonial tropes and Marxist-Leninist terminology. The second section 
analysed the communist discourse which elaborated further on the socialist myth alongside the 
national myth in reading the situation in colonial Vietnam. From 1925 to around 1940, while 
the socialist myth was dominant in the communist discourse, both the national cause and the 
socialist revolution were in a stalemate. The last section discusses the political implications of 
the dominance of the socialist myth in the communist discourse in this early period. 
6.1. Nguyen Ai Quoc and His Early Writings 
In this section, I introduced the early writings of Nguyen Ai Quoc while he was in 
France before coming to China for the formation of the Youth League in 1925. It is because 
Nguyen Ai Quoc was behind many key documents and developments of Vietnamese 
Communism, his early writings could be seen as one of the primary sources of the Vietnamese 
communist discourse. I view these writings as the link between Vietnam’s traditional anti-
colonial discourse and the Vietnamese Communist discourse. Therefore, a brief discussion of 
these document is necessary to see both the continuation of the anti-colonial discursive 
strategies and the new articulations in the later Vietnamese communist discourse.  
From 1925, the Youth League based in Canton, China was the main channel which 
brought communism into Vietnamese politics. In 1930, the VCP was established and later to 
be renamed as the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). In 1945, Vietnamese communists 
acquired power in Hanoi with the mass organisation ‘the League for the Independence of 
Vietnam’ (Việt Nam độc lập đồng minh hội– Viet Minh). Under all these key events of 
Vietnamese communism was one man, named Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot) at the 
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time of the Youth League and as Ho Chi Minh (Ho Who Aspires to Enlightenment) at the time 
of Viet Minh. Nguyen Ai Quoc was the architect of the Youth League and its documents that 
introduced the Marxist-Leninism into Vietnam’s anti-colonial politics. He was also the key 
figure in the unification of the three communist parties into the Vietnamese Communist Party 
in February 1930. Although he was physically absent from Vietnam’s politics throughout the 
1930s, he was behind all the turning points of Vietnamese Communism in its infantile period 
from the mid-1902s to the 1940s. It was Nguyen Ai Quoc, more popularly later known as Ho 
Chi Minh, who declared the independence of Vietnam and the birth of the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (DRV) in August 1945. It was not an exaggeration to say that Nguyen Ai Quoc 
was the mastermind of Vietnamese Communism at least in its infantile period.  
Born in 1890 in a scholar family in Nghe An province in Annam, Nguyen left Vietnam 
in 1911 and travelled widely to America, England, France and Russia before arriving in China 
in 1924 for the promotion of communism in Indochina. Nguyen made his name in politics 
while in Paris, where he joined the French Socialist Party and the ‘Annamite Patriots’ group, 
whose members included Phan Chu Trinh. The group presented the Demands of Annamite 
People signed under the pseudonym Nguyen the Patriot at the Versailles Peace Conference in 
1919. The demands comprised of democratic rights and reforms for Vietnam with no reference 
to national independence. The appeal was blatantly ignored, ripping Nguyen’s hope in Western 
democratic principles, which ‘presumably applied only to Europe’ (Karnow, 1997: 133). The 
ignorance of the Western power at Versailles was said to be the moment that radicalized 
Nguyen, pushing him to the path of Communism (Huynh, 1982: 60). In 1920 Nguyen voted 
for the Third International and was among the founding members of the French Communist 
Party. In 1923, he left Paris for Moscow to study at the Communist University of the Toilers 
of the East before coming to Canton, China in 1925.  
The writings of Nguyen Ai Quoc before the Youth League saw the same focuses with 
Vietnam’s previous and existing anti-colonial discourse: the brutality and oppression of the 
colonists and the failure of the feudal court in protecting its governed. However, while Phan 
Boi Chau and Nguyen An Ninh were only concerned with Vietnam’s struggle with the French, 
Nguyen looked beyond this national scale and analysed the Franco-Annamite relation in the 
international scenario under Marxist-Leninist lenses. The language of Marxist-Leninism was 
used to analyse the political situation of Vietnam. In addition, Nguyen Ai Quoc’s writings 
before the Youth League contributed greatly to the wider circulation of Vietnam’s existing 
anti-colonial tropes. Although written abroad in a foreign language like other Vietnamese anti-
colonial pieces at the time, most of Nguyen’s works were published in French newspapers or 
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performed in theatre while The History of the Loss of Vietnam was published as a book aimed 
mostly at Chinese readers and The France en Indochine was only a pamphlet which was 
confiscated when Nguyen An Ninh was on route to Vietnam. This is to say that Nguyen Ai 
Quoc’s writings must have reached a much wider audience than those of Phan Boi Chau and 
Nguyen An Ninh.  
The most famous document of Nguyen’s writings in this early period of his political 
career was The Indictment of French colonialism (Bản Án Chế Độ Thực Dân Pháp) published 
in a French newspaper around 1925. It was the collection and reassessment of his previous 
articles and knowledge about the situation in Indochina and other French colonies. The 
indictment detailed exploitative policies and inhumane behaviours of French colonial 
governments in their colonies backed up with specific figures and real-life stories. The twelve 
chapters of the ‘Indictment of French colonialism’ vividly pictured the brutality, corruption 
and greed of the civilizers and the miseries and destitution of the colonized natives. The French 
in Vietnam were reportedly enriching on the sweat and blood of the native people. The native 
people were working hard in order to ‘raise the parasites, the civilizers and others’   (Nguyen, 
1925: online). ‘Annamite people were executed by both the crescent of the capitalist 
civilization and the cross of the deteriorating Catholic church…’ (ibid). While native people 
were suffering increasing hunger, poverty and hardship, every French individual coming to 
colonies became a small king with servants and abundant of property and wealth. Taxes surged 
sharply and labours were paid cheaply or for nothing at all. People were forced to buy state-
produced alcohol and the use of opium was encouraged while banned in the motherland.  
At the time, there were 1,500 businesses trading in alcohol and opium, but only 10 schools in 
every one thousand villages… [E]very year, 23 to 24 million litres of alcohol was pressed 
down into the throats of 12 million native people, including women and children (ibid). 
According to the Indictment, colonial officials were free to rob and torture and kill Annamites, 
be they farmers, workers or civil servants. Not greeting or going faster than the French could 
result in the natives’ being bitten violently. ‘When they have white skin, they are certainly 
civilizers. As civilizers, they can commit brutal actions and still being the most civilized.’ One 
French was quoted as saying ‘the life of an Annamite is worth less that one cent’ while a small 
scratch of the civilizer was compensated a large amount of money. In the chapter ‘Blood Tax’, 
Nguyen showed how the native people were forced to fight in the French army against the 
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French rhetoric about the voluntary recruitment to become ‘soldiers serving justice and 
freedom’.  
… [I]n order to safeguard the justice and freedom that they themselves do not enjoy, they 
have to suddenly separate from wives and children, leaving their field and sheep behind to 
cross the ocean and dry their bodies in European battles… [S]ome native people are even 
allowed to descend to the bottom of the sea to protect the land of sea monsters… Some 
others… used their blood to water the laurel wreath of commanders and use their bones to 
sculpt the sticks of governors (ibid) 
 
In return for these sacrifice, those survived the battles received nothing when they came back 
home except for the chemical numbers that were drilled into their backs or wrists when enlist. 
They even did not enjoy the privileged right to trade in opium as French veterans and their 
wives did.  
The last chapter of The Indictment introduced Marxist-Leninist concepts including 
capitalism and proletariat in analysing the contradiction between the colonized and the 
colonists.  
Capitalism is a leech that has one trunk sticking to the proletariat in mainland country and 
another to the proletariat in colonies. If that animal is to be killed, it is a must to remove both 
trunks at the same time. If only one trunk is cut, the other trunk will continue sucking blood 
of the proletariat, the animal will still be alive and the cut trunk will regrow (ibid).   
 
The situation that the Vietnamese and other colonized natives were suffering were articulated 
to be part of a universal struggle between capitalism and the proletariat. The French were 
portrayed not only as the colonisers, which literally means cannibals in Vietnamese, but also 
the capitalists whose nature is to exploit the working class. The conflict between Vietnam and 
France was no longer the national problem but also the class problem on an international scale, 
and a universal problem on the capital stage of human development as portrayed in Marxism. 
That the struggle of the colonized people was an important part of the universal struggle of the 
international proletariat against capitalism was the point that Nguyen Ai Quoc had been trying 
to make to the Comintern. At the Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924, quoting Lenin’s Thesis 
on National and Colonial Questions, he delivered a speech reasoning why the Comintern 
should pay more attention to the struggle in the colonies.  
Possessing both the traditional Vietnamese anti-colonist tropes and Marxist-Leninist 
terminology, Nguyen Ai Quoc began the promotion of communism in Vietnam with the 
establishment of the Youth League in 1925. The Youth League was transformed into the 
Vietnamese Communist Party in February 1930, which was later renamed as the Indochinese 
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Communist Party in October the same year. In 1941, after the Japanese came to share the 
colony of Indochina with the French, the ICP established the League for the Independence of 
Vietnam (Viet Minh), which was a popular front liaising all strata of the Vietnamese to fight 
against the colonial government. In August 1945, five months after the Japanese’s coup to take 
control of France’s colonial government, Viet Minh carried a successful out-throwing of the 
colonial government, who were shaking at the news of Japan’s surrender to the Allies. On 
September 2nd 1945, Nguyen Ai Quoc, then known as Ho Chi Minh, declared the birth of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. From an exile cell in 1925 to a newly born state, 
Communism had transformed into a dominant political force in Vietnam. The infiltration of 
Communism into Vietnam’s politics in this infantile period was not only the growth of a 
political party but also the popularisation of a new world view, a new pool of linguistic 
resources and meanings in order to solve the identity crisis that arose with colonisation in 
Vietnam. The communist discourse was introduced into the discursive space of Vietnam. 
6.2. The Vietnamese Communist Discourse 
It was in the establishment and growth of Communist organisations in Vietnam from 
1925 that the Vietnamese communist discourse appeared. As a discourse, it strived to structure 
the dislocated society in a unity and to provide the Vietnamese with subject positions in their 
identity crisis. The Communist discourse was organised through the erection of the nodal point 
‘revolution’, the construction of social antagonism as the French colonialism and capitalist 
classes. Besides the national myth which has been articulated in previous anti-colonial 
discourses, the communist discourse added the myth of socialism as principles to ‘read’ the 
current situation of the Vietnamese as class exploitation.  
The socialist myth supplemented the national myth in bring the social antagonism against the 
French to the Vietnamese peasants and workers. The French were articulated not only to be the 
national enemy that was plotting to kill the Vietnamese people in general, but also to be the 
capitalist enemy whose nature was to exploit the working class in particular. Although the 
socialist myth installed internal boundary within the Vietnamese nation as Vietnamese 
bourgeoisie and landowners were also seen as enemies of the peasants and workers, it 
demarcated a stronger boundary between a Vietnamese nation and the French colonists. The 
socialist myth functioned to represent the totality of a complete and happy society that the 
revolution would lead to in Vietnam if the people took up their identification routes provided 
in the Vietnamese Communists’ political project. The entire political project of the Vietnamese 
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communists was defined as a revolution (kách mệnh or cách mạng in Vietnamese), which 
meant the process of building a better life. The Vietnamese people were invited to read their 
existing experiences as being oppressed and miserable and identify the French colonialism and 
other capitalist classes within the Vietnamese population as the cause of these problems.  
The Nodal Point: Revolution 
  ‘Revolution’ functioned as the nodal point of the communist discourse in this infancy 
period of communism in Vietnam. Nodal points are ‘the privileged discursive points’ or 
‘privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 
112). The entire political project of the Youth League and the ICP was not an act of rebellion 
against the existing government but defined as a revolution. Participants in the political project 
of the Vietnamese communists were termed revolutionaries, rather than nationalist nor 
communists nor Vietnamese.  
In the first half of the 1920s, the Vietnamese people were left to their own device to 
define what the word ‘revolution’ meant (Ho, 1992: 171). However, Nguyen Ai Quoc had 
successfully filled this concept with the meaning which later became the dominant 
understanding in Vietnam. In The Road to Revolution (Nguyen Ai Quoc, 1927: online), he 
defines: ‘revolution means to destroy the old for the new, to demolish the bad for the good’. 
For this man, the fight against the French was more than just a struggle to liberate the nation, 
but a revolution to build a new Vietnam. ‘A revolutionary is not only a rebel who destroys, but 
also a builder who constructs a new society’ (Huynh, 1982: 82-83). Since The Road to 
Revolution, there was no more debate on the meaning of revolution. Nguyen Ai Quoc’s 
definition had been naturalized as taken-for-granted conceptualisation of revolution. This 
definition articulated the word ‘revolution’ with progress and improvement although its literal 
meaning in Vietnamese is only to change the fate. Revolution (cách mạng) and revolutionaries 
(chiến sỹ cách mạng) were fixed with the positive progressive connotations in the communist 
discourse. In this discourse, attacking the colonial government was no longer an act of a rebel 
or a patriotic but of a revolutionary. 
Revolution was translated into Vietnamese as ‘kách mệnh’ at the time (as used in Nguyen 
Ai Quoc’s The Road to Revolution), which was later and still now popularly used as ‘cach 
manh’. The popular interpretation of ‘kách mệnh’ or ‘cách mạng’ in the existing literature on 
Vietnam is changing the Mandate of Heaven (Ho, 1992: 171). Here, I offer a different 
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interpretation. In Vietnamese cosmology, people are born to have a fate dictated by 
supernatural forces and this fate can be told from some intrinsic details such as the date and 
time of the birth of yourself or your parents, or your appearance. However, if you know the 
fate and the corresponding cosmological details that govern it, you can change the fate. Going 
to fortune tellers to find out your fate and to avoid bad luck is still a popular custom of the 
Vietnamese. ‘Cách mạng’ or ‘kách mệnh’ literally means changing fate, the future that you are 
destined to have because ‘mạnh’ or ‘mệnh’ literally means fate and ‘kách’ or ‘cách’ means ‘to 
change’. 
However, in The Road to Revolution, ‘cách mạng’ was not simply to change the destined 
future, but to change a future which is destined to be bad for a much better future. The necessity 
and significance of revolution was produced on the reading principle that the existing situation 
was bad and the post-revolution society would be a much improved one. Therefore, the first 
step toward a revolution was to ‘let the people know’ that their existing life was miserable and 
needed to be changed. In the words of Nguyen Ai Quoc (1927: online), the purpose of his 
pamphlet was to ‘awaken the people, making them stand up and join forces in doing 
revolution’. Both the national myth and the socialist myth in the communist discourse were 
doing this task. 
The ‘road’ to revolution in the Vietnamese communist discourse was introduced through 
the concept of oppression. Its meaning is constructed in its relation to oppression. In the 
tradition of Lenin’s Manifesto of the Communist Party, The Road to Revolution constructed 
the existing situation of the Vietnamese workers and farmers as being oppressed.  
Oppression breeds Revolution, thus the more oppressed one person is the more revolutionary 
and the more determined one is. Before the capitalists were oppressed, so they did Revolution. 
Nowadays, the capitalists are oppressing workers and farmers, therefore workers and farmers 
are the owners of the Revolutionary: 
1. Because workers and farmers are more heavily oppressed, 
2. Because workers and farmers are the majority so their power is highest, 
Because workers and farmers have nothing, if they lose they only lose a miserable fate, if they 
win, they have the whole world, so they are brave. Because of these reasons, workers and 
farmers are the roots of the Revolution; students, small businessmen and small landowners, 
though also being oppressed, are not as deprived as workers and farmers; these three groups 
are only revolutionary friends of workers and farmers.          (Nguyen Ai Quoc, 1927: online)                     
113 
 
In the Vietnamese communist discourse, social antagonism was constructed in the reading 
of the Vietnamese’s ongoing experiences as being oppressed. The Vietnamese mass were 
invited to read their existing life as miserable and oppressed. The communist discourse 
articulated oppression at two levels: the nation and class. At the level of the nation, the 
Vietnamese people were pictured as oppressed by the French as a whole. At the level of class, 
the Vietnamese working people, especially the peasants and workers were portrayed as 
exploited by not only the French but also some components within the Vietnamese people. The 
construction of the oppression at these two levels corresponds to two myths which were 
articulated in the communist discourse in this early period: the national myth and the socialist 
myth. The myth of the nation identified the French colonisers as the enemy and introduced the 
national/Vietnamese subject position to act for national independence from the French rule. 
The myth of socialism provided the class/socialist subject position, inviting people to act 
towards building a socialist society.  
The Myth of the Nation 
The first myth in the communist discourse was the national myth, which invited the 
Vietnamese people to identity with the nation which was being threatened by the French 
colonialism. This myth strived to represent a seemingly unity of the Vietnamese people and 
the totality of Vietnam as a country in the very construction of the French colonialism as social 
antagonism and national enemies. French colonialism was constructed as ‘a conspiracy’ 
(Torfing, 1999: 193) against the Vietnamese nation and its people. Driving out the French for 
national independence was articulated to be the only way for the survival of the Vietnamese 
people. People were invited to read the French colonialism as blocking the collective identity 
of themselves as the Vietnamese people. 
The national myth told the story of a country that was being destroyed by the French, its 
people were being exploited and oppressed. Vietnamese people were invited to read their 
existing life under the colonial rule as miserable as the fate of animals. French colonialism was 
read as a vicious plan of the French to kill the Vietnamese people and rob their belongings. 
The French imperial in the masks of ‘civilization’, ‘enlightenment’ used warships, cannons 
to conquer our country brutally and violently. They fired our cities. They burned our home 
countryside. They raped our compatriots. They robbed our wealth. They grabbed our country 
to make their colony. They enslaved our 20 million people in the fate of horses and buffalos. 
Imperialism robbed our country with the sole purpose of enriching themselves. They sneaked 
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all our farm land. They controlled our forest and mines. They kept all sea ports. They took all 
rivers. They had all commercial rights. They owned all production modes. They inflict 
increasingly higher taxes… All our country’s wealth, all our peoples’ sweat and tears are all 
drawing into their hands (The Youth League, 1929a: online). 
The French were presented as a negative force that was threatening the Vietnamese 
identity. The chain of equivalence was established among the Vietnamese people via-a-vis this 
negative force. All their particularities and differences were cancelled out in the construction 
of the French as the common enemy. The Vietnamese people were constituted as a group of 
unified people because they all shared the same experience of being exploited and robbed by 
the French. In the very representation that the Vietnamese country and its belonging were 
robbed, the Vietnamese country came to be constituted with its belongings in the imagination 
of the readers. As most of the readers have never seen other national fellows and never known 
what their country has or is, so things that ‘belong’ to the nation in constitution and the 
‘existence’ of other fellows had to be ‘talked’ or ‘written’ into existence. The above quotation 
is doing exactly this task, which is to tell the audience about all the national things and national 
fellows that they had never seen.  
Moreover, the seeming unity of the nation was also facilitated by the use of deixis words 
like ‘our’ and ‘they’ (Billig, 1995: 94). While ‘our’ involved the sense of belonging to this 
imagined national unity, ‘they’ (chúng in Vietnamese) invoked the imagination of the enemies 
and the separation and hatred against them.  
The French were represented to be the enemy whose presence in Vietnam meant the 
extinction of the Vietnamese people. Fighting the French was reasoned to be the only way for 
the Vietnamese to survive. The French were fixed to be an absolute other to the Vietnamese 
self, to be a public enemy to be exterminated. Schmitt (2007: 67) identifies these moments in 
which the enemy is recognized as the enemy ‘the high points of politics’. This is because by 
facing the friend-enemy extinction, we will be able to be clear about what we and what is 
rational for us to do (ibid).  
France grabbed all our properties, prevented us from doing this and that, they forced our 
people to use heroin and drink wine. England was only  greedy of American money, France 
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was not greedy, but also wanted to erase the Annam11 breed.                                                                           
(Nguyen Ai Quoc, 1927: online). 
The rational thing to do is to kill the French or drive them out of the country as not doing 
this is the end of the Vietnamese people. In this creation of the French enemy, overthrowing 
the colonial government meant the patriotic act of liberating the nation and the Vietnamese 
people. Liberating the nation from colonial rule was presented as the only way to solve the 
ongoing problem of oppression and national independence was the end to all the hardships that 
the Vietnamese people were enduring. In telling the story of a country being raped by the 
national enemy, the national myth recruits national subject into the political project of 
overthrowing the colonial government. 
The only way to survival of Indochinese nations is to overthrow French imperialism, fighting 
all foreign invasion regardless of white or yellow races to gain national independence. If the 
French are still here, Indochinese people will die. If the French imperialism collapses, 
Indochinese people will survive (ICP, 1939a: online). 
The association between the French colonialism and the oppression of the Vietnamese, the 
loss of the country was an existing discursive strategy of previous Vietnamese anti-colonial 
generations. Phan Boi Chau and Nguyen An Ninh had long constructed the French as the public 
enemy of the Vietnamese as a whole. However, it was in the Communist discourse that another 
level of oppression was introduced: class oppression. It was in the communist discourse that 
the Vietnamese mass, especially peasants and workers as sub-groups in the Vietnamese 
population, were specifically invited to read their ongoing experiences as being oppressed. The 
socialist myth was introduced to solve the problem of oppression at the class level.  
The Myth of Socialism: Bring the Mass In. 
 This myth of socialism was created in the construction of social antagonism as class 
oppression: working class versus capitalist class or the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie. Class 
exploitation was presented as the cause of societal dislocation alongside national exploitation. 
In locating social antagonism at the level of class, class was constituted as a natural subgroup.  
Capitalist classes or the bourgeoisie became the enemies of the working class. As belonging to 
the capitalist world, the French colonisers became the class enemy of the Vietnamese working 
                                                        
11 French colonisation divided Vietnam into three parts: Tolkin for the North, Annam the 
Central and Cochinchina the South. However, in the Youth League’s documents, Annam 
indicates the whole Vietnam, not a specific part of the country.  
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class. While the national myth constructed the French as a general national enemy of the 
Vietnamese people, the socialist myth constructed the French as the enemy of the working 
class. Social antagonism against the French was brought closer to the Vietnamese peasants and 
workers. The Vietnamese mass were constructed as the cause, the main actors and the primary 
beneficiaries of the communists’ political struggle. The socialist myth made the discursive 
grounds for the peasants and workers to enter the political realm and made the national 
identification more accessible.  
The socialist myth strived to create class identities and recruited subject for a socialist 
revolution to erase all forms of class exploitation. This socialist myth was backed up with 
representations of a two-pole world divided along the line separating between capitalism and 
socialism, and of the socialist Soviet Union as the ideal complete society where there is no 
class exploitation.   
 The class identity and the concept of class itself were constructed in the construction of 
the social antagonism of class exploitation. In the reading of the ongoing experience of workers 
and peasants as exploited by the capitalist, peasants and workers were constituted as one 
unified group of working class people. The common character among them was being 
oppressed by the capitalists. In the communist discourse, Vietnamese peasants and workers 
were constructed as a unified class, the working class, in the very construction of their 
experience as being exploited by the capitalists. 
With the socialist myth, Vietnamese communists strived to go beyond the elitist 
tendency of previous anti-colonial projects to involve the mass in their revolution. It is not only 
the Vietnamese in general which are being oppressed but also the Vietnamese peasants and 
workers in particular who are being exploited and being the most exploited within the 
Vietnamese population. Although the socialist myth constructed internal antagonism among 
the Vietnamese, it supplemented the national myth in bringing the antagonism against the 
French closer to the Vietnamese mass. As the capitalists, the French colonisers were not only 
the national enemy but also the class enemy of the Vietnamese peasants and workers. 
In was in the communist discourse that the first discursive link between the existing life 
of Vietnamese workers and peasants, which was otherwise normal everyday occurrence, with 
oppression was made. Marr (1981: 27) commented that before the 1930s, the majority of poor 
peasants were happy with the patron-client relationship with landlords, who lent money out 
117 
 
and let peasants till their land. It was under the influence of Communism that the idea that ‘the 
landlord might have stolen the land and money from the tillers’ took hold (ibid). In Marxist 
terms, the being oppressed of the workers and peasants needed to be explained, otherwise they 
would not be conscious of. Workers and peasants were oppressed because they worked hard 
but received nothing, the capitalists did not work but earned lots. These statements were 
presented as facts with specific figures and real-life evidence. With these arguments, the 
communist discourse introduced the reading of the experience of workers and peasants as being 
oppressed.  
In the world, there are two classes: 
A. The capitalists (not working but benefited). 
B. Workers and peasants (working hard but receiving nothing) 
An Annam worker, working in Hon Gay cold mine for 11 hours a day, from the beginning of 
the year and the end, he earns only 3 cents a day, does not have enough food and clothes, has 
no medicines at pain, no coffin at death. 
By contrast, the owner of the mine never touches his hand in any work, however, he has plenty 
of food and clothes, travels by horse and cars, earns tens of millions of dongs in profit (in 
1925 he gained 17000000 dong). Let’s ask who generated this 17 million dongs, the Western 
owner or the Annam worker? While our peasants do not have field to farm, Western 
plantations takes up 122000 acres of fertile fields in the Central Region and 150000 acres in 
the South. 
Our people do not have enough to eat, many starve to death in some places while plantation 
owners sell rice for nearly 1000 million francs (in 1925 they sold rice for 911,477,000 franc).                                                    
(Nguyen Ai Quoc, 1927: online)  
Interestingly, the oppressors of the Vietnamese mass were not only the French colonisers and 
the feudal court but also their fellow Vietnamese, who had lived with them in the same rural 
village for generations - the landlords. 
Annamite people are exploited and oppressed by the French imperialism, and by Annamite 
capitalist landowners and feudal court… The class of capitalists and landowners is the class 
oppressing workers and peasants… The Feudal court and its mandarins are only the French 
imperialism’ tools in oppressing and exploiting Annamite people. (Youth League, 1929b: 
online) 
The division between capitalism and the working class were articulated to be growing at 
an international level. The view of a world with two opposing camps is ubiquitous in the 
discourse of the Vietnamese Communists in this period. Thorough the period, capitalism was 
depicted as falling deeper into crisis and impending war, while socialism was increasingly 
successful in Soviet Union. Capitalism was linked with economic crisis, violent war and 
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fascism. Socialism was embodied in the image of Soviet Union, which was associated with 
peace, wealth and happiness.  
In the imperial world, the biggest ones are America and England. America is the strongest but 
only has one colony, the Philippines. America is embracing the plan to sell the whole globe, 
to rob other countries’ colonies. England has the most colonies and was the previous world 
owner. England hates America because of being bullied by the latter. They are competing to 
own the world… Japan, being powerful with a large population, wants to rob colonies. But 
wherever it goes, it was fiercely competed by England and America, so Japan wants to fight 
America… All imperialists want to divide China as China has a lot of resources and a big 
population… When the world’s strongest imperialists are at war, all other countries will be 
drawn in, one country can stand neutral. The whole globe will turn into a war battle. (VCP, 
1930g: online) 
In the Soviet Union, there is no economic crisis, no unemployment. In capital countries, the 
current technological production decreased by 25% in 1929, while Soviet’s is developing 
incredibly, in 1934 it is four times higher than in 1913, twice in 1930… All farmers have 
enough to eat and to dress, people’s literacy soars up, there is nobody illiterate. Tsar’s Russia 
used to be a cell imprisoning over 180 weak ethnicities, the success of the October revolution 
freed them from the fate of horses and buffalos, they are consolidating socialism with the 
Russian proletariat to overcome difficulty periods in the development of capitalism.                                                          
(ICP, 1935: online) 
While ‘in the capitalist society, war is inevitable’ (VCP, 1930f: online), the Soviet Union was 
described as ‘the heaven of working people and the fortress of world peace’ (ICP, 1939b: 
online). In the mid1930s, capitalism was even linked with fascism and fascism was explained 
to be an extreme stage of capitalism in time of crisis. Fascism was the more authoritarian and 
stronger rule in order to restore collapsing capitalism in some countries. ‘Fascism is the violent 
ruling form… of the most reactionary, national and imperial elements of financial capitalists’ 
(ICP, 1935: online). The French fight against Germany, which was interpreted as supporting 
democracy in the popular front period, was now explained as to target the Soviet Union. 
… the imperial France did not rush into the war with the purpose of fighting Hitler and 
eradicating ‘German quoc xa’, nor with the goal of ‘supporting democracy and small 
European in the struggle against Hitler’s invasion’. On the contrary, it stormed into the war 
in order to turn the war among imperial countries into the war against Soviet Union, to 
demolish French democracy …, to dissolve the French Communist Party, to crack down 
revolutionary propaganda of French proletariat and to turn small European countries into 
semi-colonies of England and France, and after all to preserve its market by violence.                                                                              
(ICP, 1940a: online)  
As part of this capitalist system, the French government in Vietnam was not only 
colonial, but also capitalist. As capitalists, they were war-like in nature and deemed to be 
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worsening. The improvement from its economic crisis in the mid1930s was said to be only 
temporary and it would never lead to prosperity. Reform policies like amnesty migration, loan, 
relief organisations of the colonial government were termed bogus, serving the only goal of 
softening the anger of people and building more allies and supporters. After capitalism was 
linked with fascism in the mid-1930, the French were directly juxtaposed with fascism toward 
the end of the decade. 
At present, the situation has grown completely different, the French imperialist is the 
instigator of the imperial international war. The rule of Daldie’s government has turned totally 
reactionary. The control of colonies, especially Indochina, is a clear fascist military regime 
and the plot to surrender Japanese fascists has put Indochinese nations in face with matters of 
life and death.                                                                 (ICP, 1935: online) 
Other nationalist groups, even including the communist groups of trotskyites were said to be 
part of fascism. ‘Supporters of democratic society and trotskyites are loyal servants of 
imperialism, clearing the way for fascists to power, helping fascism and are themselves 
becoming fascist’ (ibid).  
 By depicting the reality in this way, Vietnamese people were forcefully drawn into the 
socialist camp and the political project of the ICP because this was the only way they could 
survive. Having the French stay in Vietnam or building a capitalist country in the model of the 
French would mean turn Vietnam into a slaughterhouse and war battle. By introducing a happy, 
equal and wealthy Soviet Union, the audience was introduced to the spectacle of the idealized 
fullness that they will achieve if they support the political project of the Vietnamese 
Communists. The image of the Soviet Union worked to increase the reality and feasibility of 
their political project as it had been actualized somewhere else even though the reference was 
only one in words. Not only was the Soviet Union on the side of the Vietnamese revolution, 
but also the proletariat in other countries all over the world including France. The imagination 
of international support and solidarity made the communist-led revolution in Vietnam appear 
universal and more rational.  
 There are two identification projects or myths going on the communist discourse in this 
early period: the national myth and the socialist myth.  The Vietnamese people as a nation were 
constructed in opposition to the French colonists and the peasants and workers were constituted 
as a unified working class in opposition to the French capitalists and other native oppressing 
capitalist classes. At the same time, people of different backgrounds and interests were made 
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to appear in a unity with the shared experiences as being oppressed and having the same enemy. 
All the differences in terms of jobs, backgrounds, regions, ethnicities and religions were 
cancelled out to forge the image of a unified group of the oppressed people. The battle to define 
who were the oppressed and who was not was essentially the battle to shape the kind of the 
Vietnamese identity that Vietnamese Communists were constructing. It is because the 
separating line between the oppressed and the oppressors was not essential but constituted in 
discourse. The communist discourse was confusing itself between the national myth and social 
myth in demarcating the frontiers or boundaries of the collective identity it was constructing. 
However, in the early period, the socialist myth appeared to be dominant over the national 
myth.    
6.3. The Dominance of the Socialist Myth 
 In the Vietnamese Communist discourse in this early period, there were two myths in 
operation at the same time. While the national myth invested in national identities to liberate 
the country, the socialist myths invested in class identities to do a land revolution or a social 
revolution. These were two identification projects which demarcated the collective identity 
along different lines. While the national myth excluded only the French outside its ethnical 
boundary, the socialist myth made a proportion inside the Vietnamese people, the capitalist 
class and the feudal landlords, enemies. In the period from 1925 to the early 1940s, the socialist 
myth was more dominant in the Vietnamese communist discourse. The ICP claimed to 
represent the oppressed working people, not the whole Vietnamese people. The oppressed 
working people, especially the peasants and workers, were conceptualised as specific 
subgroups within the Vietnamese nation. The revolutionary force was conceptualized as only 
of the oppressed working people. Although the communists made the effort to involve the mass 
into its political project, this very effort alienated them from other segments of the Vietnamese 
population, preventing the communists from achieving any considerable results throughout the 
1930s. While the socialist myth was in dominance in this early period of the communist 
discourse, the national cause to overthrow the yoke of French colonialism was in a stalemate. 
Except for the Soviet Nghe Tinh movements in 1930 and 1931, there was no major challenge 
to the colonial authority in the 1930s.  
 From 1925 to 1941, the Vietnamese Communists consistently claimed to represent the 
working people or the property-less class, not the Vietnamese people in general. The VCP was 
self-proclaimed to be ‘the party of the property-less class’ (VCP, 1930e: online) and ‘the 
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vanguard of the property-less force’ (VCP, 1930b: online). Although the aim of the revolution 
was defined as two tasks: anti-imperialism and land revolution (1930a: online). Anti-
imperialism meant the fight against the French for national liberation. Land revolution involved 
the fight against landowners and the relocation of land to peasants to build socialism or 
communism. However, the ultimate goal of the Vietnamese Communists was to emancipate 
these oppressed people by building a communist society. Fighting the French for national 
liberation was mentioned as one of the tasks of the revolution, but was never prioritized over 
the socialist revolution. 
The Youth League is a revolutionary group representing working Annamite people, leading 
those people to fight with the ruling class… in order to destroy the present unequal society 
and to build a society, in which every has to work, has their basic needs met, have freedom 
and equality, which is communism (Youth League, 1929b: online). 
The Vietnamese Communist Party is organized to lead the miserable working people in a 
class struggle to eradicate imperialist capitalism and implement communism. (VCP, 1930c: 
online) 
The Party is the vanguard of the worker’s class… The Party is an organised group of the 
property-less class. The purpose of Communists is to build a new society to replace 
capitalism, which is the source of hunger, oppression and war, in order to have peace and 
freedom. (ICP, 1939c: online) 
The communist discourse brought the working class or the property-less class to the core 
of revolution and pushed the bourgeoisie and some other classes to the margin. Their fate was 
subject to discursive forces. Although the Youth League and the Vietnamese Communist Party 
represented other classes as potential friends of the revolution, the ICP articulated them as 
being enemies. The Youth League list students, small businessmen and small landowners as 
revolutionary friends. In the unification conference in March 1930, which led to the foundation 
of the Vietnamese Communist Party, landowners and bourgeoisie were divided into subgroups 
which could be neutralized or drawn into the revolutionary side. 
Because workers and farmers have nothing, if they lose they only lose a miserable fate, if they 
win, they have the whole world, so they are brave. Because of these reasons, workers and 
farmers are the roots of the Revolution; students, small businessmen and small landowners, 
though also being oppressed, are not as deprived as workers and farmers; these three groups 
are only revolutionary friends of workers and farmers.            (Nguyen Ai Quoc, 1927: online)  
The Party has to make its best to liaise with petty bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, middle peasants, 
the Youth, Tan Viet, etc… in order to draw them into the side of the proletariat class. 
Regarding the upper peasants, middle and small landowners and Annam bourgeoisie who we 
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are not sure of their anti-revolutionary face, we need to exploit and then make them neutral.                                    
(VCP, 1930d: online) 
In October the same year, at the first formal Congress of the Central Committee, when the 
Party was renamed to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), all landowners and bourgeoisie 
were articulated to be oppressing people, to be anti-revolutionary. They now became enemies 
to be destroyed. 
Regarding landowners, it is unclear and is not right in some points, like the division of 
landowners into big, middle and small groups. With the big, it is to confiscate their land, with 
the other two, the strategy is to take advantage, or make them neutral. This is wrong and 
dangerous. Landowners is a class who don’t participate in farming, don’t live the way of 
farmers, but only use land to collect rents, which means oppressing and exploiting the latter. 
Despite having hundreds of acres of lands or 5 to 7 thousands, they all belong to the class of 
the landowners, meaning enemies of farmers, which necessitates the need to uproot and 
confiscate all their land. You, comrades, often don’t understand the meaning of landowners, 
resulting in mistakes in dealing with farmers… 
Regarding the bourgeoisie, the strategy asks to take advantage of those bourgeoisie who are 
not clear about their anti-revolutionary face. The existence of this group is acknowledged, 
however, it is not possible to take advantage of them. They all side with (cai luong) 
nationalists, of whose influence over people the party has to destroy (using their unclear 
attitudes towards imperialists and landowners and peasant-worker alliance to unveil their 
face). Saying it is to neutralise them means telling the Party not to make workers fight with 
native bourgeoisie. Our Party cannot have that strategy.                                                                                            
(ICP, 1930b: online) 
In this discursive move, peasants’ struggle for land became an indispensable component of the 
revolution. Both French imperialists and native landowners reportedly joined force in 
oppressing the Vietnamese peasants (ICP, 1931: online). Adding land struggle to the revolution 
would reportedly enhance the scope and scale of the mass movements.  
The revolutionary movement in our country has always emphasized primarily on the fight 
against the French imperialism, against heavy taxes and rural oppression. The land struggle, 
especially the fight against the native landowners has just begun. However, there are now 
signs to link the two movements together. This will widen the scale and enhance the power 
of the mass movement a thousand time. Moreover, it has now come to the point that without 
igniting peasants’ struggle for land, the whole revolution, including the anti-imperialist 
struggle, would risk ceasing or even deteriorating. (ICP, 1931: online) 
As land struggle is considered part of the socialist revolution to eradicate class operation, 
at the same time the bourgeoisie and the landlord were being excluded, the socialist myth was 
becoming increasingly dominant. This corresponded to a nation-wide peasant-worker 
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movement called ‘Soviet Nghe Tinh movement’ which persisted for more than a year and 
involved twenty-four provinces (Huynh, 1982: 151). The revolutionary upsurge started with 
large-scale workers’ trikes in all three regions in the beginning of 1930 and reached its apex 
when red villages, or soviets, were set up in several rural districts of Nghe An and Ha Tinh 
provinces in Annam in September the same year. Led by communist carders, life in the soviets 
was reorganised economically, politically and socially (ibid, 155-159). A number of pro-poor 
policies like land reallocation, tax reduction and rice distribution were carried out. By mid-
1931, the movement was getting increasingly revolutionized and violent. Pagodas were burned 
and houses of reactionary landlords were sacked. The slogan of the day was: ‘Those 
intellectuals, rich people, landlords, and notables; Let us dig them out at the stump, pull them 
out at the root’ (Trí, phú, địa, hào: đào tận gốc, trốc tận rễ) (ibid: 158).  This was the largest-
scale and the second riot openly against the French rule since the turn of the century after the 
uprisings in Quang Nam and Phu Yen in 1908. However, the Soviet movement did not result 
in a nationwide rebellion and brutal French response quickly cracked it down. 90% of the 
Communist leadership ended in prison and it was not until 1933 that it was able to revive 
(Duiker, 1981: 41).  
Nghe Tinh Soviet movement did not only lead to the ICP’s nearly collapse after the 
colonial government’s brutal crackdowns but also resulted in a long-lasting disaffection of 
urban petti-bourgeoisie with communism (Huynh, 1982: 161). Until the end of the decade, the 
ICP did not achieve much success in increasing its popularity among urban intellectuals despite 
its changed policy towards a popular front in the second half of the 1930s. In spring 1936, a 
government of the Popular Front assumed power in France, who adopted a much more open 
attitude towards political activities in colonial countries. The ICP moved to operate in the open 
and openly asked for cooperation with all other parties and political groups. The Indochinese 
anti-imperial unified popular Front (Mặt trận thống nhất Đông dương chống đế quốc) was set 
up in the 1936 Conference to include a broad base of the people in demanding for democratic 
rights.  
The anti-imperial nationalist Front is to become the most open organisation of the broad mass. 
The front is to include all parties (like nationalist revolutionary parties and other parties), 
theatrical nationalist parties like the Constitutionalists and other groups, mass organisations, 
associations of sportsmen, students, journalists, lawyers and writers, etc. In summary, the 
anti-imperial nationalist Front is made up of all parties and strata of the peoples, regardless of 
their nationalities, French or Vietnamese or Laotian or members of ethnic minorities, as long 
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as they agree to fight for those demands raised above.                                                                                                            
(ICP, 1936c: online) 
In line with this move to a more popular front, the ICP wrote a series of propaganda 
letters to other political parties and the people asking for cooperation. The receivers were 
addressed as comrades, brothers and sisters and fellow countrymen. ‘The ICP request all parties 
to leave behind misunderstandings in the past to concentrate your every force in the anti-
imperial movement’ (ICP, 1936d: online). Under the changed guidelines of the Comitern set 
out in the VII Congress, a milder tone was noted against the French colonial government and 
the focus of the ICP’s struggle was changed to the promotion of democratic rights. Although 
no major achievement was gained in terms of the confrontation with the colonial government, 
this period was the vital time when the ICP made itself known and popular among the people’s 
mass. Moving to operate in public, calling to unite with other political groups, carrying banners 
closer to the people’s basic needs had ‘brought the ICP into the mainstream of Vietnamese 
politics’ (Duiker, 1981: 55).  In late August 1939, Russia signed a peace pact with Germany 
while France and England declared war with Hitler on September 3rd the same year. The Nazi-
Soviet pact lead to immediate repressing actions by Governor-general Catroux towards the 
Communist Party. The ICP was declared illegal and its newspapers were closed down. The 
Party retreated to the countryside.  
Conclusion                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
The Vietnamese communist discourse was an attempt to organize the dislocated society 
into a structured totality. The national myth continued in the steps of previous anti-colonial 
discourses to constitute French colonialism as a national plot to kill the Vietnamese people and 
to destroy the Vietnamese nation. Ongoing experiences of the Vietnamese were read as being 
oppressed by the French colonists. However, the communist discourse ‘detected’ another cause 
of the reported miseries of the Vietnamese people: class exploitation which occurred not only 
between the French and the Vietnamese but also within the Vietnamese population. In the 
communist discourse, the French became a double enemy of the Vietnamese working class: 
the national enemy and the class enemy. In return, the social antagonism of the Vietnamese 
mass was constructed not only against the French but also against other segments within the 
Vietnamese population. ‘Annamites were oppressed and exploited not only by the French 
imperialism, but also Annamite landlords, capitalists and other feudal forces at another level’ 
(Youth League, 1929b: online). While the communist discourse put the workers and farmers 
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at the core of the revolution, other classes within the Vietnamese population were subjected to 
the shifting of the boundary of the collective identity that the communists were forging. While 
the bourgeoisie and the landlords, were considered possible allies of the revolution in the period 
of the Youth League and the Vietnamese Communists Party, they were defined as enemies in 
the period of the ICP. The enemies of the revolution were identified as not only the French 
colonists, but also the Vietnamese feudal court and capitalist classes. This means the feudal 
court and the capitalist class, regardless of whether they were Vietnamese or not, were to be 
pushed outside the collective identity being forged in the communist-led revolution.  
With the socialist myth, Vietnamese communists went beyond the elitist tendency of 
previous anti-colonial projects to involve the mass in their revolution. It is not only the 
Vietnamese in general which are being oppressed but also the Vietnamese peasants and 
workers in particular who are being exploited and being the most exploited within the 
Vietnamese population. Although the socialist myth constructed internal antagonism among 
the Vietnamese, it supplemented the national myth in bringing the antagonism against the 
French closer to the Vietnamese mass. As the capitalists, the French colonisers were not only 
the national enemy but also the class enemy of the Vietnamese peasants and workers. 
Although both the national myth and the socialist myth were in operation in the 
communist discourse, the myth of socialism occupied a dominant role until the first years of 
the 1940s. The World War II and the march of the Japanese into Indochina in 1940 saw a 
discursive shift in the Vietnamese communist towards the proliferation of the national myth. 
In the 8th plenum of the Central Committee in May 1941, the ICP asserted that the immediate 
task of the revolution was to liberate the nation and called to temporarily drop land slogans in 
exchange for more modest slogans of reducing interest and rent, and reallocating farming land 
(ICP, 1941: online). From this point on, class struggle in socialist myth was gradually muted 







Chapter 7: The Nation: From Myth to a Social Imaginary 
Introduction 
France’s surrender to Japan in Indochina attacked France’s civilizing discourse to its 
core, further disrupting the discursive articulation of France as Vietnam’s protector and 
civiliser. Since Japan marched into Indochina in 1940, an important discursive change occurred 
in the Vietnamese communist discourse. The socialist myth was no longer prioritized as in the 
1930s and the national myth was becoming dominant. The ICP created an anti-colonial united 
front for national independence entitled the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Việt 
Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội - Viet Minh) in the 8th plenum of the Party’s central committee 
in 1941 and operated under its auspice12. The bourgeoisie, the landlords and other political 
groups, which used to be seen as enemies in the early 1930s, were now redrawn into the 
collective revolutionary identity constructed in the communist-led revolution. The proletariat 
was told to leave aside their class interest for the benefit of the nation. The nation and the 
proletariat were still seen as separate entities with different interest that might conflict with 
each other.  
A series of dislocations occurring in Vietnam during the Japanese occupation, 
especially the devastating hunger in 1944 and 1945, gave rise to the conditions for a successful 
association between national independence and individual survival, enabling the transfer the 
national myth into a social imaginary. While the colonial authority, the Nguyen dynasty and 
other political groups stayed ignorant, the ICP and its Viet Minh recognized the political 
implications of the famine. The famine rendered the discursive equalisation between the 
struggle for national independence and the struggle to survive in the national myth more 
persuasive and natural. In leading the people to fight the colonial authority for hunger relief, 
the popularity of Viet Minh was significantly increased in the aftermath of the famine.  
 By August 1945, in the political vacuum left by the disarrayed Japanese in Indochina 
at Japan’s surrender to the Allies, the ICP-led Viet Minh waged an insurrection and took power 
from the colonial government. On September 2nd when Ho Chi Minh, the name that Nguyen 
Ai Quoc was known then, proclaimed the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) 
and read the independence declaration in front of tens of thousands of Vietnamese people in 
                                                        
12 In this study, Viet Minh and their writings are seen as part of the communist discourse.  
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Ba Dinh square in Hanoi, the national myth was widely circulated among the Vietnamese 
people, marking its ongoing transfer into a social imaginary whereby national independence 
was taken for granted as the indispensable conditions for the survival of the Vietnamese people. 
A Vietnamese nation had now been formed with a name, other national symbols like flags and 
anthems and a government for its people to be identified with. Another element contributed to 
this transfer was the discursive frame that the communist discourse used to interpret 
Vietnamese’s actions in joining Viet Minh. Despite of various motives the Vietnamese might 
have had in fighting the colonial government in mind, their actions were interpreted and cast 
firmly as national acts of fighting the national enemy for Vietnam’s independence. Actions of 
hunger relief, such as storming the rice granaries of the colonial government, were framed into 
a national struggle in the communist discourse. After the August revolution, the nation had 
already figured largely as a social imaginary in Vietnam’s discursive space. The young national 
imaginary was further consolidated by the return of the French. The presence of the French 
inside the country provided the continuation of the others against which the national imaginary 
became more viable.  
This chapter analyses this process whereby the national myth was transformed into a 
national imaginary in Vietnam. It is consisted of four sections. The first one set the scene of 
the dislocated Vietnam during the Japanese occupation in the early 1940s when the national 
myth was becoming dominant over the socialist myth in the communist discourse. As the class 
struggle was muted, the bourgeoisie and the landowners were brought back in the communist-
led revolution in this national stage. The second section provided the analysis of the process 
that the national myth became a social imaginary in which national independence was taken 
for granted as the indispensable condition for the Vietnamese people to survive. As the national 
imaginary took hold, Viet Minh increased its popularity as a united front which strived for a 
common national cause. The third section discussed how the young national imaginary was 
further strengthened as the French returned, providing the continuation of others against which 
the national imaginary became more viable. Although the class struggle was muted in the 
1940s, the Vietnamese communist discourse well preserved the binary worldview which 
demarcated between a democratic and peaceful socialist front and a greedy and warlike capital 
front. The communist-led struggle for national independence in Vietnam was located in the 
universal struggle of the socialist front led by the Soviet Union for peace and democracy. The 
last section in this chapter discussed this binary worldview of the Vietnamese communists. 
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7.1. The Dominance of the National Myth 
The Japanese occupation deteriorated the already bleak economic and social situation 
in colonial Vietnam. Further dislocations occurred, deepening the Vietnamese’s feeling against 
the colonial government. Since the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee in May 1941, the ICP 
defined national liberation as the main task of its revolution at the time. The Plenum called to 
temporarily leave classes’ interests and the land revolution aside to concentrate on the national 
cause. The frontiers of the revolutionary forces were shifted to include the bourgeoisie and 
landowners. The national myth was becoming dominant over the socialist myth in the 
communist discourse.  
Japanese Occupation and Further Dislocations of the Vietnamese Society 
In May/June 1940, Paris fell into the control of Nazi Germany and in September Japan 
started their occupation of France’s Indochina. On the surface, French sovereignty in Indochina 
appeared not threatened as the Japanese left the colonial administration intact. However, 
beneath was a rapid decline of French power as the occupiers increased their demands for 
supplies and occupation costs. A large quantity of food stuff, natural resources and materials 
were to be supplied to Japan by the French. While French colonialism rendered Confucianism 
irrelevant and undermined the legitimacy of the monarchy, the Japanese occupation 
‘obliterated image of European colonial invincibility’ (SarDesai, 2008: 56), lowering French 
power in the eyes of the Vietnamese. No longer would the Vietnamese look to the colonists 
with awe and as a desirable future model of their country.  
The arrival of the Japanese into Vietnam contributed to strengthening the national myth 
in the communist discourse. While some political groups like Cao Dai and Hoa Hao in the 
South showed support to the new master, the communist discourse portrayed them as just 
another national enemy like the French colonists. The Japanese were represented as another 
exploitative Other in the same manner as the French were. The ICP described these Asians as 
robbers, who came only to have its share of the Indochinese market. Japan’s banners of ‘a 
prosperous great Asia’ or ‘Asia for Asians’ was disrupted by the articulation of Japan as another 
exploiting colonial imperialist.  
Japanese or Thai imperialism waged war in Indochina to divide Indochina and put it under an 
outrageous exploitation. Their plan, in this side or the other, is to turn the people into animals. 
Therefore, Japan’s activities were not based on the racial spirits as Japanese robbers and the 
treasonable Cuong De noisily lectured. (ICP, 1940a: online) 
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Conquering Indochina, Japan has become the owner of the economy and the army, the master 
in politics and gradually longing to become the owner of the mental sphere as well… They 
destroyed shops, murdered people and raped women and girls.                                                                                                      
(ICP, 1941: online) 
In the material sphere, Japanese occupation deteriorated the already depressing social 
and economic problem in colonial Vietnam. Peasants in some areas in the North were forced 
to stop cultivating rice but to plant industrial crops like peanuts and cotton. Instead of being 
exported, rice was confiscated and stored in granaries for Japanese troops. To make the matter 
worse, bad weather in 1944 had reduced significantly agricultural production in the North and 
the Centre. By the winter 1944 – 1945, famine struck rural areas in the North, resulting in the 
estimated 2 million deaths. In every ten Vietnamese, nearly one was suffering from hunger 
(Duiker, 1981: 83).  For many people in early 1945, the immediate inconvenience became 
genuine hunger and their sense of survival. While both the French, the Japanese and the 
colonial government turned a blind year on hunger and famine and other political parties did 
not view these social problems as political, the ICP behind its united front Viet Minh was the 
only force that demonstrated care and took concrete actions. They saw in the alleviation of 
hunger and famine the bridge to their national cause.  
The Dominance of the National Myth 
As the Japanese occupation of Indochina took place, a discursive shift occurred in the 
Vietnamese communist discourse which saw the temporary mutation of class struggle and an 
increasing dominance of the national cause. The task of national liberation was increasingly 
prioritized over the socialist revolution. In the call for national liberation, the communist 
discourse widened the political frontiers of the revolution to be the national boundaries. 
Landowners and the bourgeoisie were now included in the communist-led revolution. The 
national myth was taking over the socialist myth in the communist discourse.  
In May1941 the ICP’s Central Committee convened the 8th plenum to put forward the 
prioritized agenda of a national liberation revolution. This was the first time since the 
unification conference in February 1930 that Nguyen Ai Quoc played an active role in an ICP’s 
meeting after more than ten years of absence. In this 8th plenum, it was also the first time the 
Party defined national liberation as its number one priority. Only one year earlier, in the 7th 
Plenum the ICP still planned to implement two main tasks of the revolution, which were anti-
imperialism and land issue, alongside with each other.  
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The anti-imperial revolution and the land revolution must be implemented at the same time, 
it is impossible to do one task first and the other after. Indochinese proletariat cannot crush 
imperialism without getting rid of native feudalism and landowners, without seizing land of 
imperialists, feudalists and reactionary landowners to give to peasants in order to draw 
peasants in participating in the anti-imperial revolution. On the other hand, it is impossible to 
defeat native feudalists, colonists, reactionary landowners without fighting simultaneously 
their guardians, without the cooperation of peasants in the anti-imperialist struggle of the 
proletariat.  (ICP, 1940b: online) 
However, the 8th plenum defined: ‘At the moment, our priority is national liberation, 
not land revolution’ (ICP, 1941: online). This move was tactical, rather than permanent. Land 
revolution is not to be deleted but only to be temporarily postponed. National liberation was 
articulated to be the necessary condition for the realization of class interests. Without national 
independence, the land issue would not be solved. At this stage, the nation was still 
conceptualized to be distinct from the proletariat and the interests of these two categories were 
viewed differently.  
This does not mean that Indochinese property-less class forget their task about land, or step 
backwards, this only means that we are making a shorter step in order to have the energy for a 
longer move. At the moment, everyone should bear in mind that: if France and Japan are not to 
be driven away, our nation will bear the eternal fate of buffalos and horses and the land issue 
will not be able to resolved…. At the moment, the rights of groups and classes must be put 
under the right of the whole nation. (ICP, 1941: online) 
In the move to prioritize national liberation, the ICP called for the cooperation of people 
from all different classes and political background into their struggle. While landlords and the 
bourgeoisie were not included in the revolutionary forces in the 1930 – 1935 period, they were 
now said to have changed attitudes and were eager to participate in the revolution. Classes of 
landowners and bourgeoisie were now said to possess revolutionary spirits, which meant they 
could now fight along the proletariat and peasants against colonialism. Other parties are also 
noted to have changed their attitude towards the revolution.  
Petty bourgeoisie especially civil servants, small business owners and small landowners, as a 
result of the imperial exploitation and life hardships, are now enthusiastic to participate in and 
develop sharper sentiments to the revolution... 
The class of landlords – rich peasants, and some part of the native bourgeois have greatly 
changed their attitude. Before they had an antipathy to revolution and wanted to destroy it, or 
were indifferent. Now it is different, except for a small number who serve the French, or flatter 
and fawn on the Japanese, the majority have now developed sympathy to the revolution or stay 
neutral.          (ICP, 1941: online) 
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The social frontier of the collective identity constructed in the communist-led 
revolution was redrawn to include the bourgeoisie, the landlords, and other groups that used 
to be seen as enemies in the early 1930s. This was in sharp contrast with the discourse of the 
October 1930 1st Plenum of the temporal central committee, in which all landowners and 
bourgeoisie were not considered as friends, but enemies of the revolution. How did this happen 
in the matter of 11 years? The ICP used Marxist language that the material foundations caused 
by the double exploitation of the French and the Japanese had changed their ideologies or 
attitude towards the revolution. However, under the lenses of discourse, this move to include 
the petty bourgeoisie and the landlords into the revolutionary forces was the expansion of the 
logic of difference. The logic was that the bourgeoisie and the landlords were also exploited 
by the French and the Japanese so they shared the same antagonism so they could be in the 
same side with all the other exploited Vietnamese. It followed that if different groups shared 
the same enemy, they should all join the common revolution.  
They are the people of the Indochina, regardless of their ethnicity and class. The task of fighting 
against the French and driving away the Japanese is not the private task of the proletariat and 
peasants alone, but a common task of the whole Indochinese people. (ICP, 1941: online).  
The Political Resolution of the 8th plenum advised the dropping of Marxist terms to adopt the 
language that signified the nation. 
We should not say opposing imperialism, but fighting France – Japan. We should not say 
opposing imperial wars but fighting invasion.  We should say eradicating treasonable 
Vietnamese instead of Vietnamese feudal court and confiscating landowners’ land, … say 
unanimous cooperation to set up a democratic republic, not peasant-worker alliance to set up 
Soviets. (ICP, 1941: online). 
In line with this political line, Nguyen Ai Quoc created the League for the Independence 
of Vietnam (Viet Minh) with the agenda ‘to associate all strata of the people regardless of their 
religion, party, political ideology, class in a cooperated fight to drive away the French and the 
Japanese to endow our land with the right to independence’ (Viet Minh, 1941: online).  Its 
post-independence program was to build a democratic republic, ensuring the benefits of all 
classes. Ideological concepts of capitalism, socialism, imperialism and class were absent in the 
language of Viet Minh. It was with Viet Minh that the national myth was transformed into a 
social imaginary in Vietnam’s discursive space. 
7.2. The Nation: From Myth to Social Imaginary 
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The national myth had long been articulated in previous anti-colonial generations in 
Vietnam and was reactivated in the communist discourse. As the Japanese occupation took 
place, the Vietnamese communists invested more on the national myth and founded the Viet 
Minh as a national united front dedicated solely to the task of national liberation. However, 
even with Viet Minh the national cause did not gain much support. It was until the widespread 
famine starting in October 1944 that the national myth began to take wider hold among the 
Vietnamese mass. Social and economic deteriorations under the Japanese occupation, 
especially this severe hunger and famine, provided ‘a relation of contiguity’ (Torfing, 1999: 
112) between national survival and individual survival long articulated in the national myth. 
Rising against the colonists and looting their food banks brought survival to millions of 
Vietnamese being on the verge of starvation. The idea that national independence was a 
necessary precondition for the survival of the Vietnamese people began to take hold among the 
mass. Moreover, Viet Minh’s actions of hunger eradication, which showed their care about 
social problems and human suffering and the capacity to run society, ‘gave rise to a 
metonymical sliding’ (ibid), providing ‘the condition of possibility’ (ibid) for the discursive 
association between Viet Minh and the national cause. Although economic condition and 
physical events were part of the communist discourse, in the final instance it was in Viet Minh’s 
discursive acts of framing their organisations and actions in national terms that the national 
imaginary was constituted. Throughout 1944 and 1945, the Vietnamese people may have 
joined Viet Minh with different motives in fighting the colonist government. However, all such 
actions were cast in national terms, joining Viet Minh was interpreted as participating in the 
struggle for national independence. By August 1945, support for Viet Minh was widespread 
throughout the country and Viet Minh had successfully ousted the disarrayed Japanese in the 
political vacuum created by Japan’s defeat in the international fronts. By the time Ho Chi Minh 
read the Independence Declaration on September 2nd, the transformation from the national 
myth into a social imaginary had been in gear.  
Famine, Viet Minh and the Beginning of the National Imaginary 
The Popular Front Period in the second half of the 1930s had significantly spread the 
influence of communism in Vietnam but the ICP’s efforts to establish a united front with other 
political groups had gained no achievements. In early 1940s, the revolutionary feelings of the 
intellectuals and students were being inflamed, ‘but their passion was in general amorphous, 
unfocused and uncommitted to any particular party or program’ (Jamieson, 1995: 185). The 
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formation of Viet Minh was another attempt of the ICP in uniting Vietnamese people of all 
classes and social strata in overthrowing the colonial government.  The ICP cast Viet Minh’s 
calls in pure national terms, dropping all socialist ambitions. However, Vietminh did not 
achieve mass appeal until the eventful years of 1944 and 1945 when profound dislocations 
occurred as the result of the Japanese occupation. Faced with a severe famine that was reported 
to kill nearly 2 million people, Viet Minh lead the hungry people to raid Japanese rice granaries 
and stop their rice transports from the South. Viet Minh’s actions in famine alleviation 
significantly increased its popularity while the feeling against the Japanese, the French and Bao 
Dai’s government was inflamed. Equalising the fight against the colonial government with 
hunger alleviation, the Vietnamese people were led into Viet Minh’s national salvation 
associations. It was in Viet Minh’s concrete actions to alleviate hunger that the national myth 
began to be transferred into a social imaginary. 
The creation of Viet Minh was the ICP’s attempt to unite all Vietnamese mass regardless 
of political views and social background in the fight against the two enemies: the French and 
the Japanese. A series of national salvation associations (hội cứu quốc) representing various 
groups in society, such as workers, peasants, students, women and writers, were created to 
enlist popular support and to channel directives to the mass. Viet Minh had its base in the north-
western mountainous terrain of Viet Bac along the Chinese border. The local population of 
Viet Bac was mainly composed of ethnic minorities, who were promised with self-
determination and affected by communist carders who showed respect to and understanding of 
local customs. During the first years of its establishment, Viet Minh tide began to flood Viet 
Bac and turned the north-western highlands into a solid Communist revolutionary base. 
However, beyond Viet Bac, until late 1943 and early 1944, Viet Minh did not achieve much 
influence elsewhere (Duiker, 1981: 76).  Many groups were still competing with each other in 
striving for a free and independent Vietnam (Jamieson, 1995: 180). Mobilisation among 
workers was not very successful. The colonial government’s new labour policies of 8 hours a 
day and fair dismissal might have contributed to undercutting the Communist appeal among 
its supposed-to-be-the-core elements (ibid, 247). The urban petite-bourgeoisie or the urban 
intellectuals also appeared uninterested in Viet Minh’s appeal. 
In 1944, new situations moved to the favour of Vietminh’s propaganda. The Second 
World War and double colonialism started to manifest their tolls upon the Vietnamese 
population.  Commerce was badly hurt, taxes and war requisitions were high, unemployment 
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was widespread in the northern cities. Farming areas saw serious unrest as the result of 
government seizure of paddy rice fields. A devastating famine struck Northern villages, severe 
hunger hovered the Central region. Deaths were piled along the streets next to Japan’s rice-full 
granaries. Peasants in their skeleton-like shape flocked to the cities to beg for food, selling or 
abandoning their children. People had to eat anything edible like tree roots and barks, to fill 
their empty stomachs. While the government and all other political groups took no action, Viet 
Minh was the only political group at the time which attempted to solve the problems of famine 
and hunger and had a concrete plant to alleviate the suffering. Viet Minh carders mobilized 
people to store agricultural products against colonial orders, to storm Japanese rice granaries 
and French plantations. People were encouraged to join in Vietminh’s national salvation 
associations to rise up for food. Joining Viet Minh’s national salvation associations to fight the 
Japanese was articulated as the only solution to starvation. Viet Minh’s 1945 call to stop famine 
read: 
In order to stop the famine, everybody needs to join Vietminh’s national associations, preparing 
swiftly for the coming chance to get rid of the Japanese invaders. Only when there are no 
Japanese soldiers left, can our people live a happy life. (Viet Minh, 1945a: online) 
 
In an historic directive in March 1945, the ICP also underlined the strategy of linking 
demands for food and famine alleviation with their revolutionary cause. 
Slogans for the struggle: link the slogans demanding food, opposing paddy and tax collection 
with the slogan of ‘people’s revolutionary authority’. 
Methods of mobilization: make use of the famine to mobilize the masses and lead them to 
struggle (organise demonstrations to demand rice and food and to destroy the imperialists’ 
granaries’. (ICP, 1945: online) 
In the communist discourse, the national struggle was equalised first and foremost with the 
want for enough food to eat, enough clothes to wear (Viet Minh, 1945b: online). The 
Vietnamese were led into the so-called national salvation associations in the name of famine 
eradication before in national terms. 
The communist discourse had long circulated this articulation, linking the fight against 
colonialism with the chance of survival. However, it was until this widespread famine that this 
articulation could have hailed the bulk of the Vietnamese mass, that national independence was 
fixed as the only way to survive and to have a better life. This marked the transfer of the nation 
from myth to a social imaginary. From this point on, national independence started to be taken 
for granted as the necessary condition for the survival and prosperity of the Vietnamese. In 
rising up to take the food from the colonial authority, people were being hailed by the discursive 
link between the issue of food and survival and the issue of national independence at the same 
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time. Any foreign government, whether it was the Western French or Asian Japanese, was 
fixed as an absolute other, as a non-inclusive enemy of the Vietnamese nation.  
Ever since its early days, the ICP had been aware of the political significance of daily 
demands in its propaganda activities. ‘Our Party has to use everyday demand as the first step 
to lead the property-less class and peasants to the revolutionary battle’ (ICP, 1930a: online). 
‘Our Party have to understand the material and daily needs of the mass, exploiting every 
opportunity to take them to the front’ (ICP, 1935: online). However, the Party had always been 
facing the risk of alienating other social classes while upholding the interest of workers and 
peasants. The Nghe Tinh Soviet movement in 1930 – 1931 was an example. After the 
Communist local administration ‘soviets’ were setting up the peasant movement took a violent 
turn under increasing government repression. The slogan of the day was: ‘Those intellectuals, 
rich people, landlords and notables; Let us dig them out at the stump, pull them out at the roots’ 
(Trí, phú, địa, hào; đào tận gốc, trốc tận rễ). This movement led the disaffection with 
communism among other social classes and political groups, who referred to the Communist 
menace (hoạ cộng sản). The unpopularity of the ICP remained throughout the 1930s despite 
attempts to create a united front in the Popular Front period.  
The 1944 – 1945 famine presented the ICP with the opportunity to skip this chronic 
dilemma. This was when Viet Minh could materialize their care about the interests of the 
peasant mass without violating the interests of landlords and bourgeoisie. The famine brought 
Viet Minh a win-win situation, in which they managed to appeal to the peasant mass by taking 
concrete actions to alleviate hunger while still being able to improve its prestige among other 
social groups. By mid-spring 1945, all provinces in the North had had a Viet Minh organisation. 
In some areas, the actions did not just stop at breaking into the granaries for food stuff, but 
amounted to the establishment of ‘the people’s committees’ and ‘liberation committees’ to 
govern the local affairs before the August Revolution. ‘It is not an exaggeration to say that the 
campaign against the famine was largely possible for the Viet Minh to rise to power in Bac Ky 
and northern Trung Ky’ (Huynh, 1982: 314). By early 1944, Viet Minh’s appeal was still 
limited to its revolutionary base of Viet Bac. It was only in late 1944 and early 1945 when the 
famine reigned did Viet Minh’s influence begin to take hold among the peasants in other areas 
in the North and the Centre. Moreover, its influence was the most extensive in those places 
where the famine hid the hardest (ibid). In Cochin China, where famine did not occur, Viet 
Minh’s movement was relatively weak in rural areas. 
During 1944, Viet Minh also achieved significant improvements in appealing to the 
urban intellectuals. The new generation of Vietnamese intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s 
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recognized the constraints of traditional Vietnamese customs, but at the same time felt inferior 
and humiliated by French colonialism. The association between national independence and the 
chance to regain their dignity was articulated in the discourse of radicalism in the 1920s 
(discussed in Chapter 5). The Second World War and the Japanese occupation since 1940 
worsened their existing social and economic problems, deepening their dissatisfaction with 
colonial government, making the task of national independence more appealing. While in the 
1920s and early 1930s, writers and poets experienced an upsurge in interest in the newly found 
Western values of individualism, they gradually developed the sense of disillusion and 
alienation with romanticism and individualism towards the end of the 1930s. The devastating 
situation unfolding in front of their eyes and the own worsening circumstance in first half of 
the 1940s added the sense of guilt with romanticism and individualism. ‘Having lost breath, 
we seek depth. But the deeper we go, the colder it gets…’ (Hoai Thanh cited in Jamieson, 1995: 
185). Amid this bewilderment, intellectuals were drawn to Viet Minh’s cause of national 
independence and doctrine of sacrifice and devotion. Stripping off the communist language of 
class and social revolution, Viet Minh was able to forge the representation of a unified attempt 
of all Vietnamese people in fighting against foreign rulers, be they the French or the Japanese. 
Intellectuals found in Viet Minh the chance to contribute to getting rid of the colonial 
administration without being discriminated against or alienated as in previous Communist 
programs. Writers and poets found in the Communist’s new conceptualisation of culture and 
literature as closely related to politics a new value for their writings, a new role for themselves 
in society. To the Communists, there must be fire in poem, the pen must serve as a weapon for 
political purposes (Jamieson, 1995). By late 1944 and 1945, thousands of young urban 
intellectuals made their trek to the liberated zones to contribute to Viet Minh’s national cause. 
Viet Minh’s presence and popularity were not equal in different regions and among 
different social classes. The Front’s influence was stronger in the countryside in the North and 
the Centre, while in Saigon its appeal grew higher among workers and intellectuals in urban 
cities than among peasants in rural areas. However, by 1945 Viet Minh was the most popular 
political organisation that was able to launch a nation-wide uprising to oust the colonial 
government in the power vacuum created in the victory of the Allies. 
The Independence Declaration and the National Frame 
Together with the increasing popularity of Viet Minh was the increasing popularity of 
the national imaginary. Although people might join Viet Minh with different interests in minds, 
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theirs act of joining and fighting the current colonial authority were cast in national terms. By 
1945 after the Japan’s coup in March, in the power vacuum created by Japanese surrender to 
the Allies, Viet Minh successfully launched a nation-wide uprising to seize control of Vietnam 
in August. This event was cast in the Vietnamese narrative as the August revolution. On 
September 2nd, Ho Chi Minh declared the birth of an independent country entitled the 
Democratic Republic Vietnam (DRV). The Declaration of Independence of the DRV firmly 
put the communist-led struggle in the national frame.  
On March 9th 1945, the Japanese staged a coup against the French, taking direct control 
of the colonial administration. Vietnam was declared independence under Japanese tutelage. 
At the order of the new master, Bao Dai revoked the 1884 Protectorate Treaty with France and 
formed a government with Tran Trong Kim as Prime Minister. The ICP’s Central Committee 
wasted no time before convening a conference to adjust its strategy with the new developments. 
The historic directive entitled ‘The France-Japanese Conflict and Our Action’ (Chỉ thị Nhật 
Pháp bắn nhau và hành động của chúng ta) was issued, clarifying the anti-Japanese policy and 
identifying the Japanese as the direct enemy (ICP, 1945: online). The directive defined the 
current situation as ‘pre-insurrectionary period’, calling for enhanced military preparations for 
a final insurrection. Although favourable situations were present for the revolution, the current 
situation had not yet been ripe for a final insurrection, which was to be reserved for the 
opportune moment.  
Such opportune moment had come in August 1945 when the Japanese forces were 
squeezed in all international fronts and finally surrendered, creating a political vacuum for Viet 
Minh to fill in. On the 13th August, ICP’s Central Committee and Viet Minh’s headquarter set 
up the National Strike Committee and issued the No.1 Order for a nationwide general strike. 
The strike began in local provinces before gaining control in Hanoi in the 19th. It continued 
throughout the country and ended on the 28th with almost all provinces under the control of 
Vietminh. On August 30th, Emperor Bao Dai read his abdication and on September 2nd Ho Chi 
Mind read the Declaration of National Independence in Ba Dinh square in front of half of 
million Vietnamese.  
We, the temporary government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, solemnly declared to 
the world that: Vietnam has the right to freedom and independence, and the truth is it has 
become a free and independent country. The whole Vietnamese nation are determined to 
sacrifice all its spirits and forces, lives and wealth to preserve its freedom and independence 
(Ho Chi Minh, 1945: online). 
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In the solemn ceremony to celebrate the independence of the nation, other symbols of the 
Vietnamese nation also figured largely. The red background flag with a yellow star in the 
middle, the national flag of Vietnam until now, was proudly raised while the national anthem 
was sung loudly: 
Our Vietnamese soldiers, we all share the same determination to save our country. Our hurried 
steps are sounding on the long and arduous road. Our flag, red with the blood of victory, bears 
the spirit of our country. The distant rumbling of the guns mingles with our marching song. The 
path to glory passes over the bodies of our foes. Overcoming all hardships, together we build 
our resistance bases. Ceaselessly for the people’s cause we struggle, hastening to the battle 
field! Forward! All together advancing! Our Vietnam is eternally strong. (Van Cao, 1944) 
The ceremony was broadcast throughout the country, enabling the imagination of the 
nation widely among the Vietnamese people. The Declaration of Independence invited people 
to identify with a Vietnamese nation based on the reading of the French as the enemy that 
were exploiting and threatening the existence of the Vietnamese people in the tradition of 
previous anti-colonial pieces including Phan Boi Chau’s The Loss of Vietnam, Nguyen An 
Ninh’s France in Indochina and Nguyen Ai Quoc’s The Indictment of the French colonialism.  
Over the past 80 years, the French colonists used the flag of freedom, equality and friendship 
to rob our country, oppress our people. Their actions went against humanity and righteousness.  
Politically, there was no democracy and freedom. They applied brutal law. They established 
three different systems in the Centre, the South and the North to stop our national unification, 
to hinder our nation from consolidation. They built more prisons than schools. They blatantly 
killed our patriots. They bathed our insurrection in blood pools. They controlled press and 
applied policies to make the people become stupid. They used heroin and alcohol to weaken 
our race.  
Economically, they exploited our people to the bone, driving our people into poverty and 
destitution, dilapidating our country. They robbed our field, mines and resources. They 
monopolized on printing money, exports and imports. They levied hundreds of unfair taxes, 
making our people especially peasants and tradespeople become penniless. They did allow our 
bourgeoisie to thrive. They exploited our workers extremely ruthlessly. (Ho Chi Minh, 1945: 
online) 
In sharing the same experience of being exploited by the same enemy, the Vietnamese people 
were made into a seeming homogeneous group. All the other differences and particularities 
were cancelled out to forge the image of a unified nation. The national myth had long been 
circulated in Vietnamese anti-colonial discourse and in the communist discourse, however, 
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September the 2nd 1945 was the first time it was published and broadcast publicly in the way 
that was accessible to even the non-illiterate audience.  
Moreover, by September 2nd, the existence of the Vietnamese nation had also become more 
real as there were now concrete symbols for the people to identify with. There were not only 
the flag and the anthems, but more importantly a concrete government who claimed to 
represent the whole Vietnamese nation.  
…, we, the temporary government of the new Vietnam, representing all Vietnamese people, 
declared the removal of all colonial relations with France, deleting all treaties France has signed 
on Vietnam, eradicating all France’s interest in Vietnamese territory.   
All Vietnamese people, sharing the same will, are determined to fight against French 
colonists’ plot. (ibid) 
On the basis of the homogenous group of the Vietnamese people produced in the national 
imaginary, the communist-sponsored government were claiming the legitimate right to 
represent and to act. At the same time, the nation and the people were represented, their 
existence was constituted, consolidated and naturalized.  
In speaking in the name of the nation and whole Vietnamese people, the temporary 
government, like Viet Minh, cast their own actions and the actions of those Vietnamese people 
who cooperated with them in the national frame.  
When Japan surrendered to the Allies, the people throughout the whole country raised up to 
control power, founding the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. (ibid) 
The way that the communist discourse used the reference of the nation to interpret the uprisings 
leading to the August revolution significantly contributed to the imagination of the nation. In 
the similar way that people joined Viet Minh’s national salvation associations to settle their 
hunger in time of widespread famine, many people might have participated in the Vietminh-
led uprising against the local authority for food or other reasons. However, all these actions 
were post-framed in the communist discourse as nationalist as if the participants were all 
conscious of their national motives. Those acts of framing and narratives like the reading of 
the Declaration of National Independence on September 2nd 1945 in Ba Dinh square did not 
simply interpret the uprisings, but partly constituted them as national. ‘Although such 
perceived groupness does not necessarily reflect what is felt and experienced by participants 
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in an event, a compelling ex post framing can exercise a powerful feedback effect, shaping 
subsequent experience and increasing level of groupness’ (Brubaker, 2004: 16).   
7.3. The French Return and the Consolidation of National Imaginary 
The turbulent years of 1944 and 1945 was the time when the national myth in the 
Communist discourse started to be transferred into a social imaginary in Vietnam. By the time 
Ho Chi Minh read the Declaration of Independence, the nation imaginary had been 
significantly established among the Vietnamese people. The French colonialists had been taken 
for granted as the enemy that was plotting to exploit and kill the Vietnamese. National 
independence had been taken for granted as the only way to solve all the ongoing problems 
and difficulties that the Vietnamese people were enduring. The French return in the end of 
1945 further consolidated the transfer of the national myth into a social imaginary. The 
communist discourse continued to approach the French as the public enemy of the Vietnamese 
nation. They were represented in the old motif as the exploiting human-eating colonists. The 
war with the French was waged in the name of the nation’s resistance for independence. In 
depicting the French colonialism as threatening the survival of the Vietnamese people and their 
country, the communist discourse forced the Vietnamese to fight against the French as the only 
available and possible course of action.  
After Vietminh’s victory in August 1945, a temporary government presided by Ho Chi 
Minh was established to govern the newly born Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In November 
1945, the ICP made an announcement to dissolve itself but in fact still operated under the 
auspice of a Marxist research group. A general election was held in January 1946, resulting in 
a 97% vote for the communists and their allies in the National Assembly. In March, a 
permanent government was formed. Although the government consisted of members of 
different political parties, key posts were held by Vietminh members: Ho Chi Minh as the 
president and the minister of foreign affairs, Vo Nguyen Giap and Pham Van Dong as ministers 
of interior affairs and finance. The government of the DRV was essentially that of Vietminh, 
and by extension, that of the ICP. The new government immediately carried out a series of 
programmes to solve two problems that they deemed the most urgent: hunger and illiteracy. 
Rent and taxes were reduced and literacy classes were opened. The hated monopolies on 
alcohol, salt and opium were abolished. These policies significantly increased the support for 
the new government as it established the conditions to associate the new government with 
social caring and the capacity to act in the interest of the mass. This is similar to the manner in 
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which Viet Minh’s actions of hunger relief contributed to the popularity of Viet Minh and its 
national discourse.  
Immediately towards the end of the 1945, the French came back to reassert their 
colonial rule. They first took over the South and gradually moved to the North. Peace 
negotiations failed and in December 1946 Ho Chi Minh pronounced war against the French. In 
the words of the Vietnamese communists, the ‘national resistance’ had begun (Ho Chi Minh, 
1946b). The fight against the French was cast in the name of the people and the nation, rather 
than a specific group of people. The call to fight the French was always in the name of the 
nation, not of any specific government.  
To all the people in the nation! The nation is calling us. Please be determined to proceed! (Ho 
Chi Minh, 1946a: online) 
We would rather sacrifice everything, but we would never have the country lost, would never 
stand being slaves… 
Any one men or women, regardless of their religion, party or ethnicities, old or young. If you 
are Vietnamese, you have to fight the French to rescue the nation… 
The time to rescue the country has come. We have to sacrifice our last drop of blood to preserve 
the country. (Ho Chi Minh, 1946b: online) 
In these calls of the nation, the Vietnamese were interpellated as national subjects and forced 
to act as national subjects at the same time. ‘If you are Vietnamese, you have to fight the French 
to rescue the nation’. There were no other alternatives to rescuing the nation because if the 
French colonialism persisted in the country, the Vietnamese people would become slaves and 
the country would be lost.  
The truth is clear, French colonists want to rob our country once more time.  
At present, Vietnam has only two options: either to tie its hands at the loss of the country and 
bow down as slaves, or to determine to preserve independence and freedom.                                                                                    
(Ho Chi Minh, 1946a:  online) 
The continuation of French colonialism provided the continuation of threats against which 
the imagination of the nation could be constituted. After the August Revolution, in the 
Vietnamese communist discourse the French continued to play the role of the national Others 
who reportedly robbed and exploited the Vietnamese nation. The national frame was 
consistently used in interpreting the struggle between the DRV-led war against the French. The 
violence involved in this fight reinforced the sense of groupness among the Vietnamese, not 
the result of the existing sense of national belongings. This national imaginary was also 
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strengthened in the knowledge claim about a binary world which described the French 
colonialism as part of the collapsing capitalism and the DRV-led struggle as part of the 
international socialist movement for peace and democracy. 
7.4. The Knowledge Claim about a Binary World. 
The knowledge claim about a binary world divided by capitalism and socialism that was 
present in the Vietnamese communist discourse from the time of the Youth League was well 
preserved and further strengthened in the war with the France. The antagonistic relations 
between capitalism and socialism, and the articulations linking capitalism with war and crises, 
linking socialism with peace and democracy helped to increase the support for the communist-
led struggle in safeguarding the newly won national independence. The communist block was 
framed as the anti-imperial democratic front led by Soviet Union, which represented all the 
best things in this world and was reportedly thriving. The other side made up of capitalist 
countries was termed the anti-democratic imperial front led by the U.S., which was weakening 
and descending into chaotic wars. With this background understanding of the world scenario, 
the communist-led wars in Vietnam was interpreted as being part of the world movements for 
socialism, peace and democracy: the war for peace.  
As in the communist discourse, socialism was made equal to democracy, peace, wealth, 
freedom, justice, the most advanced stage of human development and the most popular world 
trend of the time.  
The socialist system led by Soviet Union is “the system representing democratic trends, 
working classes’ interest, oppressed nations’ wills, and the majority of the human race (ICP, 
1946: online).  
The trend towards socialism was reportedly becoming popular and on the winning side. 
The Soviet Union’s victory over Hitler and the foundation of communist governments in 
Eastern European and Far Eastern countries including China and Vietnam in the late 1940s 
were interpreted as eloquent evidences for the winning emergence of the communist front 
(Truong Chinh, 1951: online). To the contrary, the capitalist system is weakening. 
Facing a severe total crisis, imperialists headed by the U.S. fascists are making every effort to 
prepare for the third war, wishing to realize the dream of becoming the globe owner. They are 
busily increasing weapons, making nuclear bombs, directly interfering into many countries’ 
internal affairs, in order to turn these countries into their military bases, to continue invasion 
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wars, to oppress movements of peace, democracy and national liberation, to accelerate 
intelligence units, to encourage and support fascist organizations, etc… Imperialists want to get 
out of crises by means of war as they have done before. (Ton Duc Thang, 1951: online). 
The U.S. was represented as greedy and aggressive exploiters in the same manner as the 
French colonists were used to and being depicted. The familiar story was that as the nature of 
capitalism required the expansion of market, capitalist countries especially the U.S., England 
and France planned to make war to meet this demand. Although the U.S. had long been 
recognised as part of the capitalist system in the Vietnamese communists’ discourse, the 
antagonism only started to be focused on the U.S. since 1950. While the U.S. had always been 
categorised in the imperial side, it was only placed in a direct relationship with Vietnam’s 
revolution as the most dangerous enemy since 1950. As soon as the U.S. started their 
intervention in Indochina by granting support to the French, they were defined as the most 
dangerous enemy while France was the direct enemy and feudal elements as supplementary 
(Truong Chinh, 1950 and 1951: online).  The U.S. were presented as a greedy capitalist regime, 
like the French, who craved for the abundant national resources of Vietnam and plotted to turn 
the country into a market and a military base for a third world war (Truong Chinh, 1951; Ho 
Chi Minh, 1953a).  The French’s presence and the U.S. on the back stage meant the 
continuation of the Others that had been fixed as the national enemies. The U.S. was 
represented as another Other in the same interpretative frame that used to portray the French 
and the Japanese. These discursive representations of the U.S. rendered the latter war against 
the U.S. intervention in the 1960s and the 1970s possible. As Tuong Vu (2009) argued, the 
collision between Vietnam and the United States appeared conceivable from the vantage point 
of the 1945- 1954 period.   
The Communist-led war was interpreted as the struggle for not only peace and democracy 
inside the country, but also on the international scale. The Vietnamese Communists and its 
followers were invited to identify themselves as international peace keepers and on the world’s 
democratic side. 
The Vietnamese nation’s struggle against French imperialists and interventionist Americans is 
a part of the movement fighting for international peace, democracy and socialism. Vietnamese 
nation is fighting for its own freedom and democracy and for world peace at the same time. 
Every victory of the Vietnamese resistance is a brick contributing to the construction of the 
peace castle. Vietnam is one of the fortresses in the peace and democracy front against 
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imperialism, however, it is also considered by the imperialists as a strategic position in their 
anti-democratic front. (Truong Chinh, 1951: online) 
 The invisible but imaginable link with the outside world could have brought a great sense of 
justice, solidarity and confidence to its participants and helped to draw potential followers. The 
Communist-led revolution in Vietnam was also associated with a timeless force ‘the history’ 
and a transnational force ‘the world people’: ‘History has given Vietnamese workers and 
people the task to protecting this front. Vietnamese people and workers are determined not to 
hurt the confidence of the world people’ (Truong Chinh, 1951: online).  
Conclusion 
It was during the Japanese occupation and in the events leading up to the August 
Revolution that the national myth was transferred in a national imaginary in the discursive 
space of Vietnam. National independence was taken for granted as the condition of possibility 
for the survival of the Vietnamese people. Any foreign rulers, be they the French or the 
Japanese, was fixed as the public enemy who plotted to kill the Vietnamese people and destroy 
the Vietnamese nation. The national imaginary was further consolidated in the way the DRV’s 
government claimed to wage the war against the French return in the name of the nation and 
the people.  
As the national myth took dominance over the socialist myth in the Vietnamese 
communist discourse in the time of Viet Minh, the bourgeoisie, the landlords and other political 
groups, which used to be seen as enemies in the early 1930s, were now redrawn into the 
collective revolutionary identity constructed in the communist-led revolution. The proletariat 
was told to leave aside their class interest for the benefit of the nation. The nation and the 
proletariat were still seen as separate entities with different interest that might conflict with 
each other.  
It is not an exaggeration to state that the national common-sense was formed in events 
leading up the August Revolution and crystalized in this event and in the Communist-led war 
against the French return. Having established the national common-sense or the national 
imaginary, the communist discourse started to graft the socialist myth into this national 




Chapter 8: The Hegemony of the Communist Discourse 
Introduction  
With the national imaginary being constituted and consolidated in the war against the 
French return, the nation had become a nodal point in the communist discourse. An 
independent Vietnam free from foreign rule had been taken for granted as the condition of 
possibility for the survival of the Vietnamese people. Having had the national imaginary in 
place, the communist discourse started its hegemonic project to build a socialist society in the 
DRV by linking socialist elements to the nodal point ‘nation’. A system of hegemonic relations, 
‘by which a certain particularity assumes the representation of a universality entirely 
incommensurable with it’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: xiii), were established between the party, 
the state, the peasants and the nation. While classes’ interests were differentiated with the 
nation’s in previous periods, the interests of peasants were now seen as congruent with those 
of the nation and, hence, the land issue was equalized with national independence. The 
communists also claimed to represent the whole nation, not only the working class as before. 
The communist party addressed itself as the party of the nation. With these new articulations, 
the socialist myth was being grafted into the national imaginary and became a social imaginary 
itself. With both the national imaginary and socialist imaginary in place, the Vietnamese 
communist discourse had achieved its hegemony. A Vietnamese nation had now been formed 
with a name, other national symbols like flags and anthems and a government for its people to 
be identified with. That means it had successful constructed a ‘discursive formation that 
provides a surface of inscription of a wider range of demands, views and attitudes’ (Torfing, 
1999: 101). This chapter studies this process where the socialist elements were grafted into the 
national imaginary, enabling the communist discourse to attain hegemony, which occurred 
since the early 1950s and during the communist-led war against the American intervention and 
the Southern government.  
This chapter is consisted of four sessions. The first one studies the articulations that 
linked the communist Party and its sponsored state with the nation. The communist-led 
government of the DRV was presented as the only legal government of Vietnam which 
represented the interest of the whole nation. The Vietnamese Labour Party13 (Dang Lao Dong 
                                                        
13 The normal translation is the Vietnamese Workers’ Party. However, I understand ‘lao 
dong’ in the original Vietnamese name as ‘labour’ not ‘worker’ so I made my translation as 
the Vietnamese Labour Party.   
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Viet Nam), the name of the ICP since 1951, also claimed to be the party of the nation. Bao 
Dai’s government of the State of Vietnam was constituted as the anti-national illegitimate 
political group, the French’s puppet lacking ability to run the country. The second session 
examines the discursive associations between class struggle and national independence. 
Previously, all classes were viewed as different and distinct from the nation. People were told 
to put their class interest under the national interests. However, in the early 1950s, the concept 
of the nation was reduced to include only the peasants. National liberation was equalized with 
the liberation of the peasants from exploitation of landlords, making land reform necessary as 
a course of action in the war for national independence. This discursive move made possible a 
radical land reform beginning in early 1953, in which landlords had their land, livestock and 
other property confiscated and were violently punished for their long ‘exploitative practices’ 
like renting out land and hiring labour. Amid the land reform, after the DRV’s victory at Dien 
Bien Phu, the French withdraw their troop from Vietnam, terminating their nearly-a-century 
colonialisation in Vietnam. The success of the communist-led force over the French in Dien 
Bien Phu provided a metonymical relation between socialism and national independence, 
enabling the discursive equation between the two in the communist discourse, which was 
articulated in the communist discourse during the later war against the southern government 
and the American intervention. The third session analyses how the war against the U.S. and 
the southern government was presented in the national frame. With the foreign policy of 
communism containment already in place by the mid 1950s, the United States supported the 
establishment of an anti-communist government on the basis of Bao Dai’s government in South 
Vietnam. The U.S. intervention was immediately presented in the communist discourse as 
another invasion in the national frame. The presence of the U.S. troops and their supported 
southern government were cast as enemies of the nation, consolidating the already existing 
national imaginary in Vietnam’s discursive space. They replaced the French and the feudal 
court as the others who threatened the survival of the nation and who were the culprits of all 
ongoing miseries. As the national imaginary was consolidated in the presence of the American 
Other, the Vietnamese Communist discourse grafted the socialist myth into this national 
imaginary. In the same way that the class struggle was reasoned as the only means to national 
independence in the war with the French, socialism was now articulated as the only means to 
the national cause in the American era. The socialist project, which was publicly announced 
and implemented in North Vietnam in the early 1950s, continued to be embraced during the 
war with the United States. The last chapter examines how this grafting took place.  
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8.1. Hegemonic Claims to Represent the Nation 
The battle for nationhood is a battle for hegemony, by which a part claims to speak for the 
whole nation and to represent the nation’s essence (Billig, 1995: 27).  
At the same time the nation is constituted, it needs to be represented. As the communist 
discourse started to prioritize the national myth over the socialist myth since 1941, Viet Minh 
was organized to speak and act in the interest of the people and the nation. A provisional 
government was set up by Viet Minh even before the August Revolution was successful. When 
the independence of Vietnam was declared in Ho Chi Minh’s writing, there was already a 
temporary government who claimed to represent all Vietnamese people in declaring this 
independence. This is to say that even though the state claims its legitimacy on the basis of the 
people or the nation, the political significance of a nation or the people cannot be materialized 
without a force that claims to represent and act in their names. There cannot be an act which is 
agreed on and accomplished by all the people inside any national territory. The act that a state 
or an organisation is doing in the name of the nation is essentially the act of that particular 
organisation, not the whole nation.  
In the 1920s and the 1930s, the Vietnamese communists claimed to represent the 
exploited working class within the Vietnamese nation. However, at the same time that the 
national imaginary was constituted, the communists started their hegemonic claims to represent 
the whole Vietnamese nation, equating their party with the nation. The Viet Minh, the 
communist-led state of the DRV and the Vietnamese Labour Party (the name of the ICP since 
1951) all articulated their legitimacy as the legal representatives of the Vietnamese people.  
These articulations contributed to the constitution of the national imaginary and functioned to 
justify the existence of these communist organisations at the same time. They were also the 
first discursive moves to ground the inscription of the socialist myth into the national imaginary 
and to prepare hegemonic relation for Vietnamese communists’ hegemonic project of building 
a socialist society under its rule in Vietnam.  
 In the 1920s and 1930s, when the socialist myth was dominant, the communists in 
Vietnam claimed to represent the working people or the property-less class, not the whole 
Vietnamese nation.   
The Youth League is a revolutionary group representing working Annamite people, leading 
those people to fight with the ruling class… (Youth League, 1929b: online). 
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The Vietnamese Communist Party is organized to lead the miserable working people in a class 
struggle to eradicate imperialist capitalism and implement communism. (VCP, 1930c: online) 
The Party is the vanguard of the worker’s class… The Party is an organised group of the 
property-less class (ICP, 1939c: online). 
Hover, in 1945 after overthrowing the colonial government, the state of the newly-born 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam consistently represented themselves as the national 
government and the communist Party as the nation’s party. Ever since its establishment, the 
DRV had been busy explaining the legitimacy of its government and the illegitimacy of the 
French-sponsored government.  
Ho Chi Minh’s government is the only legal government of Vietnam, established in line with 
the Constitution, approved by Vietnam’s National Assembly. This government has the right to 
engage in diplomatic relations with France and other countries. Those who claim to represent 
the people to negotiate with France will be seen by national citizens as reactionary Vietnamese, 
will be convicted by the government of treason, of plotting with the enemy and will be punished 
according to the law. 
If France recognizes the unification and independence with the puppets, that unification and 
independence will be bogus and of no value… 
The only way France can solve the Vietnamese issue is to open frank negotiations with Ho Chi 
Minh’s government and recognise a true unified and independent Vietnam within the French 
union.             (ICP’s Central Committee, 1947: online) 
This reasoning was reiterated again and again in many other documents of the party in 
these years. The French-sponsored government of Bao Dai was described as the puppet without 
a capacity to run the country. Bao Dai’s government was made the enemy of the nation and the 
Vietnamese people in the communist discourse.  
 Imperialism and feudalism are the most reactionary forces plotting with each other to rule 
Vietnam over the last 80 years. It was the feudal Nguyen dynasty who sold our country to 
France, and after France’s conquest, they turned into handy men and puppet administration of 
the imperialists. Imperialism used feudalism as a leaning base to invade Vietnam am. 
Vietnamese feudalists held imperialists’ legs to preserve their selfish benefits. Bao Dai’s 
government and other puppet groups, representatives of feudal landowners and capitalists, are 
acting against the resistance, betraying the country, harming the breed. Imperialism and 
feudalism are the main objects of the Vietnamese revolution, two primary enemies of 
Vietnamese people (Truong Chinh, 1953b: online). 
The message was clear that the government presided by Ho Chi Minh would not let another 
political groups, even Emperor Bao Dai, to decide on the fate of Vietnam or to rule Vietnam. 
‘To be sure, ICP leaders wanted Vietnam to be independent; however, it was not just any 
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independence, but had to be independence with their party in charge’ (Vu, 2009a: 191). The 
construction that the Bao Dai’s government were representing capitalism and betraying the 
nation worked to delegitimate their authority among the subjects of the communist discourse. 
In 1951, the ICP changed its name into the Vietnam’s Labour Party (VLP) and began 
their hegemonic claims as the nation’s party. In his thesis on Vietnam’s Revolution read at the 
1951 Second Congress, the Secretary General Truong Chinh stated: ‘It is because Vietnam’s 
Labour Party is the Party of workers and working people, it must be the Party of the Vietnamese 
nation’.  
The statements that the DRV’s government or the VLP were national are essentially 
hegemonic claims. Both of them were essentially organisations made up by a certain group of 
people. As Brubaker (2004: 15) argued ‘organisations cannot be equated with ethnic groups’, 
in this case DRV’s state and the VWP cannot be equated with the Vietnamese nation. In effect, 
the chief protagonist of the 1945-1954 conflict with the French, which was called the first 
Indochina war in the international circle but the anti-French resistance for national 
independence in the Communist discourse, was not the Vietnamese nation, but the DRV’s 
government and the Vietnamese communists behind it. In Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory, the relation between the Vietnamese communists, or their parties, with the Vietnamese 
nation is essentially a hegemonic relation, ‘by which a certain particularity assumes the 
representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it, is a hegemonic relation’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: xiii). 
8.2. Associating Class Struggle with National Independence 
At the same time that the VLP claimed to represent the whole Vietnamese nation, the 
discursive link between the national independence and class struggle started to be linked. This 
association was accomplished by another articulation which saw the shrinking of the 
boundaries of the nation to that of the peasants. It was in the 4th Plenum of the Party’s Standing 
Central Committee in January 1953 that the interests of the peasants were articulated to be the 
same as the interest of the nation. These hegemonic articulations which equalized the peasants 
with the nation, class struggle with national liberation made possible a radical land policy 
which was carried out in North Vietnam from 1953 to 1956, resulting in the wiping out of all 
potential local rural opposition leadership (Gittinger, 1959: 127) 
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In previous periods, the communist discourse presented class and nation as two separate 
entities, whose interests might be conflicting with each other. Class struggle and the national 
issue were separated as two tasks of the communist-led revolution in Vietnam. In the early 
1940s when the national liberation was prioritized, the ICP called the workers to set aside their 
interests, asked the peasants to temporarily drop their struggle for land against the landlords in 
order to unite all forces in the national struggle. 
In the current situation, the interests of the part, of the class have to be put below the nation’s 
right to liberation. The interests of peasants and workers have to rank after the right to liberation 
and independence of the whole people. If we now raise the slogan of ousting landowners, 
allocating land to peasants, we will not only lose an ally or a supporting force in the fight against 
France and Japan but also drive that force into the enemy side…. 
The plan is to do the national liberation instead of the people’s democratic revolution (Cách 
mạng tư sản dân quyền). This does not mean that the Indochinese proletariat forget the land 
task or step backward, it only means a shorter step in preparation for a longer stride. At present, 
everyone should know that: if we can drive out the French and the Japanese, the fate of our 
nation will be forever like that of buffalos and horses and the land issue will never be solved… 
(ICP, 1941: online) 
In the move to appeal to all Vietnamese people, the class struggle was removed from 
the program of the ICP. In the words of Post (1989: 169) since the establishment of Viet Minh 
‘class struggle had in practice been totally subordinated to the anti-imperialist one’. However, 
it should be noted while Vietminh called for the cooperation of all classes and social groups in 
the national struggle for independence in its propaganda documents, in its internal documents 
the ICP never ignored the issue of class and social revolution. The land issue was not to be 
omitted, but just to be carried out after the anti-imperialist mission. The class struggle was 
temporarily postponed only because realising the interest of class at the time was said to do 
harm to the mobilisation of the whole nation. 
This line of argument was also reasoned for the ICP’s dissolution on November 11th 
1945. In the public notice about its dissolution, the ICP’s Central Committee stated the decision 
was taken under the consideration that:  
in order to fulfil the great task of national liberation, the unanimous cooperation of the whole 
people regardless of classes and parties is the vital requirement, 
and with the aim  
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to prove that: communists are the nation’s forwarders, always wholeheartedly sacrifice for the 
cause of liberating the whole people, are willing to place the nation’s interests over classes’, 
sacrifice the party’s specific rights for the sake of the common right of the nation. (ICP’s 
Central Committee, 1945a: online) 
Two months after declaring the birth of the DRV in August 1945, facing the return of 
the French, the Indochinese revolution was defined as a revolution for national liberation 
(ICP’s Central Committee, 1945b). ‘The task of rescuing the proletariat has not been 
completed… The slogan is still: ‘The nation is above all. The fatherland is above all’ (ICP’s 
Central Committee, 1945b). Until1950, the ICP still focused on the task of national 
independence and viewed the interest of the peasants and other strata separately from the 
interest of the whole nation. The attitude toward the landlord is neutral as the strategy is to 
draw them into the resistant side. 
At present, the primary contradiction required urgent settlement in Vietnam is the contradiction 
between the whole nation and imperialism (the French colonists and U.S. interventionists) 
together with their handy Vietnamese man in order to achieve independence for all the nation. 
At the moment, the interest of each and every stratum must serve the interest of the whole 
resistant nation. Between the two tasks of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism, the anti-
imperialist task is the main one… The Party’s policy in rural areas is: leaning on poor peasants, 
tying closely with middle peasants, cooperating with rich peasants and drawing landlords into 
the resistant side. (ICP’s Central Committee, 1950c: online) 
However, in 1953 the concepts of the nation, peasants and their respective 
interests were converged in the Communist discourse. At the 4th Plenum of the Standing 
Central Committee held in January 1953, the meaning of the nation was fused with that 
of the peasants.  
The foundation of the national issue is the peasant issue because peasants make up the majority 
in the nation.                                                 (Ho Chi Minh, 1953a: online) 
The democratic national revolution is the peasant revolution. The war for national liberation is 
in essence the peasants’ war.                               (Truong Chinh, 1953a: online) 
The essence of the national issue is the peasant issue. (Stalin quoted in Ho Chi Minh, 1953b) 
At the same time the peasants were taken to the core of the nation, the war for national 
liberation became the peasants’ struggle for land. While in 1950 the landlords were seen as 
possible participants of the revolution, in 1953 they became the enemy of the nation and the 
peasants. The landlords were now defined to be a feudal force, traditional practices of land rent 
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and labour hire were now theorised as exploitative. This exploitation was presented as the cause 
of the poverty of the peasants and the underdevelopment of the country.  
Landlords, accounting for less than 5% of the population, are exploiting rest 90%, who are 
peasants, with high rent and interests…With this feudal exploitation form, the landowners have 
been sitting in the cool places and eating with gold bowls without upgrading agricultural 
techniques. They even go against technical advance and impede productivity. Framers are so 
heavily exploited that they are not enthusiastic in working and they do not want and do not have 
the tools to upgrade techniques. Peasants make ups the majority of consumers in the country, 
but they are poor and destitute with low buying power. This is the reason why our country’s 
market is tightened, our commerce and industry did not develop, which in turn leave negative 
influence on agriculture (Truong Chinh, 1953b: online). 
Feudalism in the Vietnamese communists’ discourse meant not only the king, the feudal 
court and their administration, but also landlords and their existing practices of renting out land 
and hiring labour. The interest and the rent that farmers were paying to landlords were 
considered part of the exploitation of the feudal system. This existing exploitation of the feudal 
class were regarded as an impediment not only to the development of the country, but also to 
the national resistance for independence. Bringing material stakes, giving land to peasants was 
articulated to be vital to the success of the national cause.  
Our peasants take up 95% of the population, but have only 3/10 land, work hard all year round 
but are still poor for the whole life. 
Landowning class comprise of less than 5% of the population, but own 7/10 of the farming 
land, ‘sit in cool places and eat with gold bowls’. This situation is extremely unfair. Our country 
was invaded, our people were backward and desperate because of this situation. In the past 
resistance years, although the Party and Government have reduced land rent in free zones, the 
vital issue of land has not been resolved. This has influenced on the forces participating the 
resistance and the peasants’ productivity (Ho Chi Minh, 1953b: online). 
In order for the resistance to succeed and the true implementation of the people’s democracy, 
it is necessary to improve the economic and political rights of the peasants, to allocate land to 
them (Ho Chi Minh, 1953a: online). 
The argument is that in order for the national resistance to succeed, the peasants must have their 
interests and other rights increased. In the interest of the peasants, their exploiters, which were 
presented as landlords who ‘sit in cool places and eat with gold bowls’, needed to have their 
land and possessions expropriated. With these discursive changes, the Party moved beyond rent 
and interest reduction to a more radical rural policy of land redistribution, which involved the 
reapportioning of properties of not only anti-Communist factions like colonists, traitors and 
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reactionaries, but also that of landlords. The key element of this new land policy was to define 
and identify landlords and to show peasants that they had been and were being oppressed by 
landlords.  
However, it is because the landlord class, or any other social class, is not a natural 
inherent group and their rent and credit practice are not by nature exploitative, the VLP were at 
pain to present the reality of landlord exploitation and to categorise landlords and peasants into 
rich and middle and small groups.  Both the theoretical documents and practices of their new 
agrarian policies largely involved the creation of anti-landlord attitude and the classification of 
the village population into different groups. Criteria for classification kept changing. The 
application of these criteria was wrested with conflicts and corruption. All of these reportedly 
caused widespread bewilderment not only among the implementing carders but also among the 
mass. These problems of anti-landlord propaganda and population classification went on to 
haunt the Vietnamese Communists in their policies of agriculture socialisation in later periods. 
During the trial period in 1953, the land reform was carried out in 836 villages with a population 
of 3.5 million (Gittinger, 1959: 116). 14,000 hectares of rice fields and 2,650 buffaloes were 
confiscated. Out of 10,015 landowners, whose crimes were exposed by the peasants, 135 were 
condemned to death and about 1,200 imprisoned for re-education. Towards the end of the year, 
the VLP (1953) accelerated the ‘Land to the Tiller’ program, vowing to erase completely the 
feudal exploitation regime. 
Existing literature conventionally explained the land reform policy as a tactical move 
of the Party to appeal to the peasants in order to meet its soaring demand for soldiers and porters 
in preparation for the general counter-offensive phase while the urban recruitment was weak 
(Duiker, 1981: 152- 154; Post, 1989:194). This move may be tactical or not is not in debate 
here. The focus that I want to draw on is the discursive move of the Communist discourse in 
inflating the meaning of the peasants to that of the nation and the significance of the land 
revolution to that of national independence. These discursive mechanisms functioned to make 
the radical land policy, which ran against the interest of a part of the nation, appear acceptable 
and even necessary in the national cause. In the communist discourse in this period, an equation 
was established between the peasants and the nation, and between social revolution and 
national independence. The tasks of fighting against imperialism and feudalism were presented 
to be closely linked and had to be realized simultaneously. The order of the revolutionary tasks 
of the 1940s was broken down, making social revolution as importantly as fighting the French.  
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The radical land reform stopped in the end of 1957 when disillusion and disaffection was 
widespread, even among the peasants. Although the DRV openly admitted land reforms errors 
and called for corrections, they laid the blame on the implementing carders, not the content of 
the land reform itself. The communist-led revolution in Vietnam was still firmly on route to 
socialism, which was reported as the international rising trend towards peace and democracy.  
8.3. The U.S. Intervention and the Consolidation of the National Imaginary 
Our people’s resistance against the United States for national salvation is the greatest struggle 
against foreign invasion in the history, is the biggest war in the world after the second world 
war. (VLP, 1970: online) 
Since its inception, the Vietnamese communist discourse had articulated French 
colonialism in Vietnam as a problem and as a national problem of the Vietnamese people. 
Solving this problem, that is driving out the French for national independence, was articulated 
as the only way that the Vietnamese people can survive. Independence was declared in 1945. 
However, French return meant the continuation of the national problem. It would have been 
interesting to see how life became full and complete and Vietnam became an ideal nation free 
of foreign interference after the French departed in 1954. However, the existence of an U.S.-
sponsored government and American presence in the South meant the continuation of the 
national problem or of the existence of national enemies in the discourse of Vietnamese 
communists. The United States was articulated as just another capitalist colonisers in the same 
lenses through which France and Japan used to be presented. This enemy was reportedly 
planning to take over the North and then the whole Southeast Asia and China. The southern 
government was pictured as a puppet handy feudal organ of the American colonialism like the 
Nguyen feudal court and Bao Dai government, lacking autonomous agency and power. The 
existence of the southern government in the South were interpreted as a new form of colonial 
and capitalist invasion of Vietnam waken by the United States. With these background 
meanings in place, the communist-led struggle against the southern government and the U.S 
presence in the South became the national cause. The call to fight the RV’s government was 
framed in national terms in the same way that the fight against the French was cast: ‘the struggle 
against the United States for national salvation’ (Ho Chi Minh, 1966). National independence 
was further inscribed as the only condition for a happy life free of miseries and hardships, 
consolidating the young national imaginary in the Vietnamese discursive space. 
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As the land reform was implemented, the DRV achieved a historic victory in Dien Bien 
Phu battle in May 1954, which brought relevant parties to the conference table in Geneva. The 
agreement ordered the withdrawal of all French troops from Vietnam and the temporal partition 
of the country at the 17th parallel during the 300-day moratorium to prepare for a nation-wide 
general election scheduled for July 1956. This political settlement, however, was not signed by 
the Bao Dai government and the United States (Duiker, 1981: 171-172). Far from complying 
with a national general election, the Eisenhower administration, already caught in its Cold War 
formulation, was still committed to having a non-Communist state in South Vietnam. While 
the Geneva Conference was still in place, with support from the United States and Bao Dai, 
Ngo Dinh Diem arrived in Saigon in June 1954 to embark on his mission as the Prime Minister 
of Bao Dai’s Associated State of Vietnam. With a referendum in October 1955, he proclaimed 
the formation of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) over the South territory and became its 
president. Diem’s government publicly refused to comply with the Geneva accord on holding 
a general election in the whole Vietnam. Eisenhower was quoted as commenting that such an 
election, if it had been implemented, would have resulted in an 80% vote for Ho Chi Minh 
(SarDesai, 2005: 75).  
Very soon violence escalated in South Vietnam, spreading sporadically into the North 
and neighbouring countries. While the RVN and the U.S. justified the war as prevention against 
communist aggression, the DRV termed the war as national resistance against U.S. invasion. 
The National Front for the Liberatation of South Vietnam or the National Liberation Front 
(NLF) (Mật trận Dân tộc Giải phóng miền Nam) was established from secret members of Viet 
Minh operating in the region. The NLF functioned as the old Viet Minh in attracting all 
elements in the South to fight against the RVN’s government. Although the DRV claimed that 
the insurgence against RVN’s government and U.S. presence was indigenous and autonomous 
within the southern population, many studies have shown that not only were the bulk of the 
insurgent force and weapons supplied from the North, but the leadership and instruction for the 
insurgent movements were also made from the communist headquarter in Hanoi (Karnow, 
1997: 417; Duiker, 1981, 1995). Official historical textbooks in Vietnam have also publicized 
the role of the VLP and the DRV in channelling human forces, weapons and logistics into the 
South to liberate the southern people from the invasion of the U.S. (Le, 2014; MOET, 2014). 
In January 1973, a peace accord was signed in Paris, prescribing the withdrawal of the U.S. 
troops and a peaceful unification negotiated between Vietnamese parties. In April 1975, Saigon 
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fell to the North Vietnamese Army supported by the NLF. In 1976, Vietnam was unified under 
the common rule of the communist party with a new name: ‘the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’. 
While the United States justified their intervention in Vietnam as to stop the spread of 
communism into the South, the communist discourse presented their intervention as an 
imperialist intervention. The United States were described as just another imperialist invader, 
just like the French and the Japanese, who aimed to turn South Vietnam into its new colony 
and then to conquer the whole country. The Party identified the tasks of the Vietnamese 
revolution in the South as liberating southern Vietnamese from the rule of imperialism and 
feudalism and fighting against the U.S. invasion. In the Communist discourse, the United States 
and their sponsored government in the south inherited the role of the French and the feudal 
court as the others in the constitutional of the Vietnamese nation. They were presented as 
plotting to block the survival and development of the Vietnamese people and the nation in the 
same manner that the French colonists were described in previous periods.  
The U.S. had previously been present in the communist discourse as a leader of the 
capitalist world. During the war with the French in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the 
Vietnamese Communists had criticized the U.S. support toward the French in the latter’s effort 
to re-control Indochina. In July 1954, the VLP stated: ‘The U.S. is not only the enemy of the 
world people, but is turning into the main and direct enemy of the people of Viet, Mien14 and 
Lao’.  The presence of the U.S. in South Vietnam was described in the same manner as that of 
the French with links to imperialism, colonialism, invasion, exploitation and killing. In the 
documents of the VLP during this period, the Americans were interchangeably termed as 
imperialists, capitalists, colonists, invaders and robbers. The Americans and their sponsored 
government were described to have waged a cruel war in the South.  
They fired villages, killed, imprisoned, raped, beheaded and ripped the belly of civilians 
including both children and elderly people (Ho Chi Minh, 1964: online).  
In the last few years, the U.S. imperialist and its handy men led by Ngo Dinh Diem have drawn 
Southern people into fire and boiling water. They go to any length to oppress our compatriots 
in the South, to arrest, imprison and murder tens of thousands of patriots. (VLP, 1960: online) 
                                                        
14 ‘Mien’ is Cambodia. 
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The U.S. presence was said to have destroyed South Vietnam not only in terms of 
politics and economy but also in terms of culture. 
The United States has controlled the South in every front. In politics, the government of the 
South was totally in the hand of the U.S.; national policies of this government were decided by 
the U.S.. In military terms, the U.S. directly built, trained and equipped the South’s army and 
directly manage this army. In economic terms, the South has turned into a market to consume 
the U.S. wasted goods and their allies’; economic benefits in the South were gradually fallen 
into their hands. In terms of culture, the U.S. has brought into the South the extremely 
degenerating ‘the U.S. lifestyle’, seedling the poison of ‘the U.S. culture’ in the youth and the 
people.  (VLP, 1960: online)  
The U.S. were even compared to fascism as they reportedly dreamt to be the world’s owner 
and had become the most aggressive, the most reactionary force and ‘the number one enemy 
of human race’ (VLP, 1973). Their plot was reportedly to oust the French in order to separate 
the country, to control South Vietnam as their new colony and as its military base for further 
expansion over North Vietnam. Therefore, the U.S and its sponsored southern government 
were considered not only the enemy of southern people but also the enemy of the whole 
Vietnamese nation. The presence of the U.S. and its sponsored government was articulated to 
be threatening to the security of not only South Vietnam but also the whole Vietnam.  
The U.S. imperialism and its handy men are not only invading the South, hindering the social 
development there, but also preparing a war to invade our whole country, destroying the 
revolutionary cause of our people. Therefore, the Americans and Diem are not only the enemy 
of the Southern people currently under their direct rule, but also the enemy of the whole 
Vietnamese nation, of the liberated Northern people. There is profound antagonism between 
the American-Diem government and southerners, but also between the former and nation-wide 
people and northerners. Solving this contradiction is not only the task and the interest of 
southern people, but also the common task and benefit of all people throughout the country. 
(VLP, 1959: online)  
One goal of the U.S. intervention was reportedly to build a strategic base, in order to 
conquer the North Vietnam, China and other Southeast countries. We see in here what is similar 
to the so-called domino theory about communist expansion embraced by the U.S. state leaders. 
If the U.S. successfully controlled the South, other neighbouring regions and countries would 
fall under the grip of the U.S. capitalism. In the communist discourse, this was taken to mean 
war because capitalism had long been understood as full of violence and inequalities. It was 
the nature of capitalism that brought war as capitalist countries competed for international 
markets. Therefore, in order to attain peace, the Vietnamese people had no other way out rather 
than to wake war against the Americans, to pursue national unification. However, the 
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articulation that unification means peace did not help peace as it appeared but functioned to 
authorize the deferment of peace. The imagination of peace in a utopia future legitimised the 
operation of violence against the America-backed southern regime. This violence was invited 
to be read only as a temporal situation, in the preparation for a long-term peace. Temporal as 
the violence might be, but it was actually materialized into fires and bombs, injuries and deaths 
at this present of time. Peace might be long term, but it was only a possibility of the future and 
might never been actualized. We find here the performative power of knowledge and discourse: 
the discursive use of peace to justify and normalize war.  
The government of the RVN was consistently pictured as the puppet of the U.S., just 
as the way Bao Dai’s government was articulated as the puppet of the French colonialism. 
Diem and his men were portrayed as a group of handy men obeying the American master’s 
order. His rule was said to be authoritarian, exploitative, violent and go against national 
interests. 
Ngo Dinh Diem’s government is a handy body of the U.S. imperialism, a colonial and semi-
feudal reign in the South, a reactionary, violent and illegitimate… The southern government at 
present works against national interests, embodies the interests of the U.S. imperialists, of pro-
U.S. feudalists and capitalists in the South… The main components of this government are the 
most reactionary feudal and capitalist elements, hooligans, gangster and treasonable elements, 
who determine to work for the US., led by Ngo’s family and circles. (VLP, 1959: online) 
After the assassination of Diem and his bother Nhu in November 1963, Nguyen Van 
Thieu became the new president of the Republic of Vietnam a year and half latter. The new 
president made no difference to the way the North viewed the RVN. In the Communist 
discourse, the government of the RV was eternally linked to capitalism, fascism, feudalism and 
therefore exploitation and oppression no matter who was in charge. These representations of 
the RV government functioned to delegitimise their authority, justifying war and actions of 
killing and violence against these Vietnamese fellows. Their inhumane and unjust rule 
reportedly drove Southern people to hatred and revolts, making the fight against the Southern 
government appear necessary and legitimate. The narrative was that it was the nature of the RV 
government that caused resistance and fighting against them and that it was the desire of the 
Southern people to get rid of this capitalist and feudal government, not the ambition of the 
Northern government to unify the country under one communist rule. The National Liberation 
Front (NLF), the Provisional Revolutionary Government and by far the DRV in the North were 
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all represented to be innocent actors, who acted out of responsibility and justice and in the 
names of the people and the nation. The same act of the Vietnamese killing each other was 
herald as victorious and heroic if done by the revolutionary forces, but was criticised as dirty 
U.S. plots of ‘Vietnamization’. 
These discursive mechanisms which pictured the Americans and the southern 
government as national enemies worked to further consolidate the national imaginary, which 
was circulated in the discursive space of Vietnam since the August Revolution. The national 
imaginary continued to be looked after and invested in the communist discourse. While before 
national independence was presented as the condition for the survival of the Vietnamese 
people, in this period, it was articulated to be the horizon whereby people would enjoy a happy 
and prosperous life.  
Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom. After the day of victory, our people 
will reconstruct our country into a much bigger, more beautiful and wealthy one. (Ho Chi Minh, 
1966: online) 
When mountain is still there, there is water, there is people. After beating American, we will 
build a society ten times better than present. (Ho Chi Minh, 1969: online) 
Internally, the Vietnamese nation was portrayed as a solid and unified block. ‘Vietnam 
is a unified block which cannot be broken into parts’ (NA, 1959: online). Vietnamese people 
were articulated to belong to a common body, sharing the same blood and intestines (Ho Chi 
Minh, 1964: online). Therefore, the pain and miseries that the Southern people were suffering 
were also those of Northern people. ‘As long as the South has not been liberated, our 
Vietnamese nation has not been reunited, our people will not be able to eat and sleep well’ 
(VLP, 1960: online). Moreover, the struggle for national unification was also portrayed as part 
of the universal struggle for world peace. 
The unification of Vietnam is not only a national issue of the Vietnamese people, but also the 
issue of peace and security protection of Indochina, Southeast Asia and the world. (VLP, 1955: 
online)  
The struggle for peace and unification of our people is part of the struggle for world peace 
(VLP, 1956: online) 
In the communist discourse, national unification was linked to peace. As early as 1955, Truong 
Chinh affirmed ‘peace and unification are intimately associated’.  
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The national imaginary was also strengthened in the long-held binary world view of the 
Vietnamese communists, which linked the United States to the decaying capitalism. In line 
with Marxist theory about gradual stages of social formations, socialism was described as the 
highest stage of the history of human development and capitalism was an outdated and 
outgoing stage. 
Capitalism is exploitation, oppression, hunger, freeze and misery… The present time is no 
longer the era of capitalism. Imperialism is the highest evolution stage of capitalism and is 
making its last convulsion before death with no possible treatment. The present era is the era 
of the winning socialism. (VLP, 1960: online)  
Socialism was mythicized as a utopia heaven of total and complete happiness and prosperity. 
The socialist side was associated with peace and democracy and socialism presented as the 
world trend to replace the outmoded exploiting and unequal capitalist system. Portraying the 
world in this way, readers were invited to identify with the socialist side, and by short extension 
with the Vietnamese communists. The very act of presenting this world scenario as facts is the 
act of productive power. Once you accept capitalism as bad and deteriorating and the U.S. as 
a capitalist country, any force that is articulated to be related to capitalism and the U.S. logically 
becomes the enemy. Enemies of the nation are not necessary foreign countries and people of 
different race. Territorial boundaries and racial distinction ceased to function in this project of 
national identification to give place to discursive boundaries. Groups of the Vietnamese, who 
belonged to the same ethnic group and spoke the same language with the Vietnamese 
Communists, in this case the RVN government, its army and supporters, were being made to 
become the other within their own country of origin.  
 Interestingly, the United States also justified their involvement in Vietnam as part of 
the ‘struggle for the world’ (Appy, 2000: 4). In sharp contrast to the communists’ narrative of 
a prosperous and happy socialist camp, in the American discourse the Communist world was 
associated with tyranny, a slave world and imperialism (ibid: 3). ‘Freedom was everywhere 
endangered by a red imperialism of unprecedented power and ambition that was headquartered 
in Moscow’ (ibid; 3). American venture into South Vietnam was part of its endeavour to 
construct a land of freedom free from foreign tyrants. ‘The U.S. role there was nothing less 
than a holy mission to rescue poor and tortured Christians from godless Communists’ (ibid: 3-
4). Instead of a greedy and violent imperialist United States in the Vietnamese Communist 
discourse, the U.S. political culture always depicts the U.S. as the land of freedom, civilisation 
and humanity (Campbell, 1992). As the leader of a free world, the U.S.  was perceived to bear 
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the responsibility and commitment to promote freedom and protect the world from any threats 
to freedom. It was this sense of obligations that drew the U.S. to Vietnam (Klein, 2000) and in 
doing that they wanted nothing for themselves (Appy, 2000: 3). In the U.S. foreign policy 
documents, the Soviet Union was described as imperialist and aggressive (Doty, 1993: 311). 
Alternative representations of socialism, the communist model and Russia were also found in 
the state discourse in Europe. During the Cold War, Russia were described as authoritarian and 
the communist model as totalitarian in Europe’s discourse (Neumann, 1999: 103). Soviet 
soldiers were portrayed with drunkenness and laziness: ‘Drunk they beat Hitler’ (ibid: 104).  
8.4. Grafting the Socialist Myth into the National Imaginary 
At the same time that hegemonic relations were established between the party and the 
nation, and between the land revolution with the national cause, socialism was announced in 
1951 as the future of Vietnam by the communists. The knowledge claim long constructed in 
the communist discourse about the binary world helped to render necessary and possible this 
nation-building project in the socialist direction to be carried out in the country. As the U.S. 
intervention escalated in South Vietnam, the national issue once more time became on the top 
of the Party’s agenda.  Having successfully projecting a national imaginary whereby national 
independence meant the vital condition for people’s survival, the Vietnamese communist 
discourse started to present socialism as the only way to national independence. Moreover, the 
communist-led success against the French in 1954 created ‘a relation of contiguity’ between 
socialism and nationalism, making the discursive link between socialism and national 
independence appear more natural and more real. With this link established, the socialist myth 
was firmly grafted into the national imaginary and became a social imaginary itself.  
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Vietnamese communist discourse stated its post-
independence program in Vietnam as socialism. However, since the foundation of Viet Minh 
in 1941, all socialist terms were muted in the focus on liberating the nation from colonial rule. 
After Viet Minh’s success in August 1945, the ICP even declared self-dissolution to invest on 
the national outlook of the new government. The 1946 constitution declared Vietnam as a 
democratic republic (NA, 1946: online). However, in the Party’s 2nd National Congress in 
February 1951, when the Communist Party resurfaced and changed its name to the VLP, 
socialism was announced as the future of Vietnam. This was the first time since Vietminh, the 
Party officially announced its plan to build socialism in Vietnam. 
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Vietnamese people’s national, democratic revolution certainly will bring Viet Nam toward 
socialism. Lead by workers, closely united with peasants and intellectual workers (lao dong tri 
oc), supported by the Soviet Union and other peoples’ democratic countries, especially China, 
Vietnamese revolution cannot tread on any path other than a socialist route. (VLP, 1951a: 
online) 
The Vietnamese Labour Party is the party of the worker class and the Vietnamese working 
people. The objective of the Party is to develop a people’s democracy, advancing to socialism 
in Vietnam, in order to implement freedom, happiness for the worker class, the working people 
and all ethnic majorities and minorities in Vietnam. (VLP, 1951b: online) 
This public move to announce the adoption of socialism in Vietnam happened after the 
communists’ victory in China. In the fall of 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was 
established under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, who then provided crucial 
support to their communist counterpart in Vietnam. The PRC was the first country that granted 
diplomatic recognition to the DRV. In the same year, the French sponsored the establishment 
of the Associated State of Vietnam headed by the ex-Emperor Bao Dai. Until 1950, Bao Dai’s 
Vietnamese state had been recognised by 35 countries while the DRV was recognized by the 
Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries.    
While the 1946 Constitution stated that the political system of Vietnam was a 
Democratic Republic, in which the private ownership of Vietnamese people was ensured, the 
1959 Constitution affirmed that: 
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam proceeds from the people’s democracy toward socialism 
by developing and the national economy under socialism, transforming an outdated economy 
into a socialist economy with modern industry and agriculture, advanced science and 
technology. (NA, 1959: online) 
A number of ownership forms were acknowledged to be in existence in this period of transit to 
socialism, however ‘the state economy with the people ownership holds the leading role in the 
national economy and is prioritized by the state’ (ibid). 
The socialist project of the Vietnamese communists was made discursively possible in 
the very knowledge claim about the binary world divided between socialism and capitalism 
and about the nature of these two systems. The binary world view already existed in the 
communist discourse since its inception as part of the socialist myth. In the war against the 
United States, socialism was offered as a mythical space whereby all demands and interests of 
Vietnamese people would be met as in the communist discourse in the 1920s and the 1930s. 
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While the basic economic law of capitalism was reported to ‘maximise capital interests by 
exploiting and depriving the majority of the people in a country, by slaving and ruthlessly 
exploiting people of other countries’, the basic feature of a socialist economy was ‘to stratify 
to the fullness increasing material and spiritual demands of the whole society’ (Truong Chinh, 
1953a: online). Stripping out all the technical and scientific terminologies of a socialist 
economy, the primary purpose of the RPV’s socialist economic policy was stated as ‘to ever 
accelerate production in order to lift up the material and cultural lives of the people’ (NA, 1959: 
online). Ho Chi Minh (1958: online) reminded that ‘socialist revolution is to eradicate the 
exploitation among human beings in our country, bringing a life absent of cold and hunger (doi 
song am no) to our whole population’. When the socialist system was installed in North 
Vietnam, the goal was presented as to establish such a wealthy and happy society in the 
country. In the communist discourse, socialism was then firmly fixed as a prosperous and 
happy society in which people have enough to eat, to wear and are free of oppression and 
discrimination.  
Besides re-circulating the mythical space of socialism, the communist discourse 
established a symbiosis between socialism and national independence, enabling the transfer of 
the socialist myth into a social imaginary. If national independence had been taken for granted 
as the indispensable condition for the survival and betterment of the Vietnamese people and 
socialism was projected to be the only way to achieve this precious national independence, 
socialism itself became the indispensable condition for the survival and betterment of the 
Vietnamese people. The land reform, the first step of implementing socialism, was already 
possible on its discursive hinge on the nation as discussed above. The same association was 
forged between the unification and independence of the whole nation and socialism in North 
Vietnam.  
If we didn’t consolidate and advance the North to socialism, we would not have a firm leaning 
base for the struggle to unify the country for democracy and independence. (VLP, 1959: online) 
Building socialism in the North was articulated as the necessary means to achieve the national 
aims of unification of unification. The North’s socialist construction was presented as part of 
the national struggle. 
The North had to build socialism, consolidating a firm back-up base, assisting the South and 
working with Southern compatriots to defeat the U.S. imperialists and their handy men. The 
North has to fulfil its sacred task as a big back-up base to the frontline. (VLP, 1969: online) 
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As the construction of socialism in the DRV went on, it was reported that the socialist North 
had achieved considerable successes, which contributed greatly to the South’s struggle for 
national independence. 
The North’s great achievements increasingly proves that socialism is very good and is strongly 
encouraging the national struggle of the southern compatriots. (Ho Chi Minh, 1964: online) 
During the war against the United States and the DR’s government, the socialist myth 
had been grafted into the national imaginary. The implementation of socialism in the DRV was 
fixed as the only condition that national independence and unification could be achieved.  
Conclusion  
During the communist-led wars against the French (1945 – 1954) and against the 
United States and their sponsored southern government (1954 – 1975), the communist 
discourse attained its hegemony as both the national myth and the socialist myth had become 
social imaginaries. With the national imaginary, the existence of the nation was taken for 
granted and national independence was fixed as the indispensable condition for the Vietnamese 
people to survive. As socialism was articulated to be the only viable route to achieve national 
independence and save and unify the nation, it became a social imaginary itself. Hegemonic 
relations were established between socialist elements and the nation. As soon as the communist 
party resurfaced in 1951 as the VLP, it claimed to be the nation party that acted on behalf of 
and in the interest of the nation. The United States were constituted as just another plot to 
invade the Vietnamese nation in the same discursive construction that French colonialism was 
articulated. The non-communist southern government were constituted as the puppet agent of 
the U.S. imperialists betraying the interest of the Vietnamese population in the same way that 
Bao Dai’s government and the Nguyen dynasty were pictured in the communist discourse. A 
discursive equalization between the peasant and the nation, and between the land revolution 
and the national independence was established. This hegemonic communist discourse made 
the radical land reform and the adoption of socialism in North Vietnam appear possible and 
necessary.  
It was in this discourse that the existence and the rule of the communist party was 
legitimised in Vietnam. If the Vietnamese nation is real and French colonisation and American 
intervention are to kill and exploit the national people, then fighting for national independence 
is the only viable course of action. If only socialism and land revolution can bring about 
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national independence, then it follows that a communist party must rule as it is the only political 
force that is ready to take these steps.  
By the mid-1960s, the war was in full gear in South Vietnam. In 1965, it spread to the 
North. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the Johnson administration carried out an air bombing 
of North Vietnam in order to stop northern infiltration into the South. In 1968, the VLP decided 
to bring the revolution to the highest level of general offensive and uprising (VLP, 1968: 
online). As a result, a general offensive was launched in 1968 in almost all the provinces in the 
South starting with the Tet offensive in January. A series of battles and another U.S. bombing 
of North Vietnam occurred. By 1972, the United States had lost its momentum for the Vietnam 
war. The long-lasting war had exerted a huge toll on the U.S. economy (Karnow, 1997: 31). 
Hundreds of billions of dollars spent on the war had resulted in budget deficit and debt. 
Furthermore, the war had a political and cultural impact as the reputation of the U.S. army 
disintegrated. The war in Vietnam had lost its meaning and become a moral crisis in the eyes 
of the U.S. and international public. In January 1973 all parties were once again brought to a 
peace table in Paris. 
The Paris conference agreed on the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and a peaceful 
political settlement between Vietnamese parties. A year later, North Vietnam launched a 
general offensive against Nguyen Van Thieu’s government starting with provinces in the 
Central Highlands. On April 30th 1975, the North-backed army stormed into Sai Gon and raised 
the DRV’s flag at the Independence Place, the headquarter of the RV, marking the success of 
the communist-led force over the southern government. The victory of the socialist side once 
again gave rise to the condition of possibility for metonymical sliding for a stronger articulation 









Chapter 9: The Continued Hegemony of the Communist Discourse 
Introduction 
One year after the war ended, in the Party’s IV Congress in December 1976, 
Vietnamese communists announced the installation of socialism in the whole Vietnam. The 
first move to socialism was to change the name of the party and the country to reflect a socialist 
character. The Vietnamese Labour Party was renamed the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) 
and the reunified country was named the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) with Hanoi as 
the capital. The Party officially declared that it would expand the socialist project from the 
North to the South and proceed swiftly into socialism. Giant agro-farm collectives and the 
economic management of central planning were implemented across Vietnam. However, this 
socialist project soon encountered economic problems and was slowed down by the end of the 
decade. Adjustments were adopted in the early 1980s but reformed policies were not officially 
declared and legalized until the VCP’s VI Congress in 1986. In this Reform (Đổi Mới) 
Congress, the centrally-planned management of the economy and giant agricultural collectives 
were officially abolished, private ownership and private trade were allowed. Despite initial 
setbacks, considerable improvements took place in the country’s economy and people’s living 
standard. The inflation rate went down from 700% in mid-1980s to 13% in 1995 and 6% in 
2000. In 1999, instead of importing rice in late 1970s, Vietnam became the second largest rice 
exporter in the world. Although the economic policies have been reformed towards capitalism, 
the social imaginary is in normal operation in the Vietnamese communist discourse. Since the 
Reform Congress and well into the twenty first century, Vietnam has consistently embraced, 
what it called, a ‘socialist-oriented multi-sectoral commodity economy’. As the words in this 
phrase indicate, Vietnam’s economy may be market-oriented, but is also socialist-oriented. 
Vietnam’s economy may be open, but its political system remains essentially socialist, a system 
which positions the Communist Party as the only ruling party. The fact that Vietnam remains 
socialist while its economy is liberalized along market lines in the Reform process has become 
a topic of academic interest. This chapter studies how it is possible for Vietnam to maintain 
this socialist identity throughout the Reform Process. That Vietnam became a socialist country 
is not taken here as an inevitable or natural historical development as told in the Vietnamese 
official historical narrative, but as a process of power struggle in the realm of discourse over 
‘who we are and the state we are in’.  
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This chapter examines the Vietnamese communist discourse from the DRV’s victory 
against the RV in 1975, through the Reform Congress and up to the present. It argues that the 
hegemony of the communist discourse, which was attained during the communist-led war 
against the U.S. intervention and the DR government, has been maintained since reunification. 
The significance of national independence and the existence nation have been taken for granted 
as common sense. The symbiosis between nationalism and socialism, which was established 
in the war time, is becoming even more stronger. Socialism and the leadership of the VCP are 
articulated as the only condition to maintain national independence and to ensure that the 
national construction succeeds. The socialist regime and the nation are fused with each other 
in the language of national security and national defence, which made possible the protection 
of the party and the socialist state in the name of the nation. In return, the language and 
application of the law on national security and national defence contributes to further blurring 
the distinction between the socialist regime and the nation. Although the economy is now 
geared towards a capitalist market mechanism, socialism never ceases to function as a social 
imaginary in the Vietnamese communist discourse. Since unification, the knowledge claim 
about the ‘scientific’ Marxist-Leninist law on human development has been increasingly 
circulated in the communist discourse, consolidating the war-time socialist imaginary, which 
justified the adoption of socialism and legitimated the continuation of socialism in Vietnam. 
The continued hegemony of the communist discourse has enabled the VCP to maintain its 
hegemonic position in Vietnam despite economic reforms and the collapse of the socialism in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  
This chapter is composed of three parts. The first one analyses the communist discourse 
after the war ended in 1975. The success of the communist-led force against the U.S. and its 
supported southern government had consolidated the symbiosis between socialism and 
nationalism, enabling the communist discourse to achieve a stronger hegemony. Both national 
independence and socialism have been taken for granted as the necessary condition for the 
Vietnamese people to survive and to thrive. The second part studies the communist discourse 
around the Reform Congress in 1986. Reference to the Marxist-Leninist objective law on the 
development of human society was found to be the dominant discursive mechanism in 
justifying reformed policies. However, although the economy was geared towards capitalism, 
the communist discourse has never let go the grip on the socialist imaginary. The Reform was 
seen as a continuity of the construction of socialism in Vietnam, not a rupture nor a termination 
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of this process. The last part of this chapter analyses how the socialist imaginary is maintained 
in present Vietnam.  
 
9.1. The Hegemony of the Communist Discourse 
The Vietnamese communists’ victory against the southern government and the U.S. 
intervention provided the condition of possibility for a stronger hegemony of the communist 
discourse. Socialism and the leadership of the VCP were articulated as the only condition that 
can ensure national independence in Vietnam. The socialist imaginary that was formed during 
the war against the U.S. intervention and the southern government was further consolidated as 
socialism was increasingly enmeshed with nationalism. After independence was achieved, 
socialism functioned as the social imaginary whereby all social demands and interests in post-
independence Vietnam could be inscribed. With both the national and the socialist imaginaries 
being consolidated, the communist discourse had attained a stronger hegemony in the 
discursive space of Vietnam. The revolution in Vietnam was articulated to be both national and 
socialist at the same time.  
During the wars against the French, the United States and their supported southern 
governments, as discussed in the previous chapters, we have seen that a symbiosis was 
established between socialism and nationalism in the Vietnamese communist discourse. 
Adopting a social revolution by implementing a land reform and setting up agricultural 
collectives was reasoned to be an indispensable means for the struggle for national 
independence and unification to succeed. After 1975, when the country was reunified and 
became independent from foreign intervention, socialism is firmly fixed as nationalism. 
Socialism and nationalism became two sides of the same coin in the Communist discourse. The 
means (socialism) and the end (national independence) were so intricately fused that 
distinctions could no longer be made to separate means from end. Socialism was articulated to 
be the indispensable condition that had enabled Vietnam as a nation to achieve independence 
and to maintain this independence in the future. Besides socialism, the leadership of the 
Communist Party was also articulated to be the vital element for any success of Vietnam in 
both national safeguarding and construction. These articulations helped to create the possible 
and legitimate foundations for the establishment of socialism and the Party’s leadership in the 
whole Vietnam after unification. Given that national independence had been taken for granted 
as the only condition whereby ongoing problems were solved and all social demands were met 
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(see chapters 7 and 8), when socialism is articulated to be the only way to bring about and 
maintain national independence, its significance will be logically taken for granted in the same 
manner as national independence was. The symbiosis between nationalism and socialism is 
omnipresent in all documents of the VCP since 1975. The combination of national 
independence and socialism were said to be ‘a universal truth of the era’ (VCP, 1976: online). 
In addition, as in the war period, socialism continued to be presented as the only way that 
Vietnamese people can enjoy a happy and prosperous life, perpetuating the socialist imaginary 
in the Vietnam. 
In the political report of the IV Congress in 1976, the first Congress after independence 
and unification, it was assessed that the theoretical value of Marx-Leninism and the North’s 
socialist economy were decisive factors of victory of the anti-America resistance for 
unification. Socialism was made equal with national independence: independence would not 
have been achieved and would not be maintained without socialism. ‘The truth is that the 
struggle against the American for national salvation would not have succeeded without the 
socialist North’ (VCP, 1976: online). The means (socialism) was then articulated to be the end 
of Vietnam’s revolution. The means and end had been so mixed up that they became 
inseparable.   
At present, when our nation has become completely independent, nation and socialism 
become one… In this present era, when national independence and socialism are 
inseparable, when workers hold the leading role in the revolution, the success of 
national revolution is the beginning of a socialist revolution. (VCP, 1976: online) 
Socialism was the goal of our whole cause because socialism ensures independence and 
freedom for our country. (VCP, 1982: online) 
Socialism was articulated as not only the key element to realize and maintain national 
independence but also the only way for the country to develop and the people to enjoy a 
prosperous life.  
Only socialism can realize the long-held dream of the working people for an eternal 
escape form oppression, exploitation, poverty, backwardness to live a life with enough 
food to eat and enough clothes to wear, to have a secure future of happiness of 
civilization. Only socialism can give working people the full ownership right, can return 
the true value to human beings, enabling human beings to become the true owner of 
society, nature and their selves. Only with socialism, our country can achieve a modern 
economy, advanced culture and science and strong national defence so that our country 
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can be eternally independent, free and ever developing. Only socialism can enable our 
country to be unified at the highest and fullest level in terms of territory, politics and 
spirits, economy, culture and society, in terms of rights and responsibility, in which 
everybody unites and loves each other in the most sincere and affectionate manner. 
(VCP, 1976: online) 
Besides supporting the South, the socialist North was depicted to have transferred into a new 
land of prosperity and equality. ‘At present in the North, working people were no longer 
exploited and looked down upon… Everybody has enough to eat, to wear and enjoy access to 
education’ (ibid). The South, pictured as being infested with eco-social evils under the U.S. 
influence, was said to be in dire need of such socialist improvements.  
The knowledge claim about a binary world, in which there was an ongoing struggle 
between backward capitalism and thriving socialism, was well preserved in the communist 
discourse in post-independence Vietnam. The victories against the French and the United 
States appear to further consolidate this knowledge, strengthening the claim that socialism was 
winning over capitalism.  
Socialism has spread beyond the scale of one country to become a world system. 
Soviet Union and China are thriving. Life is proving the champion of socialism and 
the international socialist system is playing its role as the determining factor to 
human development. (VCP, 1976: online) 
On the contrary, the capitalism system was said ‘to be collapsing in a general crisis’ 
and ‘to have gone deeper into its last stage, becoming an obstacle and a reactionary force in 
the development of human society’ (ibid). The issue over who would win between socialism 
and capitalism was seen as the issue of the era with socialism as a progressive and more 
advanced force. As in the war time when Vietnam’s fight for independence was seen as part of 
the world struggle on the side of the socialist front, the building of socialism in post-
independent Vietnam was presented as the continuation of the country’s participation in this 
world struggle. Having successful unified and liberated the country was seen as the completion 
of not only a national task but also an international task (VCP, 1976: online). With the 
establishment of socialism in the whole country, the SRV was proclaimed ‘to be an invincible 
fortress of socialism, an important factor in the promotion of peace, national independence and 
social progress in the Southeast Asia and in the world’ (ibid). The cause of building socialism 
was understood to be not only for the benefit of the country, but for the sake of the advance of 
the whole human race. The route to socialism was also presented as backed up by ‘science’: 
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the objective law of human development. Socialism was considered to be the inevitable 
evolution of the Vietnam, ‘in line with the law on the development of human society, which is 
in the transition from capitalism to socialism in the scale of the whole wide world’ (VCP, 1976: 
online). The political decision to build socialism was made on the foundation of the ‘scientific’ 
knowledge that the human society evolved through orderly steps under a universal law 
discovered by Marxism’s evolution theory.  
The IV Congress (VCP, 1976: online) proclaimed that ‘Vietnam’s revolution had gone 
into a new stage: the stage of independence and unification with the only strategic goal of 
implementing socialist revolution, proceeding swiftly, vigorously and firmly into socialism’. 
Vietnam’s revolution did not stop when the war ended, building a socialist system was also 
seen as a revolution. This socialist revolution had already been on in the North since the 1950s. 
What was different in this period was that the socialist revolution was about to happen in the 
whole Vietnam and in the absence of war. Twenty years of socialist revolution was said to have 
brought North Vietnam with considerable progresses, the greatest of which was the eradication 
of human exploitation and the establishment of socialist ownership. ‘At present in the North, 
working people were no longer exploited and looked down upon’ (ibid). The South, seen as 
being infested with eco-social evils under the U.S. influence, was said to be in dire need of 
such improvements. Socialist revolution was not only about economy, but about culture and 
ideology. The central task of the transition to socialism in economy was defined to be the 
implementation of socialist industrialization, prioritizing the development of heavy industry. 
The cultural task was to build a new culture and new people in line with the new society. It 
would not be any kind of culture and people, it had to be a socialist culture and socialist people. 
‘The new culture is built on the bases of Marxist-Leninism and socialist collective ownership’ 
(ibid). New people had to be working people, to love labour and to love their socialist country. 
These people were said to be new, but at the same time the crystallization of all the best 
characters of Vietnamese people nurtured along the long history of four thousand years. The 
building of socialism was not about making policies that suited the conditions of Vietnam, but 
a revolution to change Vietnam, including its people, its culture and economic system to match 
the Party’s idealized socialist model. 
However, by the 1980s the socialist country was deteriorated rather than being ‘then 
times better’ as Ho Chi Minh envisioned (Ho Chi Minh, 1969), in spite of substantial assistance 
from the socialist block and China. From a rice exporter in the 1930s, Vietnam had to import 
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three million tons of rice annually in the three years preceding 1980. The same period saw the 
rice ration fall to the lowest point of supply in North Vietnam during the war. National income 
and per capital income did not increase but declined towards the end of the Second Five Year 
Plan. Vietnam’s exports were only about 15% of its imports in 1980. The post-war economy 
was also plagued by problems of inflation and corruption.  
Although changes to the socialist economy had been reported to be underway since as 
early as 1979 (Quinn-Judge, 2006) and was signalled in the V Congress in 1982, it was until 
the VI congress in 1986 that the Party officially and publicly announced a program of economic 
reforms. Reformed policies were further elaborated in consequent Congresses and is still 
embraced in Vietnam at the present.  
9.2. Reform and the Objective Law 
The VI Party Congress in December 1986 was commonly known as the Congress of 
Reform, marking the official initiation of economic renovations in Vietnam. In this occasion, 
the Party declared the existence of multiple sectors in Vietnam’s current economy and the 
eradication of the centrally planned economy. In the VII Congress in 1991, the VCP called 
Vietnam’s reformed economy as the socialist-orientated multi-sector economy (VCP, 1991a: 
online). Although under reformed policies, the socialist economy was dismantled and 
Vietnam’s economy was geared towards capitalism, the Reform was represented as a 
continuity, rather than a rupture of the nation’s path to socialism in the communist discourse.  
It was articulated as a necessary step in the transitional period, through which Vietnam’s 
backward economy could advance directly into socialism, skipping the capital stage (VCP, 
1986: online). Socialism still maintained its role as a social imaginary in the communist 
discourse. What enabled the grip of the socialist imaginary in the communist discourse despite 
this market-oriented economy was the knowledge claim about the objective law of Marxist-
Leninism, which governed the transition to socialism. The Marxist-Leninist law was indeed a 
panacea discursive weapon in the Vietnamese Communists’ discourse. As we have seen in the 
previous section, in the first post-war National Congress in 1976, it was used to back up the 
establishment of socialism in the whole Vietnam in the first place. In this section, we are going 
to see how it was referred to justify the implementation of a capitalist economy while the 
country remained socialist under the sole leadership of the Communist Party. Under this 
putative law, the transformation from a backward economy like Vietnam’s into socialism was 
said to require a pro-longed transitional period, which was consisted of several small 
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transitional stages. During some first initial small transitional stages, some capitalist elements 
like individual ownership and private sectors should be allowed to exist and develop in order 
for the infrastructure or production forces to improve before the adoption of socialist 
production relations was applied in later stages. This is required by the objective law in 
Marxist-Leninism about the compatibility between production forces and production relations. 
Conceptualizing the transition as a multi-stage process was hailed as important contribution of 
this Congress of Reform in both theory and reality of building socialism in Vietnam’s official 
historical narrative (Le, 2014: online). 
As mention in the previous session, reference to the objective law on the development 
of human development was made in the 1976 Congress to back up the installation of socialism 
in the whole Vietnam. It is also this objective law which was referred to make possible the 
reformed policies in the communist discourse. While the IV Congress advocated a swift and 
direct step to socialism, the V Congress in 1982 envisioned a prolonged transition into 
socialism. The target of the economic policies was changed from industrialization into simply 
meeting the basic demands of the people. The view that Vietnam’s transition into socialism 
would go through different stage first appeared in this 1982 Congress. The period that Vietnam 
was going though then was called the first stage of this transition. In this first stage, instead of 
concentrating in industry as specified in the IV Congress, the focus was now agriculture and to 
meet the everyday basic and urgent demands of the people, stabilizing material and cultural 
lives (VCP, 1982: online). The problems that Vietnam’s post-war economy had encountered 
were not the problems of the socialist system itself, but were caused by the lack of knowledge 
in the transition to socialism. The Party self-criticized that they ‘had not mastered the objective 
law of the development process from a small production to a big one’, therefore they ‘had been 
subjective and hasty in setting some over-ambitious targets on the scale and speed of basic 
construction and productive development’ (ibid).  
Despite economic problems were declared and assessed, the celebration of socialism as 
a thriving international trend world was ubiquitous in the documents of the V Congress. 
Familiar plot was on: the Soviet Union had passed the socialist stage and proceeded to the 
higher phase of communism, more and more countries were building socialism. The United 
States was struggling to survive, allegedly finding a way to fight the Soviet Union and distort 
Vietnam’s image in the international front. Enemies were reported to be both domestic and 
outside the countries, plotting to destroy the Party. The late 1970s was recorded in the 
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documents of the V Congress with great victories in national defence. The military 
interventions into Cambodia and Lao was referred to as the international responsibility towards 
peoples of these two countries, contributing to the safeguard of peace and national 
independence in Indochina and Southeast Asia. These actions were seen as part of the world 
struggle against capitalism.  
In the Reform Congress, the objective law that governed the transition to socialism was 
elaborated in detail. 
In line with the law on the compatibility between production relations with the nature 
and development level of production forces, the consolidation of socialism needs to 
have suitable steps and forms. Practical experiences make it clear that: production 
forces are hindered not only in case of outdated production relations, but only in case 
when production relations grow ahead of the development level of production forces. 
Our country’s situation requires the appreciation of the existence of middle-ground 
economic forms between low and small scale to big and high scale. In each step of the 
consolidation of socialism, it is necessary to build up technical-material foundations, 
and create new production forces. Only on this basis, can production relations be 
advanced to new forms and scale to encourage the development of production forces. 
(VCP, 1986: online) 
Under Vietnam’s Marxist lenses, ownership is part of production relations and state and 
collective ownership are the high-level forms of production relations. Seeing in this way, the 
failure of the country’s post-unification socialist economic policies was explained to be the 
incompatibility between production relations and production forces. By creating state and 
collective ownerships, the production relations were led to develop too far ahead of the existing 
production forces, which hindered the growth of the latter. In Marxism and Leninism, the 
economy only develops when production relations are compatible with production forces under 
objective law. Therefore, the centrally planned economy had to be abandoned to build a new 
management which was in line with the existing development level of the economy as required 
by this putative law. The socialist economy characterized by collective and state ownership 
and state management applied in post-war Vietnam was not wrong in itself, what was wrong 
was that the existing level of production forces in the country had not developed high enough 
for the production relations of a socialist economy. What was wrong was the failure to respect 
the law on the compatibility between production relations with production forces. 
175 
 
The VI Congress theorized about a transitional period between capitalism and 
socialism. Building a socialist system in Vietnam was still the ultimate goal of the VCP, but 
the process was articulated to be a long and difficult multi-step transition.  
That the evolution from capitalism to socialism goes through a transitional period is an 
objective necessity, and the length of this period depends on the economic, political 
and social conditions of each country. The transitional period in our country, which is 
advancing straight towards socialism from a small-scale production bypassing the stage 
of capitalist development, naturally must be very long and full of difficulties. (VCP, 
1986: online) 
Instead of proceeding swiftly and strongly to socialism as declared in the IV Congress in 1976, 
the VI Congress proclaimed that they were only on the first step of this process, which is only 
‘a small transitional step in the big transitional step’. Lenin was quoted as saying that ‘the 
transitional period, in our policy, is to be divided into multiple smaller transitional steps’, each 
of which bore their own tasks (ibid). The Reform Congress defined ‘the general task of the first 
step is to stabilize social-economic conditions, consolidate necessary foundations for the 
enhanced socialist industrialisation in the next step’. Industrialization, which was underlined 
in the IV Congress, was now considered the target of the next step, giving priority to improving 
people’s living standards. This Congress stated that the transitional period required a multi-
sector economy and the removal of the bureaucratically centralized management based on State 
subsidies 
Policies of economic reforms continued to be embraced and further clarified by the 
SRV until the present day. The 6th Plenum of the Central Committee in March 1989 stated that 
one of the guidelines in reform is the consistent implementation of the policy of a multi-sector 
economy in order to free all productive forces (VCP, 1989: online). At the VII Congress in 
1991, the VCP reaffirmed that they would stand for ‘the consistent implementation of the 
policy on a socialist-oriented multi-sector economy’ and strive for a new management 
mechanism – a market mechanism under the management of a socialist state (VCP, 1991a: 
online). This economic hybrid was institutionalised in the two most recent constitutions of the 
SRV. 
The state promotes a multi-sector goods economy following market mechanism under 
state management with socialist orientation. The multi-sector economy has a variety of 
ways in organizing production and business based on the ownership of the people, the 
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collectives and the individuals, of which the people’s and collective ownership is the 
foundation. (National Assembly, 1992: online). 
Vietnam’s economy is a socialist-oriented market economy with a variety of ownership 
forms and economic sectors; state sector plays a key role (National Assembly, 2013: 
online). 
  While permitting multiple sectors and various ownership forms in the reformed 
economy, the vital role of the state sector and the management role of the state in the national 
economy were consistently stressed in the discourse of the reform process. The Reform 
Congress’s political report asserted that one of the tasks of the first stage of socialist 
consolidation was to ‘turn the state sector into the core, making it play the decisive role in the 
national economy’ (VCP, 1986: online). The central role the state sector played in the economy 
was regulated in the most recent constitution of the Vietnam in article 51 (National Assembly, 
2013: online). Article 15 of the 1992 Constitution states that the people and collective 
ownerships were the foundation of the multi-sector economy. What is the people ownership 
remains unclear and receive no specific explanation, except for another general reference in 
article 16, which regulates that all natural resources and important infrastructures belong to the 
State, under the people’s ownership. The 2013 constitution preserves the same content with 
slightly different word order in article 53: all natural resources and important infrastructures 
are public property under the people ownership, of which the State represent to own and 
manage. In the discourse of the VCP, Vietnam’s current economy is that of multi-sector 
economy with socialist orientations under the State leadership, in which the state sector takes 
the central place.  
The type of economy that Vietnam is embracing in the Reform Process is a market 
economy with multi-sectors and multi forms of ownership, which is essentially a capitalist 
economy. However, Vietnam remains a socialist country under a monopolistic rule of the 
Communist Party and the state still plays a decisive role in the national economy. This peculiar 
combination of socialism and capitalism was made possible in the discursive reference to the 
objective law ‘discovered’ in Marxist – Leninism, which not only describes history as 
inevitable passages from one economic stage to the next with socialism as the final outcome 
but also preordains a prolonged transition period from a backward economy like Vietnam’s to 
socialism. The existence of multiple sectors and various forms of ownerships in this transition 
period is articulated to be a natural requirement regulated by the objective law governing the 
compatibility between production forces and relations. Commenting on the SRV’s excessive 
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reference to putative law, Kolko (1994: 40) stated that the Party, ‘rather than coming to grips 
with Vietnam’s complexities as specific, historically caused events – some of which were 
avoidable and others not – justified its essentially capitalist program in terms of ostensible 
Marxist global laws’. He criticised these putative laws to ‘be intellectually disgraceful, simplify 
the world as badly as its mechanistic Marxist-Leninist strictures of the past, and only obfuscate 
issue and make positions dogmatic’ (ibid).     
The objective law about human evolution in Marxist-Leninism was the transcendental 
force that hailed the VCP into its socialist project and kept alive its grip onto socialism. The 
articulation of socialism as the advanced stage of human development in the Vietnamese 
discourse is rooted in the knowledge claim of Marxist-Leninism. When someone accepts 
Marxist-Leninism as science and its knowledge claims about the existence of the objective law 
that governs human development, he/she is buying in and the inevitability and the installation 
of socialism at the same time.   
9.3. The Continuity of the Socialist Imaginary after Reform 
 After the Reform Congress, the Party has never ceased to identify Vietnam in socialist 
terms. The socialist imaginary is kept well alive in the communist discourse until the present 
time. Despite adversary developments of the communist system in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, which may give rise to different reading of socialism, socialism in the 
Vietnamese communist discourse preserves its fine signification as in the war time. It is still 
presented as the final inevitable glory stage of human development. The association between 
national independence and socialism is further consolidated. The leadership is popularly 
circulated as the indispensable condition to maintain national independence and to ensure the 
national construction succeeds. The hegemonic relation by which the VCP claims to represent 
the whole Vietnamese nation is preserved. The socialist regime and the nation have been fused 
with each other, making it possible for the legal protection of the socialist state and the party 
in the name of the protection of the nation in Vietnam.  
The Ongoing Grip of Socialism 
When the socialist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was collapsing in 
the late 1980s and in the early 1990s, the Party made it clear in the 6th Plenum of the Central 
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Committee that reform was not about the change of the socialist end, but only the change of 
the means to achieve the same end. 
Proceeding to Socialism is the inevitable path of our country… Reform is not a change 
in the goal of socialism, but is the effective realization of that goal by better thoughts, 
more compatible forms, steps and methods (VCP, 1989: online). 
During the reform process, while promoting an open foreign policy to make friends with all 
countries including ex-enemies, the VCP stated its preference for enhancing relations with 
Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Vietnam’s socialist project is still seen as a 
contribution to the evolution of progressed human race against capitalism. The VCP proclaim 
to be a firm base of the socialist front and declared their loyalty to Marxist-Leninism. The 
building of socialism is articulated to be part of the universal struggle for peace. 
The Marxist-Leninist law, which pre-ordains socialism as the final and highest stage 
in the development of human society, is still omnipresent in the discourse of the Vietnamese 
Communist in the present time. In the two political blueprints of post-reform Vietnam, The 
Agenda on National Construction in the Transition into Socialism passed in 1991 and 2011, 
the VCP confirmed that the human race will definitely advance to socialism according to 
the evolution law of history.  
The struggle between socialism and capitalism is still going on intensely… Capitalism 
is still an oppressing, exploiting and unjust system. Socialism are facing a great deal of 
difficulties and challenges… Human race will finally advance to socialism because it 
is an objective law. (VCP, 1991: online) 
At the moment, capitalism still has the potential to grow, however, in nature it is an 
oppressing, exploiting and unjust system… The intrinsic contradictions within 
capitalism, especially the contradiction between the increasing socialization of 
production forces and the capitalist individual ownership, will not be able to be solved 
but will become more and more intense. Economic, political and social crises are still 
occurring. The motion of these intrinsic contradictions and the struggle of working 
people will decide the destiny of capitalism… According to the evolution law of 
history, human race will certainly advance to socialism. (VCP, 2011a: online) 
Both the 2011 Agenda and the resolution of the XI National Congress affirmed: 
Advancing to socialism is the aspiration of our people, the rightful choice of the VCP 
and President Ho Chi Minh, in line with the evolving trend of history (VCP, 2011a and 
2011b: online).  
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Socialism was regulated in all the constitutions of the country after independence (National 
Assembly, 1980, 1992, 2013). Socialism was regulated clearly in Vietnam’s first post-war 
constitution passed in 1980. While the 1959 constitution referred to socialism in a very general 
and subtle manner, the 1980 document asserted the socialist character of the country and 
specified elements and steps of building socialism. The latter stated that ‘the SRV advances 
directly from a small economy into socialism, skipping the stage of capitalism’. The 1950 
document did not put the connotation ‘socialist’ next to the state and affirmed the existence of 
a variety of ownership forms in the transition. In the 1980 constitution, the state was definitely 
confirmed as the socialist state, which were consolidating socialist ownership system 
composing of two parts: the state economy under the people ownership and the cooperative 
economy under the collective ownership of working people. Both the 1992 and 2013 
constitutions affirmed that Vietnam was in the transition to socialism and the state in the 
country is a socialist state ‘of the people, by the people, for the people’ (cua nhan dan, do nhan 
dan, vi nhan dan) (National Assembly, 1992 and 2013) 
The symbiosis between socialism and national independence is increasingly popular in the 
communist discourse. National independence and socialism are represented as two sides of the 
same coin: Vietnam could not have become and could not remain independent if it does not 
adopt and follow socialism. This pre-reform articulation is preserved, brought forward and 
widely circulated in the communist discourse in the present time. The symbiosis between 
national independence and socialism is ubiquitous in the party documents.  
National independence is directly tied to socialism (VCP, 1991: online). 
National independence is the first condition to implement socialism and socialism is 
the firm foundation of national independence. Building socialism and protecting the 
socialist country are two strategic tasks that are closely related (VCP, 2011a: online). 
The term ‘determination in the goals of national independence and socialism’ (kiên định mục 
tiêu độc lập dân tộc và chủ nghĩa xã hội) is popularly circulated in both writings and speeches 
of the VCP. 
We have to be determined in Marxist-Leninism, Ho Chi Minh’s ideology and the goals 
of national independence and socialism (VCP, 2006: online). 
Under any condition and situation, it is vital to… be determined in the goals of national 
independence and socialism (VCP, 2011b: online). 
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The symbiosis between national independence and socialism is articulated to be a core lesson 
of Vietnam’s revolution. The combination between national independence and socialism has 
been taught as a political idea in Ho Chi Minh’s ideology to undergraduates in Vietnam. Since 
the establishment of the SRV in 1976, Marxist-Leninism has been the only foreign ideology in 
Vietnam’s political education. At the present, it is compulsory for all undergraduates to study 
three political subjects in the country. One of them is Marxist-Leninism, the other two are Ho 
Chi Minh’s ideology and the VCP’s revolutionary guideline. Ho Chi Minh’s ideology appeared 
as a political subject in 1991, 5 years after the launch of Reform and just after the falling of 
Berlin wall. The VCP’s revolutionary guideline is more like a historical autobiography of the 
VCP.  
Socialism does not only signify national independence but also a happy and fulfilled 
life. It signifies a utopia where the communists are leading the people into. 
The socialist society that our people are building is a society: which is composed of 
wealthy people, strong country, democracy, equality and civilisation; being owned by 
the people, possessing a highly-developed economy based on modern productive forces 
and compatible advanced productive relations; having a progressive culture but full of 
nationalist characteristics; where the people have enough to eat and to wear, have 
freedom and happiness, have the condition to fully ; where all ethnic communities are 
equal and united, respect and support each other to co-develop; having a law-ruled 
socialist State of the people, by the people and for the people led by the Communist 
Party; having a friendship and cooperative relationship with other countries in the 
world. (VCP, 2011a: online) 
The XI National Congress in 2011 proclaimed that ‘only socialism can ensure our nation to 
have true independence and freedom, our country to develop prosperously and our people to 
enjoy happy lives’ (VCP, 2011b: online). As the central element that defines socialism in 
Vietnam, the leadership of the communist Party is put forward in the communist discourse as 
the indispensable condition for Vietnam to succeed in its national safeguarding and national 
construction.  
The Association between the Party and the Nation 
The leadership of the VCP in post-independence Vietnam is cast in the national 
terms. It is presented as the only condition that ensures the success of Vietnam’s national 
defence and construction both in the past and in the future. In the IV Congress in 1976, the 
Party’s leadership was assessed to be the source element of the victory over the French and 
181 
 
the United States to liberate and unify the country (VCP, 1976). However, the articulation 
that the leadership of the Party is the necessary condition to enable Vietnam’s national 
defence and construction in the future to succeed is a new intervention of the post-reform 
period.  Not only past achievements but also all possible achievements in the future are pre-
determined to be attributed to the rightful leadership of the Party. The Party’s leadership 
was hailed as ‘the indispensable condition for the success of the national safeguarding and 
construction’ (VCP, 1989: online) and as ‘the vital factor determining the success of the 
renovation process’ (VCP, 1991a: online). The metaphor that the Party’s flag was ‘always 
winning’ (bách chiến, bách thắng) is very common in the present discourse of the 
Vietnamese Communists.  
The association between the communist Party’s leadership and the success of 
Vietnam’s revolution is reasserted in the two ‘Agenda on National Construction in the 
Transition to Socialism’ as one of the five crucial lessons of Vietnam’s revolution. 
The Party’s rightful leadership is the primary factor ensuring the victories of Vietnam’s 
revolution. The Party does not have any other interest other than the interest of serving 
the nation and the people (VCP, 1991b and 2011b: online).  
This lesson is said to be withdrawn from experiences in reality: ‘The reality of our country’s 
revolution has proved that in Vietnam, except of the Communist Party, there is no other 
political force that is able to handle the leading role assigned by the history’ (VCP, 1991b: 
online). The statement that only the communist Party can lead Vietnam to success is an un-
foundational claim. It may be true that the VCP had lead Vietnam to victory in the fight against 
the French and in national unification, the articulation that history has assigned the VCP with 
the task of leading the country and that only the VCP can bring Vietnam to victory is no more 
than a fairy tale. 
The leading role of the VCP in Vietnam has been constitutionalised in all the 
constitutions of the SRV.  
The VCP, the pioneers and think tank of Vietnam’s working class, is armed with 
Marxist-Leninism, is the sole leader of the state and society; is the primary factor 
deciding every victory of Vietnam’s revolution. The Party exists and make effort for 
the benefit of the working class and Vietnamese people. Party’s organisations operate 
under the framework of the Constitution (National Assembly, 1980: online). 
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The VCP, the vanguard of the Vietnamese working class, the loyal representative of 
the interest of the workers’ class, the working class and of the whole nation, adhering 
to Marxist-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thoughts, is the leading force of the State and 
society (National Assembly, 1992: online). 
The VCP – the vanguard of the workers’ class, of Vietnamese working people and the 
whole nation, the loyal representative of the interest of workers’ class, working people 
and the whole nation, adopting Marxist-Lennism as the ideological foundation – is the 
leading force of the State and society (National Assemble, 2013: online). 
The SRV’s constitutions do not only regulate the sole leadership of the VCP in Vietnam 
but also the hegemonic relation between the Party and the nation. In the VCP’s claims to 
represent the nation and its interests, the nation is constituted as such. The relation that the 
Party represents the interest of the whole nation is not an objective relationship, but a discursive 
one. The nation or the Vietnamese people that the Party claims to represents is a political or 
contaminated universality, a constructed totality (Laclau and Mouffe, 1980: xiii). 
The Legalization of the Protection of the Socialist Regime 
After with the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and, the 
socialist regime, which is understood here as the VCP, its leadership and the socialist state, has 
become a subject of protection under the law in Vietnam. What makes the legalization of the 
protection of the socialist regime possible is the discursive equation between the communist 
party, and the socialist state with the nation. The existence and application of these legal 
documents contributes to produce and perpetuate the understanding the socialist regime is part 
of the nation.  
References to stability and security emerged and became more popular in the 
Vietnamese communist discourse around the early 1990s, when the socialist system was 
collapsing in the Soviet Union and Eastern European. ‘Only with political stability can social 
and economic conditions be stable and developed’ (VCP, 1990). This statement was a stark 
contrast to the war time motto, which emphasized the only way to survive and to improve living 
condition was to fight against the France and the American-backed South government, which 
meant causing political instability. Taylor (2001: 198) remarks that while the leadership’s 
buzzwords were openness and renovation in the early 1990s, its prominent concern was 
security and stability by the end of the century. In this concern with security and stability, the 
socialist regime made itself become a subject of legal protection.  
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The protection of the socialist regime is regulated in the Criminal Code, the law on 
National Security passed in 2014 and the White Papers on National Defence. All versions of 
the Criminal Codes of post-war Vietnam (1985, 1999 and 2015) contain one whole chapter 
dedicated to crimes violating national security. Article 108 entitled ‘Treason’ of the 2015 
Criminal Code, the first article of the chapter of crimes violating national security, reads: 
Any Vietnamese citizen, who cooperate with foreign elements to do harm to the 
independence, sovereignty, unification and territory of the country, socialism and the 
State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, national defence and security, is sentenced 
to from 12 years’ to 20 years’ imprisonment, life imprisonment or death penalty. 
(National Assembly, 2015: online) 
In this article, socialism and the socialist state are put alongside the national independence and 
unification. The violation of socialism is considered the same as the violation of the nation. In 
the Law on National Security passed in 2004, national security is defined to be ‘the stability 
and sustainable development of the socialist regime and the State of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, the inalienability of the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of 
the Fatherland’ (National Assembly, 2014: online). All the White Papers on National Defence 
of Vietnam define one of the tasks of national defence as to ensure Vietnam’s socialist regime 
(MOD, 1998, 2004, 2009). The introduction of concepts of ‘national security’ and ‘national 
defence’ and the laws and legal documents that accompany them contributes to produce and 
perpetuate the equation between the socialist regime and the nation in the communist discourse. 
The legalization of the protection of the socialist regime and the socialist state has been 
achieved at the expense of erasing the distinction between concepts of the nation and the state 
and the party. The effect of this meaning fusion is the protection of the socialist regime, 
including the communist Party and the socialist state, by the force of law, criminalizing all 
actions against socialism and the VCP’s leadership in present Vietnam.  
Conclusion 
 Since reunification in 1976, throughout the Reform process until present, the communist 
discourse has been able to maintain its hegemony in Vietnam. The meanings of socialism, the 
party’s representation of the nation and its leading role were found with more continuities than 
changes in the communist discourse. The Reform is represented as a continuity, rather than a 
rupture in the socialist imaginary. Socialism still holds powerful grips in this discourse. In a 
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very recent state ceremony to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the October Russian 
Revolution, General Secretary of the VCP, Nguyen Phu Trong, asserted that Vietnam would be 
determined in following Marxist-Leninism and was firmly stepping towards socialism (VCP, 
2017: online). 
The continuity of the socialist imaginary in the communist discourse is founded first 
and foremost on the symbiosis between socialism and nationalism. As national independence 
has been naturalised as the indispensable condition for the Vietnamese people to survive and 
to thrive in the national imaginary, socialism is articulated as the only means to ensure national 
independence. Firm determination with the combination of national independence and 
socialism is one of the core value in Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, a compulsory political subject 
for Vietnamese undergraduates. ‘[O]nly socialism can ensure our nation to have true 
independence and freedom, our country to develop prosperously and our people to enjoy happy 
lives’ (VCP, 2011b: online). 
The continuity of the socialist imaginary in post-independence Vietnam is consolidated 
in the Vietnamese communists’ knowledge claim that Marxist-Leninism is scientific and 
reflects true objective conditions of human society. Whenever Marxist-Leninism and the law 
on the development of human society are still recognised as ‘the scientific truth’, the socialist 
imaginary will be still able to exert its power. Although dissidents in Vietnam have never been 
absent, the vast majorities of their activities are anti-party and anti-government. The foundation 
claim to power of the VCP, which is Marxist-Leninism, has not been subjects to much 
criticism. Given that Marxist-Leninism is the only international political thought taught in the 
country, Vietnam’s political imagination is far from being diverse enough to give rise to any 
serious disruptions to the VCP’s political ideology and its sole leadership in Vietnam.  
The equation between the socialist regime and the nation in the communist discourse 
is also another discursive mechanism that enables the continuity of socialism in present 
Vietnam. This equation was established during the war and was further consolidated in the 
post-war period. During the Reform process, it has been brought into the legal field. The 
socialist regime, which includes the VCP and the Vietnamese socialist state, is articulated as 
an element of national security, which is protected by law. The legalization of the protection 
of the socialist regime is made on the premise of the protection of the nation. However, as the 
law exists and continues to be interpreted and applied as such, the equation between the nation 
and the socialist regime is legalized and is, at the same time, produced and taken for granted. 
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The distinction between the party and the nation is becoming blurred in the communist 
discourse. The discursive fusion between the nation and the socialist regime has made possible 
the making of these laws on national security, producing material forces in blocking alternative 
routes of political practices, enabling the continuity of the sole leadership of the VCP in present 
Vietnam. 
However, Vietnam is not yet a socialist country as its name suggests. While ensuring 
socialism in the Reform process, the establishment of socialism was obviously deferred. By 
conceptualizing the transition into socialism as a series of steps, the actual realization of 
socialism was temporarily deferred while still functioning as a social imaginary. This linguistic 
articulation also worked to break the link between socialism and economic failures as the 
conditions in Vietnam around 1980 could have possibly amounted to. As long as the Reform is 
in place, socialist economic policies are not to be implemented in Vietnam. The only element 
that renders Vietnam appear a socialist country at present is the monopolistic leadership of the 
Party that bears the connotation ‘Communist’.  
The meaning of socialism in the VCP’s discourse can never be fixed once and for all. 
The reason is, as I have attempted to show, there is no such things as the inherent central 
meaning of this concept. The meaning of socialism has been established on the relations with 
other concepts including national independence, peace and prosperity, which are also empty in 
themselves except for all the linguistic articulation that made up their existence. The very 
meaning of socialism is only constructed on its own deferment, always delaying the actual 
realization of something called socialism. Present Vietnam in the Reform process is exactly the 
deferment of socialism. Existing capitalist economic policies are justified as necessary in order 
to achieve the actual realisation of socialism in the future. Socialism in Vietnam is always in 








Chapter 10: Conclusion 
10.1. Core Findings 
This research critically studies the national frame in which the communist-led 
revolution in Vietnam has always been cast. Using post-structuralist discourse theory, it studies 
the process whereby the nation was imagined and became ‘real’ in the Vietnamese communist 
discourse and how this national imagining contributed to the legitimization of the socialist state 
in Vietnam. Its central argument is that the Vietnamese nation is a discursive construct which 
enabled the communist party and the socialist state to acquire legitimacy in Vietnam. This 
argument is arrived based on three findings of the research. Firstly, the Vietnamese nation was 
constructed in the communist discourse in the very representation of French colonists, 
American interventionalists and their sponsored governments as enemies of the nation. French 
colonialization, the U.S. intervention and their sponsored governments were constructed as the 
social antagonisms that were to blame for all the problems and miseries ongoing in Vietnam. 
They were read as foreign plots to kill the Vietnamese people and to destroy the Vietnamese 
nation. The French and the Americans were cast foreign invaders who only came to rob and 
exploit the Vietnamese. The Bao Dai government of the Associate State of Vietnam and the 
southern government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were both presented as the 
puppets of the invaders and the enemies of the nation. 
Secondly, the nation was able to be imagined to be more real among the mass in the 
discursive fixing of national independence as the indispensable condition for the survival of 
the Vietnamese people, which occurred around the 1945 August Revolution. The myth that a 
Vietnamese nation was exploited and brought to the verge of extinction by the French colonists 
was circulated in the pre-communist colonial Vietnam and brought into the communist 
discourse since its inception in the middle of the 1920s. However, it was until the 1940s and 
1950s that this myth was able to take hold among the Vietnamese mass and transferred into a 
social imaginary whereby the significance of national independence had been taken for 
granted. A number of contingent events during the Japanese occupation made possible the 
fixing of the equation between national independence and the survival of the Vietnamese 
people. Many Vietnamese had become a national subject in the communist discourse as they 
joined the Viet Minh-led struggle for national liberation. The national imaginary was further 
consolidated during the war against the Americans as they were presented as yet another 
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national enemy just like the French and the Japanese before them. The significance of national 
independence as the condition of survival had become the national common sense in Vietnam.  
Last, this national imagination enabled the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) and its 
socialist state to legalize its rule in Vietnam through the establishment of a symbiosis between 
nationalism and socialism in the Vietnamese communist discourse. While the existence of 
nation was being naturalized and the significance of national independence was being taken 
for granted, a hegemonic articulation occurred in the communist discourse from the early 1950s 
to discursively link socialism with nationalism. The Communist Party started to claim to 
represent the whole nation and socialism was presented as the only way to achieve national 
unification and independence. After the unification of Vietnam under the communist rule in 
1976, socialism was increasingly enmeshed with national independence, the Party’s leadership 
articulated as the indispensable condition for Vietnam’s national construction and 
development. The Reform, in which the economy was geared towards capitalism, was 
represented as a continuity, rather than a rupture in the socialist imaginary. The installation of 
socialism in Vietnam was also founded in the knowledge claims about the scientific Marxist-
Leninist law on the evolution of human society, according to which human race will certainly 
advance to socialism (VCP, 1991 and 2011a). Moreover, the socialist regime and the nation 
are fused with each other in the language of national security and national defence, which made 
possible the protection of the party and the socialist state in the name of the nation. In return, 
the language and application of the law on national security and national defence contributes 
to further blurring the distinction between the socialist regime and the nation, producing 
material forces in blocking alternative routes of political practices, enabling the continuity of 
the sole leadership of the VCP and socialism in present Vietnam. 
These findings correspond to three main discursive constructions in the Vietnamese 
communist discourse, which are now very much taken for granted as the national common 
sense in the country. The first is the constitution of the nation as a ‘real’ existence through the 
construction of foreign intervention as the cause of all ongoing problems and miseries inside 
the nation. The second is the equation between national independence with the survival of the 
Vietnamese people. The third is the associations between the national elements with socialist 
elements (national independence with socialism and the socialist regime with the nation). 
Although I present these processes in this research in a temporal order, I do not mean that they 
occur in a neat time-ordered fashion where one process finishes completely before the other 
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starts. As discursive processes to fix meanings in a particular way, they require continuous 
circulation and repetition of articulations. These processes are still going on as, otherwise, the 
entity or the meanings they constitute will cease to exist. Moreover, these discursive processes 
do not happen separately but are mutually dependent on each other and reinforce each other.  
The nation-making project of the Vietnamese communists is essentially a political 
project. It makes possible the establishment of socialism and allows the VCP to attain a 
monopolistic rule in Vietnam. It rules out other possibilities in Vietnamese politics, for 
example the possibility of having a non-communist government. It involves the destruction of 
enemies outside and inside the national self, whether they are foreign or Vietnamese, and the 
sacrifice of its own subjects to protect this national self. Moreover, the national identities of 
the Vietnamese communists and the boundaries of their national project are not objective but 
politically decided. The Vietnamese communists previously claimed to represent only the 
working class and made an enemy of other classes within the Vietnamese population. The 
boundaries of the nation used to be articulated to be close with the limits of the peasantry. This 
is in stark contrast with the VCP’s present claim to represent the whole nation.  
Moreover, the constitution of the nation in the communist discourse is not finished 
when the national myth was transferred into a social imaginary or when the state was formed 
or when the war ended. As the nation has ‘no ontologically status apart from the various acts 
that constitute its reality’ (Campbell, 1998: 9), these various acts have to constantly in operation 
in order for to reproduce the existence of the nation. The violence involved in the communist-
led struggles against the French colonialism, the U.S. intervention and the southern 
government, together with the national frame that these struggles were cast, ‘reinforce the sense 
of groupness, not its result’ (Brubaker, 2004: 19). As Renan (1990: 19) has observed ‘suffering 
in common unifies more than joy does’, the suffering that the Vietnamese had endured during 
these wars helps to unify the Vietnamese more. After independence, the Vietnamese people 
are still constantly reminded that they are rooted in a same family, that they share the same 
heroic past and a distinct culture.  
The equation between national independence and the survival of the Vietnamese people 
and the symbiosis between nationalism and socialism also need to be unceasingly reproduced. 
In all kinds of documents produced by the entire administrative system of the state in Vietnam, 
from the police to schools, and in all correspondence of citizens to all state organs, there must 
be a header, which states:  
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The Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
Independence – Freedom - Happiness 
These seemingly benign wordings also play a part in constituting and, at the same time, 
reminding about the association between the socialist regime, independence, freedom and 
happiness. The existence and application of the legal regulations on national security play a role 
in naturalizing the equivalence between the socialist regime, whether it is the Communist Party 
or the Socialist state, with the nation.  The communist movement in Vietnam have become 
‘national not only in form but in substance, i.e., nationalist’ as Hobsbawm (1977: 13) observed 
about Marxist movements. ‘There is nothing to suggest that this trend will not continue’ (ibid). 
The nationalist elements have been intimately imbedded in the Vietnamese communist 
discourse. The discursive formation that it constructs, which is erected on the three nodal points 
‘revolution’, ‘nation’ and ‘socialism’, still functions as ‘a surface of inscription of a wider range 
of demands, views and attitudes’ (Torfing, 1999: 101). Revolution is fixed as the need to change 
Vietnam for the better. A nation independent from foreign rule is fixed as the condition to ensure 
the survival and existence of the Vietnamese people. Socialism is fixed as the indispensable 
condition for the preservation of national independence and for the country to develop and 
modernise. Hegemony requires the construction of a universality or a seemingly total structure 
so that a particularity can speak in the name of this universality. The universality in the 
Vietnamese communist discourse is not the working class or the proletariat but the nation. The 
nation is put out as the universality to be protected so that the communists can speak and act in 
the name of this constructed nation.   
 The knowledge regime that is embedded in the Vietnamese communist discourse is 
composed of a system of inter-related knowledge claims. Firstly, the existence of the 
Vietnamese nation is an unquestionable fact. Secondly, any foreign intervention, whether it is 
the Chinese occupation, French colonisation and American intervention, was only a vicious 
plot to kill and exploit the people and to destroy the country. National independence is the first 
and foremost condition for the Vietnamese people to survive and to thrive. Thirdly, the law of 
the development of human society in Marxist-Leninism, which foresees the collapse of 
capitalism and the appearance of socialism as the highest stage in the development of human 
society, is taken as the scientific truth in the political imagination in Vietnam. Fourthly, the 
equivalence between socialism and national independence is also taken as the political truth. 
The socialist system and the leadership of the Communist Party are constructed as the 
indispensable conditions for Vietnam to attain and maintain national independence. The 
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adoption of socialism in Vietnam does not only help Vietnam to carry out the national cause, 
but also is in line with the science of Marxist-Leninism. 
 The Vietnamese communist discourse has been playing the role of ideology in Marxist 
sense in justifying the rule of the ruling class. It invests in the character of inevitability and 
validity to the political and historical view of the Vietnamese communists. In order to represent 
its own interests as the shared values of all members of the society in question,’ the ruling class 
has to invest its views with the character of inevitability and convince everyone that these ideas 
are the only serious option’, the one way of understanding the world that is genuinely sensible 
and valid (Marx and Engels quoted in Belsey, 2002: 32).  
 The establishment of socialism and the leadership of the Communist Party are 
articulated as inevitable in the Vietnamese communist discourse. Although since the launch of 
Reform in 1986, Vietnam has embraced a capitalist economy and socialism is being deferred 
in the country, the vision towards socialism has never been silent in this discourse. ‘If history 
refused to conform to the theory, that did not validate the theory for the Marxist faithful, but 
merely delayed its eventual, inevitable success’ (Sim, 2002: 81). The Vietnamese Communists 
are exactly those Marxist faithful, who embraces wholeheartedly the grand narrative of 
Marxism, which claim that its theories are based on the principles of modern science (Butler, 
2002: 14). The Vietnamese discourse is itself part of this Marxist grand narrative, basing its 
legitimation on the claim to science. Science is conceptualized in Marxism as an objective, 
value-free discovery of reality and/or the law of reality as in the discourse of modernity.  
 The Vietnamese communism appears immune to the leftist critique of science (as in 
post-modernism, post-structuralism and feminism). In this critique, science is less a means of 
revealing reality than a technique of constructing particular realities and truths. Accordingly, 
scientist have no such privilege of knowing the nature of nature, ‘they promote just ‘one story 
among many’, their pretensions are unjustified’ (Butler, 2002: 38). Such a critique will be able 
to deconstruct the claim to truth and the inevitable narrative of the Vietnamese communists.  
10.2. Contribution to the Existing Literature 
 This research extends the existing literature on exposing the constructed nature of the 
Vietnamese nation with a novel approach. Although the application of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
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discourse theory to nationalism is not new15, this is the first study that use discourse theory in 
the case of Vietnamese nationalism. This approach has enabled the conceptualization of the 
Vietnamese communism as a discourse in the post-structuralist sense, which is the world of 
meanings and subjectivities embraced by the Vietnamese communists. By following the 
communist discourse throughout the history of communism in Vietnam, this research is able 
to trace how the national common senses have taken shape and to reveal the central role of 
these commons senses in legitimatizing the socialist state. This is also the first work that studies 
the relationship between nationalism and socialism in Vietnam in discursive terms. 
In conceptualizing communism in Vietnam as a discourse, this research provides a new 
way of understanding Vietnamese politics, which is a struggle to fix meanings. The communist 
movement in Vietnam is to be approached not as driven by ideology, whether it is nationalism 
or communism, neither as driven by the thirst for power, but as a particular discourse emerging 
in colonial Vietnam as the intellectuals were contemplating their selves and their collective 
identity in the encounter with the modern West under the French colonisation. This discourse 
did not arrive in Vietnam with fixed set of meanings and stable identities. The production of 
meanings and the constitution of subjects were subject to contingent events and developments 
occurring along the course of history. The successes of the communist-led movements to fight 
against French colonists and the U.S. interventionists were made possible by the subjectivities 
and meanings produced in the communist discourse. The ongoing socialism and the 
monopolistic leadership of the Communists Party in Vietnam are also made possible by the 
constitution of meanings in this discourse.  
Existing literature on Vietnamese politics are mostly premised on pre-defined 
categories of the state, civil society and political legitimacy or dissent to explain the endurance 
of the monopolistic rule of the CPV. Forde (2009: 9) has criticised that analyses that assume a 
stable ontology of those political concepts and impose ready-made categories ‘will read 
meanings into the situation that reflects observers’ varying prior assumptions and beliefs’. This 
research approaches Vietnamese politics at the ontological level, to examine how a political 
concept (the nation) is constituted as such and the political implications of its constitution. 
Instead of taking the boundaries between human groups for granted, this research has focused 
on how social boundaries between human collectives are erected and maintained. Instead of 
                                                        
15 There have been a few studies that apply discourse theory to nationalism including the 
works of Sutherland (2002), Al-Azmed (1993), Mastnak (1989, 1991). 
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explaining Vietnamese politics by its present manifestations, this research provides a historical 
analysis of how the present came to be constituted through past discursive practices. It offers a 
historical and contextual account of Vietnamese politics, conveying contingencies and 
ambiguities. This research exposes not only the constructed nature of the Vietnamese nation 
but also the embedded power relationship between statehood and nationhood in the country. It 
brings one established argument in the existing post-structuralist literature on nationalism that 
‘nationalism is a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy’ (Campbell, 1992: 11) to the 
Vietnamese case.  
  Besides contributing to the literature on nationalism and politics of Vietnam, this 
research has also enriched the growing literature on the political culture of the Cold war, which 
argues that ‘the Cold war was a competition over discourse’ and seeks to break the ‘constraints 
in the poverty of our political imagination’ (Appy, 2000: 6-8). It has revealed one Cold War 
script, a Vietnamese Communist way to perceive and engage in the struggle for the world. This 
way of imagination runs opposed to the narrative of different U.S. actors, but no less authentic 
and ‘real’ in its own right. After all, this research presents one interpretation of the Cold war, 
which was embraced by millions of Vietnamese with their own life and blood. 
10.3. Evaluation  
  This research is one of the first attempts to bring the leftist critique into the case of 
Vietnam. It is a critical project in the sense that it aims to unmask ‘the taken-for-granted, 
naturalized knowledge’ (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2012: 1985) constituted in the communist 
discourse and to critique the scientific truth that the Vietnamese communists claim to possess. 
This research is not only a study of Vietnamese nationalism per se but also a study of the 
foundational claims to power of the Vietnamese communists.   
However, this study does not claim to have produced a knowledge closer to the truth, 
either. Adhering to the anti-foundational premise that ‘all knowledge is discursively produced 
and therefore contingent’, including scientific knowledge (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2012: 175), 
this research rejects ‘the possibility of absolute knowledge’. Although the knowledge produced 
in this research is scientific because it applies a specific theory which enables the researcher to 
distance himself/herself from everyday understanding and it uses specific rules to produce a 
knowledge which is not normally available within the everyday context (ibid: 207), I only 
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claim to have provided a different knowledge about Vietnamese nationalism and communism 
for a wider democratic discussion. 
The version of reality which one puts forward in research is not better than any other at the level 
of principle, and it can always be cast aside through discursive struggles both within the 
scientific field and in the public sphere as a whole. But by representing a qualified (that is, 
scientific) and different account of reality from those which are otherwise available, research 
knowledge can hopefully contribute to the addition of new perspectives to public debate. 
(Jorgensen and Phillips, 2012:  210) 
The communist-led struggle against colonisation and foreign intervention less a war for 
national independence than a project of self-identification, a project of restructuring the 
dislocated society in its totality. Conceptualizing Vietnamese communism as a discourse has 
allowed this research to examine the operation of this identification project in organising and 
restructuring meanings and identities. When a discourse has attained hegemony, it has 
successfully naturalized its constructed system of meanings and identities as common sense. 
Real effects have been produced at the level of social actions. Millions of Vietnamese have lost 
their lives and or had their lives profoundly altered in supporting or opposing to this hegemonic 
project. The possibility of having a non-communist government in Vietnam has been ruled out. 
The hegemony of the Vietnamese communist discourse has enabled the Communist Party to 
attain a hegemonic position and maintain their sole leadership in the whole Vietnam for more 
than 30 years since the war ended. In explaining the appeal of the communist-led struggle 
against the American intervention in Vietnam, Kolko (1997) also observed an equivalence 
between the nationalist and social causes as the core causal factor. ‘The masses had confidence 
that the nationalist and social causes were identical and the latter was in their objective interest’ 
(Kolko, 1997:19 – 20). However, this research does not see the relationship between discourse 
and reality in a causal relation. Nor does it wish to comment of the rationality of the knowledge 
produced in discourse. Social action and behaviour is part of the discourse itself. Social action 
is made possible in discourse, but in return it is also an articulation of discourse. ‘The order 
with which we identity is accepted not because of its rationality, but because it brings about the 
possibility of an order, of a certain regularity’ (Laclau, 1994: 3). The order put out in discourse 
is only a possibility of an order, its realisation is accomplished at the expense of other possible 
orders. The materialisation of the possibility that Vietnamese Communists became the ruling 
group in Vietnam when the communist discourse is accepted is attained on the cancellation of 
other possibilities. The vision of a Vietnamese nation under the tutelage of France was ruled 
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out. The possibility of having a non-communist government in the South and in the whole 
Vietnam was violently eradicated.  
 Laclau’s comment (1994: 1) that ‘the end of the Cold War has also been the end of the 
globalizing ideologies that had dominated the political arena since 1945’ appears invalid in the 
case of Vietnam. The Cold War discourse, ‘the attempt to legitimate one’s own ideology by 
presenting it as a fulfilment of a universal task’ (ibid) and as the only valid truth, is still 
omnipresent in the discourse of the Vietnamese communists. The suspicion that ‘any kind of 
universal grounding’ is supposed to be contemplated with in Laclau’s judgement (1994) has 
not arrived in the academic discussion about the rule of the communists in Vietnam. This 
research may be a late attempt in criticizing the globalizing ideologies of the Cold War on an 
international scale, but is by no means late in the case of the Vietnamese communist discourse. 
It is the first attempt to deconstruct the universalizing ideology of the Vietnamese communists 
in its particularities and in its specific historical context. It will be especially a novel 
interpretation to the Vietnamese audience.  
 As a ‘history of the present’, this research has been trying to show that the present is 
the result of contingent processes. The August Revolution in 1945, which saw the 
establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, was the result of an ensemble of 
contingent events including the World War II, the Japanese occupation, the severe famine in 
1944 and 1945, and most of all the French colonialization. The existence of socialism and the 
leadership of the communist party in Vietnam was the result of a bundle of discursive 
articulations and processes which make up the knowledge claim about the nature and 
significance of the nation, national independence, socialism and the world. These knowledges 
are not necessarily true. Some are even obviously false, for example the claim about the dying 
capitalism taken from Marxism, which has been on in the Vietnamese communist discourse 
since its early days until the present time. However, they have significantly contributed to and 
are still playing a part in enabling the Communist Party to attain and maintain its hegemonic 
rule in Vietnam.  
 There may be arguments that Vietnam is now only socialist in rhetoric as its current 
economy and mass consumption are similar to those in a capitalist country. However, even if 
the Vietnamese do not believe in Marxism-Leninism and socialism any more, they still act as 
if Marxism-Leninism is the only valid political ideology and socialism is the political system 
of the country. After all, Marxism-Leninism is the only international political ideology 
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embraced in Vietnam. All students in Vietnam have to learn Marxist-Leninism and Ho Chi 
Minh’s ideology during their first years in universities. After all, the Communist Party is still 
the only ruling party in Vietnam. Not only the number of Party members is growing rapidly, 
but also the percentage of the Party’s members in the whole population is also on the rise, 
especially after the Reform was launched.  




Percentage of Party’s 
members in the Population 
1960 500,000 32,670,623 1.5 % 
1975-1976 1,550,000 48,729,397 3.2% 
1990-1991 2,155,022 68,209,604 3.2% 
2015-2016 4,500,00018 93,447,601 4.8% 
Even if many people may join the Party not for ideological reasons, but for pragmatic purposes, 
in what they do (by joining the Communist Party), they act as if they support and believe in the 
Communist Party, Marxist-Leninism and Socialism. To post-structuralist discourse analysts, it 
is what people are actually doing that count, not the intentions and feelings of the actors. The 
hegemony of the Vietnamese communist contains elements of the ‘ideological fantasy’ of 
Zizek (quoted in Torfing, 1999: 116). Zizek’s ideology fantasy is reserved for the illusion 
which is structuring the real social activity, not on the level of knowledge. It accounts for those 
phenomena in which even though people ‘know very well how things really are, but they still 
they doing it as if they did not know’ (ibid). An example of ideological fantasy is commodity 
fetishism, in which people act as if money is the real wealth even though they may well know 
that money functions as the universal embodiment of commodities, not the commodities 
themselves. Ideological fantasy in this case compensates for the fact that some people, at the 
level of knowledge, may be not convinced by the totalizing propositions of the Vietnamese 
communist discourse, they still act in the support of the reality constructed in this discourse.  
                                                        
16 Source: http://www.bacgiang.gov.vn/ves-portal/29500/Dang-Cong-san-Viet-Nam-qua-
cac-ky-Dai-hoi.html [accessed on December 4th 2017]. 
17 Source: https://danso.org/viet-nam/ [accessed on December 4th 2017]. 
18Source:http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/chinhphu/NuocCHXHCNVietNam/Th




10.4. Limitations and Recommendation for Future Research 
 This research has provided an analysis of the constitution of nationalism in the 
communist discourse in Vietnam from the mid-1920s until the present time. According to the 
research design of Hansen (2006: 74), this is the study of one single Self, the Vietnamese 
communists, with the analytical focus as the official discourse. Although I have tried to include 
the stories as told from different actors involved, the inclusion is sketchy and is based on the 
existing literature. If this research could include an analysis of competing discourses, such as 
that of Bao Dai’s government (the Vietnamese monarchy 1926 – 1945), the State of Vietnam 
(1949 – 1955) and the Republic of Vietnam (1955 – 1975), or an analysis of popular culture, it 
would have stronger foundations for assessing the hegemony of the communist discourse and 
the degree of stability this discourse enjoys within the wider political and public sphere. 
However, within the framework of the PhD project and given the long historical development 
covered, the focus on one Self is justifiable. Moreover, as a historical genealogy, this research 
has been able to cover the transformations and contestations within the Self of the Vietnamese 
Communists. The boundaries of the revolutionary identity forged in the communist discourse 
haven been shown to be negotiable and contestable. The national identities of the Vietnamese 
Communists are not objective but political decided.  
In conceptualising the Vietnamese communism as a discourse competing in the struggle 
to make meaning and produce identities as Vietnam encountered the modern world, this 
research provides a new way of researching the politics of Vietnam. This study has shown how 
the meaning and significance of the nation has been articulated and stabilized as a nodal point 
in the communist discourse. The communist discourse in Vietnam has been able to incorporate 
national elements into its discursive system, turning them into its internal moments. Concepts 
of the nation as well as national independence have contributed to the promotion of socialism 
and to the leadership of the Communist Party rather than doing the opposite. It would be 
interesting to see how other key concepts of modernity such as development, democracy and 
human rights are articulated in the Vietnamese communist discourse. Such studies would be 
able to supplement this study in giving a fuller view of the politics of meaning-production of 
the communist discourse and in deconstructing the foundational claims to knowledge, that is 
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Appendix I: List of Abbreviations 
 
 
DRV:        The Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
ICP:          The Indochinese Communist Party 
MOD:         Ministry of Defence 
MOET:       Ministry of Education and Training 
NA:             The National Assembly  
NLF:           The National Liberation Front or the National Front for the Liberation of South 
Vietnam 
RVN:         The Republic of Vietnam 
SRV:          The Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
U.S.:           The United States of America 
VCP:          The Vietnamese Communist Party 
VLP:          The Vietnamese Labour Party 














Appendix II: Chronology 
2524 – 258 BC 
 
 
257 – 179 BC 
 
204 – 111 BC 
Van Lang ruled by Hung kings of the Hong Bang dynasty with the 
capital in the presend-day Phu Tho province. 
 
The kingdom of Au Lac ruled by King An Duong Vuong. 
 
Nam Viet ruled by Trieu Da 
 
111 BC – 939 AD Nam Viet ruled by China as the province of Jiaozhou (Giao Chi) 
 
939 - 968 Ngo Quyen overthrows the Chinese, establishes the Ngo dynasty. 
 
968 – 980 
 
 
980 – 1010 
 
1010 – 1225 
 
 
225 – 1400 
 
1400 – 1407 
 






Dinh Bo Linh establishs Dinh dynasty, names his state Dai Co Viet 













Vietnamese conquest of Champa 
 
The Le emperor is killed by Mac Dang Dung, who proclaimed 


















1627 – 1672 













1788 - 1802 
Nguyen Kim, a former official in the Le court, revolt against the Mac 
and restore the Le in a southern court in Thanh Hoa area. 
Nguyen Kim is assassinated and the military power fall into the 
hands of his son-in-law, Trinh Kiem. 
 
Nguyen Hoang, Nguyen Kim’s son, move to the far south provinces 
of present-day Quang Binh to Binh Dinh to be the governor while 
Trinh lords continue the war against the Mac. 
 
The Mac fell. The Le kings act as figureheads. The real power of the 
north belong to Trinh lords. 
 
Nguyen Hoang declare himself Lord and establish the capital in Phu 
Xuan, modern-day Hue. 
 
Trinh-Nguyen war 
While the Trinh lords rule the North, the Nguyen lords rule the South 
and continue the southward expansion into present-day Sai Gon and 
the Mekong delta. 
 
The Tay Son revolution led by three brothers Nguyen Nhac, Nguyen 
Lu and Nguyen Hue breaks out in Qui Nhon, which is under the 
control of Nguyen lords. By 1776, the Tay Son has occupied all the 
Nguyen’s land and kill almost the entire royal family. The surviving 
prince Nguyen Anh flee Vietnam. 
 
The Tay Son march North and defeat the Trinh lords. The last Le 
emperor, Le Chieu Thong, flee to China. 
 
The Tay Son dynasty. 
 
1802 – 1820 
 
Nguyen Anh defeats the Tay Son with the help of the French 







1820 – 1841 
 
1841 – 1847 
 











becomes Emperor Gia Long (reigned 1802-1820), starts the Nguyen 
dynasty in 1802. 
Capital moves to Hue 
 
Reign of Minh Mang 
 
Reign of Thieu Tri 
 
Reign of Tu Duc 
Franco-Spanish expedition attacked Tourane (Da Nang city) 
Vietnam signs the Patenotre treaty with France, recognise France as 
its protector. Vietnam is divided into three regions: Tonkin in the 
North and Annam in the Centre as France’s protectorates and 
Cochinchina in the South as France’s colony. 
Kinh Ham Nghi issue the Royal Edict on Resistance, starting the 
‘Serve the King’ movement (phong trào Cần Vương) 
 
The French Indochinese Union is created, including Vietnam, Laos 















Phan Boi Chau’s The History of the Loss of Vietnam written in 
Chinese is published in Japan. The book lists France’s exploitative 
policies and cruelty in the country. 
 
Nguyen Ai Quoc or Ho Chi Minh leave Vietnam and travel to 
America and Europe. 
 
Nguyen Ai Quoc attend the Fifth Comintern Congress, delivering a 
speech on why the Comintern should pay more attention to the 
natives’ struggle in the colonies. 
 































Nguyen Ai Quoc’s The Indictment of French Colonialism was 
published in France. 
Phan Chu Trinh deliver the speech Easter, Western Morality and 
Ethics (Đạo đức và luân lý Đông Tây) in Sai Gon. 
Nguyen An Ninh deliver the speech The Aspiration of Annamite  
Youth calling Vietnamese Youth to take action against French 
colonisation. 
 
The Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Việt Nam Quôc Dân Đảng – 
VNQDD) is established by Nguyen Thai Hoc (1904 – 1930). 
Nguyen Ai Quoc completes ‘The Road to Revolution’ (Đường cách 
mệnh) as a training document for Youth League’s new members. 
 
The Revolutionary Party of the New Vietnam (Tan Viet) is formed in 
Annam. 
 
VNQDD launch a general revolt, which is suppressed swiftly. 
Nguyen Thai Hoc, VNQDD’s leader, is executed. 
 
A communist Party is formed from members of the Youth League 
and Tan Viet, naming ‘the Vietnamese Communist Party’. 
 
The Vietnamese Communist Party renamed as ‘the Indochinese 
Communist Party’ (ICP). 
 
The First National Congress of the ICP is held in Macao, China. Le 








The ICP is declared illegal and has to retreated to the countryside. 
The 6th plenum of the ICP’s central committee set the task of 





































Japanese troops march into Vietnam. 
The 8th plenum of the ICP’s central committee define national 
liberation as the immediate task of the revolution. 
A new central committee is selected, Truong Chinh as the new 
General Secretary 
The League for the Independence of Vietnam (Viet Minh) is formed 
to bring all Vietnamese into a common front to fight for 
independence 
 
A terrible famine stalk north Vietnam, killing 2 million out of an 8 
million population. 
 
The Japanese take over the direct control of the colonial 
administration. 
ICP’s central committee issue the directive ‘The French-Japanese 
conflict and our action’, pointing the Japanese as the main enemy. 
Japan surrenderst o the Allies. 
 
The general revolt is launched and won by Viet Minh. 
 
Bao Dai abdicates, handing over the sword and seal of the feudal 
court.. 
 
Ho Chi Minh read the declaration of independence in Ba Dinh 
square, proclaimed the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV). 
China occupies Vietnam north of the 16th parallel; British troops 
occupy south of the 16th parallel. 
 
ICP dissolves and is replaced by the Association of Marxist Studies. 
 
The French come back to reassert their colonial rule.  




































The State of Vietnam wis declared with Nguyen Van Xuan as Prime 
Minister and Bao Dai as head of state. 
 
Communists win in China, the People’s Republic of China  (PRC) is 
established. 
 
The communist party resurfaces as the Vietnam’s Labour Party 
(VLP) at the 2nd National Congress. Truong Chinh remains as the 
Secretary General. 
 
At the 4th Plenum, the Party’s Central Committee announce a 
comprehensive land reform. 
 
Viet Minh defeat the French the battle of Dien Bien Phu 
France agreed to grand total independence to all of Vietnam under 
the Geneva Accords. 
Ngo Dinh Diem appointed premier of the state of Vietnam. 
 
President Eisenhower offers Diem unconditional support.  
Diem proclaimed the formation of the Republic of Vietnam over the 
south territory of Vietnam. 
 
The 3rd National Congress of the VLP was held, affirming the plan to 
install socialism in north Vietnam 
 
Diem and his brother, also his advisor, Ngo Dinh Nhu were 
assassinated. 
 
Withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam begins. 
 
Paris peace accords were signed.  
 












In the Party’s IV Congress, the VLP is renamed into the Vietnamese 
Communist Party. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam  
was established. The VCP declare it will expand the socialist project 
from the North to the South, leading the country to proceed swiftly to 
socialism. 
 
The V National Congress state that the establishment of socialism is 

























The VCP’s VI National Congress is held, marking formal reforms. 
the centrally-planned management of the economy and giant 
agricultural collectives are officially abolished, private ownership 
and private trade are allowed. 
The Reform Congress first defines the transition to socialism is a 
prolonged period composed of several stages. Vietnam is reported to 
be in the first stage, whose economy is a multi-sector market 
economy under state management.  
 
The VCP’s VII National Congress affirm the determination toward 
socialism.  
The Agenda on National Construction in the Transition into 
Socialism declares that the human race will finally advance to 
socialism because it is an objective law. 
 
The VIII Congress state that the road to socialism in Vietnam was 
more clearly identified. 
 
The XI Congress’s Agenda and the new 2011 Agenda on National 
Construction in the Transition into Socialism affirm that the advance 
to socialism in Vietnam is in line with the evolving trend of history 




2013 The new constitution preserves the wordings of the 1992 constitution 
that Vietnam was in the transition to socialism and the Vietnamese 
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